ANGOLA:
THE POST-WAR CHALLENGES

COMMON COUNTRY ASSESSMENT 2002

UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM IN ANGOLA

Executive summary

This Common Country Assessment (CCA), conducted jointly by the UN agencies between September 2001 and June 2002, is a comprehensive assessment and analysis of the situation in Angola, aimed at providing a strategic vision for the UN agencies working in the country. It is one of the main inputs into the design of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), a programme framework for the entire UN system that will cover the period from 2004 to 2008. At the same time, the document is intended to communicate to its Angolan partners the UN's main concerns – about the problems facing the Angolan people and what needs to be done to address them.

This is a particularly appropriate time for the UN to engage in such an exercise, as the cessation of hostilities provides the best opportunity in many years for the country to build a sustainable peace, overcome the humanitarian tragedy and start the process of economic and social recovery.

The CCA has two main components. First, the situation of Angola's people is assessed with respect to the civil, political, economic and social rights embodied in the international human rights conventions and in national law, in particular the Angolan Constitution (law 23/92 of September 1992).

This assessment, or 'photograph' of the surface situation, is followed by an analysis of the main underlying factors that lie behind the violations or shortfalls in the achievement of rights. The analysis stresses that, while the ending of the war has removed the main causal factor, the new peace situation pushes to the foreground a series of other deep-seated underlying problems that now need to be seriously addressed.

Rights-based assessment of the country situation

A wide range of data sources has been used to assess the extent to which Angola's people are enjoying their rights. This assessment is organized in five broad 'clusters': the right to personal security and physical integrity; the right to development; the right to survival and a long and healthy life; the right to protection; and the right to participation. The goals and targets set by the Millennium Summit, held in September 2000, and other major international conferences, as well as national programmes and plans, have been used as benchmarks to measure progress. The main findings are summarized as follows.

The right to personal security and physical integrity. As a direct consequence of the war, millions of Angolans were denied the right to live a secure and peaceful life and were direct victims of gross human rights violations. The abuse of civilian populations resulted in massive population displacements. According to Government figures, 4 million people (almost one third of the total population) were internally displaced, as of May 2002. Of these, over 1.4 million were confirmed IDPs, registered for humanitarian assistance. There were also over 200,000 civilians in 'family camps' attached to the UNITA quartering areas and well over 450,000 Angolan refugees in neighbouring countries. Although the ending of the war paves the way for the return of IDPs and refugees to their areas of origin, this will take time. The humanitarian crisis will remain extremely serious at least until returning IDPs and refugees harvest their first crops – and in the short term the humanitarian caseload is actually increasing as humanitarian agencies reach severely distressed populations in previously inaccessible areas. Furthermore, despite the ending of the war, landmines and unexploded ordnance will continue to constitute a threat to life, as well as a constraint on economic and social recovery, in many parts of the country.

The right to development. In the urban areas, 63% of the population was living below the poverty line (equivalent to $1.68 a day) in 2000. Although this represented only a modest increase compared with 1995 (61%), the proportion of the urban population living below the extreme poverty line

(equivalent to 75 US cents a day in 2000) doubled between 1995 and 2000, reaching almost 25%. This dramatic increase in extreme poverty was closely related to the influx of destitute IDPs into the cities, in a context where urban jobs and income-earning opportunities have been limited by the depressed state of the non-oil sectors of the economy. Poverty is far deeper in the rural areas, where families have receded to an almost entirely subsistence economy, if they have not fled for safety or to seek humanitarian assistance.

Poor housing, while a longstanding characteristic of rural society, has become an especially serious problem in the urban and peri-urban areas, due to the influx of IDPs and migrants, and the lack of town planning, investments in urban infrastructure and financing for housing. As a result, huge informal settlements have developed around most large cities, with inadequate infrastructure and services. Most urban-dwellers have no security of tenure.

In the social sectors, Angola has so far made little progress towards meeting the goal of universal primary education. The Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), conducted in 2001, gave a net primary enrolment ratio of 62.5%, but this figure was exaggerated by the non-coverage of inaccessible rural areas where social conditions, including access to education, have been especially poor. The Ministry of Education's most recent national data on school enrolment, for 1998, imply a net primary enrolment ratio of 47.4% and a gross enrolment ratio of 59.6%. The main reasons for children not attending school are economic factors (the cost of 'informal' fees and materials, as well as children's workload), followed by lack of documents (birth certificates) and lack of school places. The country faces the huge challenge of raising the number of children in primary school from an estimated 1.5 million in 2000 to 5 million by 2015, in order to achieve universal primary education – while keeping up with the rapid growth of the school-age population.

There continues to be a significant gender disparity in access to education, to the disadvantage of girls. This is reflected in a large gap in literacy rates among men and women. The MICS 2001 data, for accessible areas, give literacy rates of 82% for men and 54% for women, with the situation worst in the rural areas, where only 39% of women were found to be literate. Educational disadvantages, as well as cultural biases, result in a much lower proportion of women in skilled jobs. The vast majority of women are employed in agriculture and petty trade. Women also continue to face disadvantages in access to resources, ownership of assets and inheritance.

The right to survival and a long and healthy life. Life expectancy remains low in Angola, at about 42 years. Children are especially at risk from disease, poor nutrition, unsafe water and poor sanitation, and mortality rates among young children are among the highest in the world. The MICS 2001 data, which understate the seriousness of the situation due to the non-coverage of inaccessible areas, indicate that almost one new-born child in seven does not reach the age of one and that one in four dies before the age of five. UNICEF estimates indicate that Angola has the second highest under-five mortality rate in the world (295 per 1,000 live births), after Sierra Leone.

Malaria is far the largest single cause of child mortality, as well as deaths among adults. As a major cause of morbidity, it also has far-reaching effects on economic productivity and household incomes, contributing to the high levels of poverty. In the long term, however, HIV/AIDS may become an even greater threat than malaria, as is already the case in much of Southern Africa. There are no nationally representative data on HIV prevalence, but data from a series of surveys among expectant mothers in Luanda indicate that infection is spreading rapidly: the HIV prevalence rate in that population group rose from 1.1% in 1993 to 3.4% in 1999 to 8.6% in 2001.

Apart from malaria, the current main causes of child mortality are acute respiratory and diarrhoeal diseases and vaccine preventable diseases, including in particular measles. Immunization rates are generally lower than the averages for Sub-Saharan Africa. Major headway has been made in polio immunization, but only as a result of a massive, donor-funded investment in mobile campaigns. Routine immunization has suffered from the general problems of a severely weakened primary health care system.

High maternal mortality is another major issue of concern. Although there is no really reliable national figure, the Ministry of Health estimates a maternal mortality ratio of 1,850 per 100,000 live births. This would be one of the highest MMRs in the world – for example, it is about 230 times higher than in Portugal. There are several contributory causes: low levels of deliveries attended by skilled health workers, low levels of pre-natal care, low levels of vaccination against tetanus, poor nutrition and illness (especially malaria) and the practice of unsafe abortions. The latter, in turn, is largely a consequence of the extremely low rates of use of contraception: according to the MICS 2001, only 6% of women practice any form of contraception and only 4.5% use modern methods. Ultimately, one of the key underlying causes of poor reproductive health and high maternal mortality is the debilitated state of the health service.

Despite the high levels of poverty, less than half the population uses Government health services in response to illness: more than a quarter use private health facilities and the rest resort to self-diagnosis and self-treatment. The sharp decline in utilization of Government health services since the early 1990s reflects public dissatisfaction, mainly with the lack of medicines in public health facilities and delays in attending to patients. The fees charged in public health facilities, sometimes illegally as *gasosas*, are an additional complaint, although fees are a much more serious barrier to access in the case of private health facilities.

Poor nutrition is another contributory cause of the high levels of morbidity and mortality, especially in areas that have been inaccessible to humanitarian agencies during the war. Agencies have reported extremely high rates of wasting among children in these areas. Apart from deficiencies in calorific and protein intake, micro-nutrient deficiencies are an additional cause of illness, disability and death. While poor nutritional status reflects a mix of economic, ecological, cultural and health-related problems, one of the core underlying factors has been the worsening of household poverty and food insecurity. Households devote a high proportion of their expenditure to food, indicating a high level of vulnerability with respect to food security.

Health and survival are also at risk in many households that do not have access to safe sources of water and do not have adequate sanitation. In the rural areas, 60% of households obtain their water from unprotected wells, springs, rivers and similar sources. Even in Luanda, much of the water comes untreated from the Rio Bengo in cistern trucks, due to the low coverage of the mains. Access also has an economic dimension in some urban areas, including in particular Luanda, where the poorest layers of the population mainly buy their water from private sellers, at prices far higher than the official tariffs charged for water from the mains.

The right to protection. Large sections of the population have been at risk of abuse and exploitation, with inadequate protection from the State. IDPs, for example, have been exposed to violence (including rape in the case of women), even after fleeing to secure areas. Because they often lack identification documents, they have also suffered harassment or been denied access to services. Many IDPs have also been resettled against their will, or without the minimum conditions for security, land availability and basic services, such as water supply, being in place. To address this problem, the Government took the important step of issuing a decree that sets out norms for the resettlement of IDPs, in January 2001, but this has not always been fully respected in practice.

Large numbers of children require special protection due to their heightened risks of abuse or exploitation, or their disadvantaged situation. These include children with disabilities, displaced and refugee children, under-age soldiers, orphans, children separated from their families, children living on the street, child workers, child victims of sexual abuse and children imprisoned or detained. The rights of children are also put at risk by their lack of identity documents: the MICS 2001 found that only 29% of children under the age of five had birth certificates.

Women have been victims of rape and abduction during the war, and domestic violence against women is a serious problem. While the principle of non-discrimination is entrenched in the Constitution and various other laws provide for the protection of women's rights, these legal provisions have little practical effect in the informal sector of the economy, where most women work,

or in communities where civil matters are regulated mainly by customary law, which is often discriminatory.

Furthermore, legal provisions are often not enforced. For cultural, psychological and economic reasons, as well as the slowness and complexity of judicial procedures, it is usually difficult for women, as well as the poor in general, to uphold their rights through the courts. The inefficiency and delays in processing criminal cases result in many prisoners being held in preventive detention for prolonged periods, often greatly exceeding the limits set down in law.

The right to participation. Political rights were widened as a result of the reforms in 1991-92 that instituted a multi-party system and legalized independent associations and trade unions, the right to assembly and an independent press. However, the implementation of these reforms was circumscribed in practice, partly because of the politico-military situation. There have been no national elections since 1992 and the provincial and local government bodies remain unelected. Some legal restrictions on the press also remain on the statute book, particularly with respect to television and radio.

Popular participation in public affairs is also limited by poverty and vulnerability, by low levels of education and by the continuing fear among much of the population. Although large numbers of small national NGOs have come into being, there are not as yet powerful community-based organizations. The trade unions, although now independent of the state, have a small membership, because of the small size of the formal sector workforce. Development of the mass media has been held back by high costs (and, in the case of the printed press, illiteracy), as well as legal restrictions.

Key issues for future progress

The ending of the war opens a new chapter in Angola's history, with much improved prospects to tackle the country's problems and move towards the fulfilment of rights and achievement of the international development goals. In addition to the new situation of peace, the country has the huge advantage (compared with most African countries) of high and rising oil revenues. If well managed and allocated in accordance with clearly defined priorities, these revenues could enable Angola to make substantial progress towards the achievement of the international development goals over the next few years.

While the war has unquestionably been the single most important constraint on development, as well as the immediate cause of the humanitarian emergency, other factors, of an institutional and policy-related nature, have exacerbated the serious situation experienced by Angola's people. The new situation therefore requires two types of action. The first is a series of peace-building measures in the short to medium term, aimed at promoting national reconciliation, demilitarization and recovery. Second, however, there is an urgent need for policy reforms and institutional measures, including measures regarding the management and allocation of public resources, in order to address the other deep-seated problems that have contributed to the situation of economic malaise, widespread poverty, high mortality and social exclusion. The United Nations recommends that these measures, which are summarized below, should feature prominently in the Government's proposed Poverty Reduction Strategy.

1. Post-conflict measures. True national reconciliation will require policies that promote inclusion, so that all Angolans, irrespective of their ethnic or geographic origins or their political affiliations, see that they have a stake in the new post-war Angola, on a basis of equity, without facing any kind of discrimination. In this respect, it will be critically important to uphold the rule of law and protect human rights in all parts of the country. A major programme of demobilization will be needed, to reduce the number of troops to a level adequate for national defence in a context of peace, and to free up resources for economic and social development, while also assisting the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life. Another major challenge will be to help large numbers of IDPs and refugees to return to their areas of origin, based on the principle of voluntary return. Mine action

should be another important dimension of the post-conflict strategy, aimed at facilitating the return of IDPs and refugees, as well as reopening vital communications routes to revive domestic trade and support the recovery of the economy.

While some measures will need to be targeted, to assist specific population groups, lessons from post-conflict situations in other countries indicate that the most effective strategy will be one that promotes a broad-based process of economic and social recovery. This would aim at improving the lives of the poor and rebuilding communities, creating favourable conditions for the successful reintegration of demobilized soldiers and returning IDPs and refugees.

2. Tackling urban poverty. In the urban areas, deepening poverty has been associated with widening social inequality: while the richest 10% (decile) of the population has increased its share of total urban household income, from 31.5% in 1995 to 42.2% in 2000, the share of all other population deciles has declined. The Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, rose from 0.45 to 0.51 during this same period. An effective poverty reduction strategy will therefore require not only high rates of growth, but also measures to halt and reverse the trend towards increased inequality in income distribution. A strategy based on economic growth alone would require a growth rate of 7.3% a year just to prevent the absolute number of poor from rising.

Large-scale job creation is the key requirement for urban poverty reduction. In the long run, sustainable employment generation can only come from broad-based economic development, going beyond the oil sector, which directly provides very few jobs. In the short to medium term, large numbers of jobs could be generated by public works programmes aimed at rebuilding the country's shattered infrastructure. In addition, everything possible should be done to stimulate micro-business activities, mostly located in the so-called informal sector, since this is likely to remain the main source of urban employment and income-generation for a long time to come. This should include a more supportive regulatory framework, improved access to micro-credit and improvements in education, training and apprenticeship schemes. Micro-credit should be accompanied by opportunities for small-scale savings by the poor, as well as measures to ensure that urban residents obtain legal titles for their land and homes, so that these become means for the poor to guarantee loans and leverage capital.

3. Promoting rural recovery and poverty reduction. One of the main challenges of the post-war period will be to regenerate rural communities and revive the rural economy, after years of disruption of agriculture and rural trade, destruction and decay of rural infrastructure, and decapitalization and displacement of rural populations. The vast majority of rural people, including returning IDPs, refugees and demobilized soldiers, now have virtually no assets of any kind, apart from customary land rights. The key will be to ensure that the rural poor, including these returnees, obtain access to adequate arable land, agricultural tools, seeds, animals and other key assets and inputs, as well as opportunities to access markets.

The rural recovery strategy should focus mainly on the development of the small-holder sector, where rising production would make the greatest contribution to reducing rural poverty, while also making better use of available resources, than increases in output from large-scale commercial farms (*fazendas*). A prosperous rural small-holder economy would also reduce the 'push' factors inducing migration to the cities. From this perspective, it will be crucial to reverse the trend of the past decade towards growing land concentration, which has seen new large landholders acquire more than 2 million hectares, about half the area held in colonial times by Portuguese settlers.

4. Tackling the challenges of rapid population growth and urbanization. Long-term improvements in human well-being will require measures to reduce the population growth rate, which at about 3.0% a year is one of the highest in the world. The total fertility rate, estimated at 7.1 children per woman, is exceeded only by Niger, Yemen and Somalia. The youthful age-structure, which results from such high fertility and rapid population growth, produces a high dependency ratio, contributing to poverty and practices such as child labour. One way in which these high rates could be reduced would be to improve access to cheap methods of family planning, thereby also contributing to the fulfilment of reproductive rights. Angola currently has one of the world's lowest contraceptive prevalence rates

(6% compared with an average of 22% in Sub-Saharan Africa and 62% in the developing world as a whole).

Another major challenge facing the country is how to adjust to rapid urbanization. Over the past half-century, the urban share of the population has risen from 6% to an estimated 60%. Luanda alone now has almost one quarter of the national population. This huge shift in the geographical composition of the population has major policy implications. First, rural development must be given high policy priority in order to reduce the rate of rural-urban migration, as well as being an important end in itself. Second, development planning and recovery strategies must be premised on the fact that Angola is already a predominantly urban society, and that this will not change, despite the end of the war. 'Resettlement', as an exercise in artificial demographic engineering, will not alter this reality – quite apart from the rights abuses that would be inherent in any attempt to force part of the urban population to leave the cities. The shift in the urban-rural balance of the population means that most jobs and incomes will have to be generated in the urban areas. It also implies the need for much greater attention than in the past to urban planning, investments in urban infrastructure and the development of low-cost housing on serviced sites, with related financing mechanisms.

5. Promoting economic diversification and development. Since the mid-1970s, Angola's economy has become overwhelmingly dependent on one sector, the oil industry, which accounts for more than half of GDP, about 80% of Government revenue and about 90% of export earnings. The oil sector itself generates very few jobs. However, the country's substantial oil earnings (almost $6 billion in exports and over $3 billion in Government revenue in 2001) could be a major resource for investment in physical infrastructure and human capital, contributing to the development of other sectors that generate much larger numbers of jobs.

The ending of the war has removed the main obstacle to the recovery of the non-oil sectors of the economy, but this needs to be accompanied by other measures to improve the environment for investment and job-creation. These measures need to address six types of constraints that hold back development of the economy: macroeconomic instability and uncertainty; barriers to competition and excessive bureaucracy; the poor state of the country's physical infrastructure; the inadequacy of financial services; the weakness of the judicial system; and the low level of education and skills of the majority of the labour force.

6. Rebuilding the social sectors. Although access to basic social services depends in part on household income, to a large extent the low access to and poor quality of basic social services are attributable to deficiencies in key inputs (staff, materials, equipment and infrastructure). Underlying these problems, however, are deeper issues concerning the policy framework, institutional arrangements and capacity, and the financing of Government services.

In the education sector, the *Plano Nacional de Acção de Educação para Todos 2001-2015* provides a basic strategic framework for achieving key education goals, including universal primary education. In the health sector, work on the *Plano de Desenvolvimento Sanitário* and the National Health Policy, both of which have been under preparation for several years, needs to be successfully concluded, setting the policy framework, priorities and objectives of a sector-wide strategy.

In both sectors, implementation of such sectoral strategies and plans will require a high level of Government commitment, including the allocation of much larger budgetary resources than in the past. Relative to the size of the budget as a whole, social sector expenditure has been extremely low compared with other Southern African countries. In addition, there should be a more rational distribution of resources within each sector, giving top priority to basic social services (primary education, primary health care, water and sanitation).

7. Mounting an effective national response to HIV/AIDS. If the HIV/AIDS epidemic continues to spread unchecked, there is a high risk that Angola will rapidly find itself in an AIDS crisis comparable to that already faced by several Southern African countries. As is already the case in those countries, HIV/AIDS threatens to reduce life expectancy, while impoverishing affected families,

overwhelming the already weak health service and creating a generation of AIDS orphans. The mounting of an effective national response to HIV/AIDS must therefore be a central part of the Government's broad strategy for post-war recovery, poverty reduction and long-term development. An important step forward was the preparation and adoption of a National Strategic Plan for Sexually Transmitted Diseases, HIV and AIDS. As outlined in this plan, the main emphasis should be on awareness-raising (especially through programmes directed at youth), increasing the availability of condoms (including through social marketing), improving access to counselling and testing, measures to reduce mother-to-child transmission, including the provision of antiretroviral drugs, and improved screening of blood. The reality, however, is that little has been done to put the plan into practice – despite the enormity of the challenge posed by HIV/AIDS. Minimal budgetary resources have been provided and the proposed *Comissão Nacional de Luta contra o SIDA* has still not been set up. The plan now needs to be updated and operationalized, and given substantial budgetary resources for implementation. The National Commission should be established as a matter of urgency, to lead the fight to roll back the advance of this devastating disease.

8. Promoting good governance. Underlying many of the country's problems are deeper institutional problems concerning the nature of governance in Angola. Although the constitutional revision in 1991-92 opened the way to pluralist politics, more diverse mass media, independence of the trade unions and the emergence of independent associations and national NGOs, there have been limits to the scope and impact of the reforms. The National Assembly has remained quite weak in terms of its capacity to provide effective checks on the actions of the executive. Provincial and local government have not yet been democratized. And there are still some legal constraints on the mass media.

In addition, institutional capacity in the public administration has been eroded since the early 1990s, partly because of the steep decline in the real value of salaries in the early part of the decade, which undermined motivation and performance, and also encouraged many of the better qualified civil servants to leave Government employment.

A third major area of concern is the inadequate transparency in the management of public resources. The country's large public revenues, generated mainly by oil, should be used to meet the priority needs of the population and to promote long-term development. A prerequisite for this is to ensure the transparency of government finances, by bringing all revenue and expenditure within the framework of the approved national budget and requiring that expenditures follow strictly the procedures set down by law. This means ending the current situation, where upwards of $1 billion a year in Government spending (more than 20% of total Government expenditure) are not recorded and classified in the budget accounts. In addition, the public procurement system needs to be brought up to international standards and rigorously enforced. Likewise, the contracting of Government debt should follow well defined procedures and be consistent with an approved strategy for debt management and with broader economic policy objectives.

Opportunities and threats

Despite the ending of the war, the country continues to face major risks as well as unprecedented opportunities. Apart from the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which is emerging as one of the biggest threats to human well-being and the future development of the nation, the single biggest risk is that widening social inequality (in terms of income, land ownership and access to resources and opportunities in general) will fuel frustration and resentment, sowing the seeds of future social conflict.

On the other hand, the opportunities now opening up for Angola are the best the country has known since independence. There is not only a real chance for sustainable peace, but also the opportunity to use the country's large oil revenues to promote the post-war recovery and make rapid progress towards meeting the international development goals. Although likely to remain stable in 2003-04 (at around $3 billion a year), Government fiscal revenue from oil is expected to rise sharply from 2005, reaching $5 billion by 2007.

The challenge will be to seize the opportunities created by peace and large oil revenues to improve radically the situation of Angola's people, while responding to the risks and threats in order to minimize their potential scale and impact.

The role of Government, donors and the UN

Government leadership and commitment. The Government has the primary responsibility to lead the process of reconstruction and development and, given its large oil revenues, should provide the bulk of public financing. To address the challenges facing the country, it will be necessary to strengthen the capacity of key Government institutions, given the systemic weaknesses in the public administration. However, capacity will not be the key factor determining the pace of progress. More important will be the political will or commitment to tackle the shortfalls in rights and their underlying causes and to move decisively towards achievement of the Millennium Declaration Goals.

The Government's role should essentially be to set an appropriate policy framework, while also ensuring that appropriate institutional structures are in place, providing leadership and co-ordination for other actors (including donors) and allocating budgetary resources in accordance with well defined priorities. The proposed Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) – and its successor 'full' PSRP -- could provide the necessary broad policy framework. Such a strategy would incorporate the actions needed to overcome the humanitarian emergency, promote post-conflict reintegration, reconstruction and recovery, and promote job-creation, access of the rural poor to land and markets, food security and universal access to basic social services, while also tackling emerging threats like HIV/AIDS. The strategy would also address the large 'macro' issues of promoting democratic governance, sound economic management, transparency in the management of public resources and curbs on corruption.

The role of donors. In recent years, the principal donors in Angola have adopted a cautious approach to long-term development programming, due both to the primacy of the humanitarian crisis, security constraints and the perceived weakness of Government commitment and capacity to pursue pro-poor policies. They have been sceptical about the Government's willingness to develop and implement an appropriate policy framework, allocate budgetary resources accordingly and ensure adequate transparency. As a result they have tended to channel most assistance through UN agencies and NGOs, rather than Government ministries.

A clear Government commitment to policies that promote social and economic recovery, poverty reduction and improved governance, backed up by the allocation of substantial internal resources, would provide the foundations for an enhanced partnership between the Government and donors, including the UN System. Donors would be better able to play a supporting role, complementing the Government's efforts, and would see themselves as supplementing, rather than substituting for, internal resources.

At the same time, the donor community cannot assume that such a transformation will automatically happen. Building a powerful civil society, with representative, effective organizations, as well as pluralistic mass media, an independent judiciary and a strong National Assembly, capable of acting as an effective check on executive power, will be fundamental components of a strategy for long-term improvements in the quality of government.

Next steps for the UN. Following the completion of the CCA, the UN System in Angola will begin to discuss and develop the strategy and programmes that the UN agencies will pursue in the period from 2004 to 2008. This will culminate in the drafting, discussion and adoption of the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for 2004-08. In designing this programme framework, the UN System will consider carefully the specific role it should play, taking into account its comparative advantage (in terms of agency mandates and experience) and fairly modest resources, in assisting the Government and other Angolan partners to respond to the challenges identified in this assessment and analysis of the country situation.

Abbreviations and acronyms

AEA	Aliança Evangélica de Angola
ARVs	Antiretroviral drugs
Ascorp	Angola Selling Corporation
BNA	Banco Nacional de Angola
CAOL	Coordenação de Atendimento Obstétrico de Luanda
CAP	Consolidated appeal
CAP	Caixa Agro-Pecuária e Pescas
CBO	Community based organization
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CEAST	Conferência Episcopal de Angola e São Tomé
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
CGSILA	Confederação Geral dos Sindicatos Independentes e Livres de Angola
CICA	Conselho das Igrejas Cristãs em Angola
COIEPA	Comité Inter Eclesial para a Paz em Angola
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DfID	Department for International Development, of UK Government
DPT	Diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus
EDA	Estação de desenvolvimento agrícola
ENDIAMA	Empresa Nacional de Diamantes de Angola
EPAL	Empresa Provincial de Águas de Luanda
EU	European Union
FAA	Forças Armadas de Angola
FAEN	Fundo de Apoio ao Empresariado Nacional
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FAS	Fundo de Apoio Social
FDES	Fundo de Desenvolvimento Económico e Social
FESA	Fundação Eduardo dos Santos
FWCW	Fourth World Conference on Women
GARE	Gabinete do Redimensionamento Empresarial
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNP	Gross national product
GURN	Governo de Unidade e Reconciliação Nacional
HIV/AIDS	Human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development, 1994
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDA	Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agrícola
IDPs	Internally displaced persons
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INAROEE	Instituto Angolano de Remoção de Obstáculos e Engenhos Explosivos
INE	Instituto Nacional de Estatística
IDCPSSB	Inquérito sobre a Disposicão e Capacidade no Pagamento dos Serviços Sociais Básicos
IDR	Inquérito aos Agregados Familiares sobre Despesas e Receitas
IMCI	Integrated management of childhood illnesses
IMR	Infant mortality rate
INSP	Instituto Nacional da Saúde Pública
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPCVD	Inquérito Prioritário sobre as Condições de Vida aos Domicílios
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

Kz	Kwanza
LPG	Liquefied petroleum gas
MAPESS	Ministério da Administração Pública, Emprego e Segurança Social
MDG	Millennium declaration goals
MEC	Ministério da Educação e Cultura
MINADER	Ministério da Agricultura e Desenvolvimento Rural
MINFIN	Ministério das Finanças
MINPET	Ministério dos Petróleos
MINSA	Ministério da Saúde
MMR	Maternal mortality ratio
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières
MTCT	Mother to child transmission (of HIV)
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OAA	Ordem dos Advogados Angolanos
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAR	Programa de Apoio à Reconstrução
PAV	Programa Alargado de Vacinação (Expanded Programme of Vaccination)
PEPAs	Provincial Emergency Plans of Action
PNEAH	Programa Nacional de Emergência para a Ajuda Humanitaria
PPP	Purchasing power parity
PRC	Programa de Reabilitação Comunitária e de Reconciliação Nacional
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PRIMA	Programa de Reforma Institucional e Modernização Administrativa
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PUNIV	Ensino pre-universitário (pre-university education)
PV	Present value
SIGFE	Sistema Integrado de Gestão Financeira do Estado
SINPROF	Sindicato Nacional dos Professores
SMP	Staff Monitored Programme
Sonangol	Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis
SOWC	State of the World's Children
STDs	Sexually transmitted diseases
SWAPs	Sector Wide Approaches
TB	Tuberculosis
TBA	Traditional birth attendant
TFR	Total fertility rate
UCAH	Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
U5MR	Under five mortality rate
UN	United Nations
UNACA	União Nacional das Associações de Camponeses Angolanos
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNOA	United Nations Office in Angola
UNPWG	United Nations Programme Working Group
UNTA-CS	União Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Angola-Confederação Sindical
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXOs	Unexploded ordnance
WCHR	World Conference on Human Rights, 1993
WEF	World Education Forum, 2000

WFP	World Food Programme
WFS	World Food Summit, 1996
WHO	World Health Organization
WSC	World Summit for Children, 1990
WSSD	World Summit for Social Development, 1995

Contents

List of boxes

List of tables

List of figures

Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Purpose and objectives of the CCA

The aim of the United Nations Common Country Assessment is to provide a comprehensive assessment and analysis of the humanitarian and development situation in Angola and to establish a strategic vision for the UN agencies working in the country. This is a particularly appropriate time for the UN to engage in such an exercise, as the halt in hostilities in March 2002 provides new hope for achieving sustainable peace and beginning the process of economic and social recovery. While the situation may evolve rapidly in certain respects, the assessment and analysis presented in this document reflect the information available as of June 2002.

This document is the first step to producing a common programming framework for the UN system. Similar exercises have been taking place throughout the developing world, as a result of the global UN reform process, launched by the UN Secretary General in 1997. The reform has been comprehensive in scope, but includes in particular innovations in the system's development work, aimed at equipping the UN to meet the development challenges of the 21st century. One of the goals of the reform has been to achieve greater synergy among the UN agencies, including the harmonization of their activities and the avoidance of unnecessary overlaps. Two important tools for achieving this are:

- the Common Country Assessment (CCA), a joint assessment of the situation of a country by the UN agencies, conducted in cooperation with national partners; and

- the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), a document intended to bring 'greater coherence to the United Nations programmes of assistance at the country level…with common objectives and time frames in close consultation with the governments' [UN, 1997].

UNDAF establishes a unified programming framework for the UN system over a five-year period, with the aim of enhancing the impact of the system as a whole. The individual UN agencies' country programmes are designed within that system-wide framework and must be consistent with it.

In Angola, the UN system has hitherto found it difficult to develop a long-term programming framework, due to the unstable situation of military conflict and an acute humanitarian emergency, which created a high degree of uncertainty. In the past few years, most of the UN agencies in Angola were unable to engage in long-term programming or planning, and the system as a whole was unable to establish harmonized programming cycles – the common time frames referred to by the Secretary General in his 1997 proposals for UN reform.

Although many aspects of the situation in Angola remain unstable or could evolve rapidly in the coming months, the return to peace creates a much more favourable context for longer-term planning. Even before this positive turn of events, the UN heads of agencies in Angola had already decided, at a etreat in November 2000, to move towards harmonized programming cycles by 2004. At that time, the UN Country Team had decided also to proceed with the joint preparation of an interim CCA that could 'summarize and highlight a shared vision and key issues, opportunities and concerns of the UN in Angola', which would be used as 'a basis for programming, as well as for advocacy' [UN, 2000].

This document therefore serves two main purposes. First, it is intended to provide an objective foundation for the design of the UN's common programming framework in Angola, the UNDAF, which will cover the period from 2004 to 2008. The preparation of UNDAF is due to begin in the second half of 2002, as direct follow-up to the completion of the CCA.

Second, the CCA is intended to serve as a tool for UN advocacy on major development issues and to contribute information and analysis useful for the formulation of strategies, policies and programmes by a wide range of actors, including the Government of Angola, NGOs and donors. The document presents the shared values and the common concerns of the UN system in Angola, with the aim of encouraging debate and discussion on the actions needed to achieve more rapid progress towards the realization of human rights and the achievement of key development goals. This is particularly relevant in a context where the Government is in the process of preparing a poverty reduction strategy. A well designed poverty reduction strategy could become an over-arching framework for policy formulation, planning, programming and resource allocation to address the nexus of inter-related humanitarian, recovery and developmental challenges facing the country.

Given this dual purpose, the CCA has the following basic objectives:

1) to provide an *assessment* of the situation of the country and its people, with respect to the realization of the rights embodied in the international human rights instruments, international humanitarian law and national legislation, and the development goals and targets set by the major UN conferences and by national legislation, policies and programmes;

2) to provide an *analysis* of the main underlying or structural problems that lie behind the shortfalls in progress highlighted by the assessment, highlighting the key issues that need to be addressed to achieve future progress towards the fulfillment of rights.

Consequently, Chapter 2 of the CCA provides an assessment of progress on human rights and development, while Chapter 3 analyses the key underlying issues that need to be addressed for future progress. In addition, Chapter 4 reviews external assistance to Angola, since the UN agencies are part of the broader donor community and the experience of past donor assistance is important for the UN to take into account in designing its future programme. Chapter 5 presents the main conclusions of the assessment and analysis, along with their implications for the UN's strategy in Angola.

It is necessary, finally, to note that the CCA does not address the political or diplomatic dimensions of the UN's work in Angola. That work is conducted by the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) headed by the Representative of the Secretary General, under mandates provided by the UN Security Council. In the chapters that follow, the politico-military situation is not addressed as such, but is taken as a critical part of the context for the UN's humanitarian, human rights and development work. However, the latter can, if well conceived, also contribute in important ways to long-term peace-building and national reconciliation.

1.2 Methodology

This document follows a sequence that begins with an assessment of the situation of the country and its people, before moving on to an analysis of core underlying issues of importance for future progress.

Rights-based approach. The assessment in Chapter 2 is conducted in a rights-based framework. The situation of the country and its people is assessed against a set of rights enshrined in both national law, including the Constitution [law 23/92, 16 September 1992], and the various international conventions to which Angola is a party and which, by virtue of their ratification and entry into force, have the status of international law, implying obligations and responsibilities on the part of the Angolan State. A series of principles and rights are enshrined in Chapters I and II of the Angolan Constitution, on 'fundamental principles' and 'fundamental rights and duties'. They are summarized in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1
Rights embodied in the Angolan Constitution

Articles	Principles and rights
2	Rule of law, dignity of the person, pluralism of expression, pluralism of political organization, respect and guarantee of fundamental human rights and freedoms
3	Popular sovereignty, universal suffrage
4	Equality of treatment of political parties by the state and by the press
8	Secular nature of the state and right to religious freedom
12	Right to property, including peasants'right to land ownership
18	Equality of citizens before the law, universality of rights and obligations, and principle of non-discrimination
20	Dignity of the person, protection of the life, liberty, physical integrity and reputation of every citizen
21	Recognition and integration into Angolan law of the rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, African Charter of Human and People's Rights and other international instruments to which Angola is a party
22	Respect and protection of human life; outlawing of the death penalty
23	Outlawing of torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
24	Right to live in a healthy, non-polluted environment
25	Right of free movement and residence in any part of the national territory and to freely leave and enter the country
28	Right of all citizens aged 18 and above to participate in public life, to vote and be voted for
29	Equality of men and women within the family, with same rights and duties; responsibility of the family, with the special support of the state, to provide protection and rounded education for children and youth
30	Protection of children by the family, state and society; promotion of the development of the personality of children and youth; and creation of conditions for their integration and participation in social life
31	Promotion, by the state, with the collaboration of the family and society, of the harmonious development of the personality of young people and creation of conditions for the realization of their economic, social and cultural rights, notably in education, professional training, culture, access to first jobs, labour, social security, physical education, sport and recreation
32	Freedom of expression, assembly, demonstration and association
33	Right to organize and join trade unions and professional organizations
34	Right to strike and prohibition of lock-out
35	Freedom of the press and prohibition of censorship
36	No imprisonment outside the law; right of the accused to legal defence and assistance; duty of the State to ensure that access to justice is not prejudiced by insufficient economic means; no retroactive application of the law (except when this is beneficial to the defendant); presumption of innocence prior to a judicial judgment
37, 38	Restriction of preventive detention to cases identified by law, and right of those in preventive detention to be tried within time limits defined by law or released
39	Right to be informed of charges at time of arrest
40	Right of those imprisoned to receive visits from family and friends and to receive and send correspondence
41	Right of appeal against sentence
42	Right of habeas corpus
43	Right of the citizen to take judicial action against all acts that violate his rights as established in the Constitutional Law or in other legislation
44	Inviolability of the household and secrecy of correspondence
45	Freedom of conscience and religious belief; freedom of worship
46	Right and duty to work; workers' rights to fair remuneration, rest, holidays, protection, and workplace hygiene and security; worker's right to freely choose his/her occupation
47	Promotion by the State of the measures necessary to assure the exercise of the rights to health care, early childhood care, maternal health care, assistance for the disabled, the elderly and those incapable of working
48	Right of special protection of disabled veterans of the national liberation war, orphans of citizens killed in the war and those with physical or mental disabilities resulting from the war
49	Promotion by the State of access by all to education, culture and sport
50	Duty of the State to create the political, economic and cultural conditions necessary for citizens to enjoy effectively their rights and fulfill their duties

Source: Lei de Revisão Constitucional (law 23/92 of 16 September 1992).

The Constitution provides legal protection for a wide range of civil and political rights, and also for many social and economic rights. Article 50 of the Constitution specifically makes it incumbent on the State to create the 'political, economic and cultural conditions necessary for citizens to enjoy effectively their rights and fulfill their duties'. Furthermore, Article 43 makes all the legally established rights justiciable. Citizens 'have the right to challenge and seek redress through the courts against any acts that infringe their rights as established in the Constitutional Law or in any other legislation'.

Angola has also ratified most of the main international human rights instruments (see Table 1.2). These include the two broad-ranging covenants on civil and political rights and on economic, social and cultural rights, which were adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966 and ratified by Angola in 1991. The two covenants codified and developed further the principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly in 1948. International human rights law also includes several specialized instruments, such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which were adopted by the General Assembly in 1979 and 1989 respectively and ratified by Angola in 1984 and 1990.

Alongside these international human rights instruments are others adopted at a regional level by the Organization of African Unity, including the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, both of which have also been ratified by Angola.

Table 1.2
International human rights instruments: Angola's ratification and reporting status

International human rights instruments	Date of ratification	Status of reporting obligations
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966	1991	Never reported
ICCPR Optional Protocol	1991	Never reported
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 1966	1991	Never reported
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965	Not ratified	
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1979	1984	Reported 1999
CEDAW Optional Protocol, 1999	Not ratified	
African Charter on Human and People's Rights, 1981	1991	Never reported
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984	Not ratified	
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1989	1990	Never reported
CRC Optional Protocols on children in armed conflict and sexual crimes against children	Ratification in progress	
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child	1992	Never reported
Geneva Conventions, 1949	1984	No reporting obligations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, and refugee protocol, 1967	1981	No reporting obligations
ILO Convention on Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999	2001	No reporting obligations
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2000	Ratification in progress	No reporting obligations

Source: Ministry of Foreign Relations

Significantly, Article 21 of the Angolan Constitution expressly refers to these international legal commitments, stating that:

> 'The constitutional and legal norms relating to fundamental rights must be interpreted and integrated harmoniously with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the African Charter of Human and People's Rights and the other international instruments to which Angola is a party.'

Taken together with Article 43 on justiciability, this article means that the international human rights conventions ratified by Angola have the force of domestic law. In legislative terms, that is abstracting from issues concerning the enforcement of the law in practice, these provisions give Angola a strong framework for the protection of human rights.

Although the country is entering a new period of peace, the long history of conflict requires that the assessment should also be based on the obligations established under international humanitarian law (the Geneva Conventions of 1949), as well as other relevant international legal commitments, such as the Ottawa convention on anti-personnel mines.[1]

Goals and targets. Through a series of world summits, conferences and special sessions of the UN General Assembly, the international community has set a series of goals and targets development, including the eradication of poverty, reductions in child and maternal mortality, universal primary education, gender equality and the reversal of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Several of these goals have been quantified and given target dates for achievement. In voting for the final declarations and resolutions of these international gatherings, the Government of Angola has signaled its commitment to strive to achieve the goals and targets.

The Millennium Summit, held in New York in September 2000, was one of the most recent and significant of these events. Attended by 189 countries, including Angola, it unanimously adopted a set of Millennium Declaration Goals (MDG), to be accomplished by 2015, among them the goal of halving the proportion of the world's population living on less than $1 a day (see Table 1.3).

Nature of the analysis. Chapter 3 examines some of the key underlying factors that need to be addressed if the problems highlighted in the assessment are to be effectively tackled. The ending of the war has removed the main constraint. However, there is a series of other deep-seated problems that need to be seriously addressed in the new situation created by the return to peace. Among the key issues discussed in Chapter 3 are the following:

- The challenge of post-war recovery and reconciliation;
- The 'poverty trap', resulting from the limited access of the poor to employment, land and other resources, and the growing inequality in Angolan society;
- The implications of rapid population growth and urbanization;
- The need to use oil revenues, along with appropriate policy measures, to promote economic diversification and so reduce dependence on oil and generate sources of employment and incomes;
- The need to revive rural communities and the rural economy, focusing in particular on the small farmer sector, and to restore food security;
- The challenge of rebuilding the social sectors, including in particular basic social services;
- The mounting of an effective national response to HIV/AIDS;
- The improvement of governance, in particular through effective systems of democratic participation, accountability and transparency.

[1] Angola signed the Ottawa Convention in December 1997 and the National Assembly approved ratification in July 2000. However, the Government has said that, due to the resumption of the war, it cannot complete the process of ratification.

Table 1.3
The Millennium Development Goals
(goals and targets for monitoring the Declaration of the Millennium Summit, New York, September 2000)

Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Target: to halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the world's people whose income is less than one US dollar a day
Target: to halve, by 2015, the proportion of the world's people who suffer from hunger
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education
Target: to ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women
Target: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality
Target: Reduce the under-five mortality rate by two thirds
Goal 5: Improve maternal health
Target: Reduce the maternal mortality ratio by three quarters by 2015
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
Target: by 2015, to have halted and begun reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS
Target: by 2015, to have halted and begun reversing the incidence of malaria and other major diseases
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability
Target: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources
Target: to halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water
Target: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development
Target: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system, with commitments both nationally and internationally to good governance, development and poverty reduction
Target: Address the special needs of the least developed countries
Target: Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing states
Target: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term
Target: In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth
Target: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries
Target: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications

Note: These goals and targets were based on the Millennium Summit Declaration and refined on the basis of consultations between the UN, IMF, OECD and World Bank.

Source: Road Map towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, Report of the Secretary-General, General Assembly of the United Nations, document A/56/326, 6 September 2001.

External assistance. Chapter 4, on the characteristics and trends of external assistance to Angola, provides a bridge from the assessment and analysis in this document to the preparation of the strategy, objectives and programmes to be pursued by the UN in the framework of UNDAF. The UN System is one external partner among several in Angola and it is important for the UN, in developing its own strategy and programmes, to take into account the scale and nature of the assistance provided by other donors, the constraints on aid effectiveness in Angola and the factors that influence donor practice.

1.3 Process of preparation of the CCA

This document was prepared over a nine month period from September 2001 to May 2002, under the guidance of the heads of the UN agencies. UNDP provided a small team of facilitators (a principal writer and a research assistant), who gathered research material and prepared successive drafts of the

chapters and annexes. These drafts were reviewed by the UN Programme Working Group (UNPWG), a body with members from each of the UN agencies, and by the heads of agencies. The members of the UNPWG were responsible for distribution and discussion of the drafts within their respective agencies and transmitting feedback to the facilitators. The final text was formally approved by the UN Country Team at a meeting in June 2002.

Chapter 2
A rights-based assessment of the country situation

This chapter assesses the situation of Angola's people with respect to the civil, political, economic and social rights that are embodied in international and national law by virtue of their codification in the international human rights instruments ratified by Angola and their incorporation into Chapter II of the Angolan Constitution (law 23/92 of September 1992). The goals set by the Millennium Summit and other international conferences, as well as national programmes and plans, are used as benchmarks for measuring progress.

Due to the large number of rights enshrined in the Constitution, as well as the various international conventions, covenants and charters, the assessment below is organized in five 'clusters' of rights for ease of presentation. These are:

- ***the right to personal security and physical integrity***, which encompasses a range of civil rights, including in particular the rights of women, children and other civilians in situations of war;
- ***the right to development***, which includes a series of rights related to education, shelter, the attainment of an adequate standard of living, the elimination of poverty and women's equal access to education and economic opportunities;
- ***the right to survival and a long and healthy life,*** a cluster grouping children's right to survival, the rights to health and access to health care, reproductive rights, the right to adequate food and nutrition, and the rights of access to potable water and adequate sanitation;
- ***the right to protection*** from exploitation, violence, discrimination and other forms of maltreatment or injustice, to which those in various situations of vulnerability, such as children, women and IDPs, are especially at risk;
- ***the right to participation,*** which groups a number of political rights, such as the rights to political participation, freedom of association, freedom of expression and access to information , including the right of women to participation on an equal basis with men.

It should be noted that these are not hermetically sealed clusters. There are gray areas and overlaps between them. For example, the right to personal security and physical integrity is itself a dimension of the right to protection, but has been separated out as a special cluster due to its importance in a country deeply affected by years of war. Some specific issues may simultaneously concern rights in several clusters. The rights of women and issues concerning gender equity and equality are considered in a cross-cutting manner, within each of the clusters, as are the rights of other specific population groups, notably children.

2.1 The right to personal security and physical integrity

War-related human rights abuses. As a direct consequence of the war, millions of Angolans, particularly in the rural areas, have been denied the right to live a secure and peaceful life and have been direct victims of gross human rights violations, including attacks on civilian targets, massacres of civilians, the rape and abduction of women, the looting of food stocks and household assets, the burning of homes, and other crimes. Successive waves of rural people have fled their homes following such violations of rights, because of the fear generated in conditions of insecurity and lack of respect for civilians, or because the conflict has created extreme shortages of food, threatening human survival. Large numbers of people have been deliberately driven from their homes as a war tactic.

The right to personal security and physical integrity is the subject of several articles in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular Article 6 on the right to life, Article 9 on the right to liberty and security of person and Article 12 on liberty of movement and residence. These internationally codified rights are likewise recognized in Angolan law, notably in the provisions in the Constitution on fundamental rights and duties, that 'the law protects the life, liberty, personal integrity, good name and reputation of every citizen' (Article 20) and that 'every citizen can move freely and reside in any part of the national territory without being impeded from so doing for political or other reasons' (Article 25).

In addition, there is a body of international humanitarian law, known collectively as the Geneva Conventions of 1949, providing protection for civilians in wartime situations, including specifically in internal conflicts. These basic rules include the principle that persons who do not take a direct part in hostilities are entitled to respect for their moral and physical integrity and shall in all circumstances be protected and treated humanely. The conventions require parties to a conflict at all times to distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, in order to spare civilian populations and property and to ensure that civilians are not the object of attacks. More specific provisions prohibit the use or movement of civilian populations for military advantage, the taking of hostages, and the starvation of civilian populations or destruction and theft of food stocks, crops and livestock, while also providing for the protection of women and children [ICRC, 1983].[1]

Population displacements. In Angola, serious war-related violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been a matter of deep concern to the United Nations system. Following a mission in October-November 2000, the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons reported that large numbers of rural people had been displaced by UNITA forces engaging in 'attacks on, and destruction of, villages, looting foodstuffs and possessions, and killing, abducting and raping civilians, including children.' The FAA also were responsible for displacement, as a result of tactics employed in 'mopping up' and counter-insurgency operations. The Representative of the Secretary-General noted that 'FAA troops employ many of the same tactics as UNITA, such as looting villages', partly because 'the FAA troops often receive neither their salaries nor sufficient supplies and are thus inclined to prey on the local population' [UN, 2001a]. In the second half of 2001 and early months of 2002, large numbers of civilians were forcibly removed from rural areas, particularly in the east of the country, as part of a FAA strategy to deprive UNITA forces of civilian sources of food. These tactics resulted in a large increase in civilian displacement during that period.

Since IDPs and refugees usually leave their areas of origin with almost none of their belongings, they are effectively destitute, at least in the short to medium term, and consequently have been the main vulnerable groups targeted for assistance by humanitarian agencies. In the brief periods of peace, some IDPs have returned to their areas of origin, but many others have become integrated into host communities, where they often already have relatives and benefit from the solidarity mechanisms characteristic of African extended family systems. As a result, displacement has become one of the main factors driving the process of rapid urbanization in Angola.

In the period between independence and the Bicesse accords, when the war was concentrated in remote rural areas, displacement tended to be quite localized, normally involving short-range movements between villages and into nearby municipal centres. By the time of the Bicesse accords, there were about 800,000 IDPs and 425,000 Angolan refugees in neighbouring countries, some of whom returned to their areas of origin during the brief interlude of peace in 1991-92.

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[1] In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the World Conference on Human Rights in June 1993 expressed deep concern about violations of human rights during armed conflicts and called upon "States and all parties to armed conflicts strictly to observe international humanitarian law, as set forth in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other rules and principles of international law, as well as minimum standards for protection of human rights, as laid down in international conventions".

After Bicesse, the war intensified, taking on a semi-conventional form, and several large provincial capitals became theatres of conflict. The scale of the conflict engendered much larger population displacements than previously, resulting in an influx of rural people into provincial capitals and large-scale population movements from the worst-affected areas of the hinterland to more secure coastal cities, including Luanda. Overall, it is estimated that between 1.3 and 2.0 million Angolans fled their homes during this period. In the four years of 'quasi-peace' that followed the Lusaka protocol, some IDPs returned home, but the numbers were small, because of continuing insecurity and lack of confidence on the part of many IDPs in the durability of the peace process.

Figure 2.1
Cumulative number of IDPs, 1998-2002



NOTE: 'Reported' IDPs are total number of IDPs reported by Government authorities at provincial level. 'Confirmed' IDPs are IDPs displaced since January 1998 and registered by humanitarian agencies for assistance.
Source: OCHA

When the country drifted back to war in 1998, there were large new population displacements. Figure 2.1 charts the cumulative increase in the number of IDPs since that time. This shows the total number of IDPs reported by the Government, as well as the number of IDPs confirmed by OCHA. The latter are IDPs registered by humanitarian agencies as beneficiaries of assistance programmes. According to the Government figures, the total number of reported IDPs rose from a little under 530,000 in November 1998 to 4.01 million in May 1992. This would imply that overall almost 30% of the Angolan population is internally displaced, given a total population estimate of 13.8 million in 2001.[2] As for confirmed IDPs, their number rose from just under 360,000 in November 1998 to 1.46 million in May 2002, according to OCHA data.

These figures do not include more than 200,000 civilians who entered 'family camps' attached to the quartering areas for UNITA soldiers in April-May 2002, following the restoration of peace. In addition, UNHCR has reported that, as of December 2001, there were 457,492 Angolan refugees, mainly in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Zambia.

Of the confirmed or registered IDPs, almost 420,000 were located in camps or transit centres, as of May 2002, while about 600,000 had been resettled temporarily. The remaining 425,000 were regarded as integrated into host communities. This is also likely to be the case for many of the non-registered 'reported' IDPs . However, this latter category has also included some IDPs in inaccessible areas, that were reached by the humanitarian agencies for the first time in April-May 2002, following the cessation of hostilities. Data from the first 28 such locations to be assessed by the UN during that period indicated that there were about 155,000 IDPs in those areas, out of a total population of about 815,000. These figures were expected to increase as access was obtained to additional areas.

Improved access resulted in humanitarian agencies having to address the needs of an increased caseload, including some IDPs and resident populations found to be in exceptionally poor nutritional and health conditions in some of the newly accessible areas which had previously been cut off from assistance. The new situation created by the cessation of hostilities will hopefully create conditions

[2] Based on INE population projections from the 1970 census and partial provincial censuses in 1983 [INE, 1985].

propitious for the safe return of those IDPs who wish to go back to their areas of origin. The IDPs in temporary camps and transit centres, as well as others who are not well integrated into urban host communities, are the most likely to return. However, even in the best case scenario of large scale return before the start of the planting season in October 2002, the humanitarian caseload was unlikely to decline significantly until the harvest in April 2003.

In addition to providing food and other relief items for IDPs, the UN system has increasingly sought to improve protection for the displaced, who are especially vulnerable to abuse, because of their precarious situation. These protection issues affecting IDPs will be discussed later in this chapter, in Section 2.5.

The threat from landmines. Landmines and unexploded ordnance continue to pose a deadly danger, especially to children, and are also an important constraint on economic and social recovery. In the post-war period, mine action, including mine surveying, mine/UXO clearance and mine awareness, will be one of the high priorities. There are only rough estimates of the number of landmines laid in Angola, but there is no doubt that this is one of the most mine-infested countries in the world. On the basis of the initial 'level one' surveys conducted after the Lusaka Protocol, the *Instituto Angolano de Remoção de Obstáculos e Engenhos Explosivos* (INAROEE) estimated that there was a danger from mines in about 35% of the national territory and that there were possibly between 6 and 7 million mines, implying a ratio of one mine for every two persons in the country. In reality, these figures are no more than broad guesses, as it would require much more detailed 'level two' surveys in all at-risk zones to locate precisely all mined areas and make accurate estimates of the number of mines.

It is clear, however, that the problem of anti-personnel mines is most serious in the areas around population centres in the interior of the country that became major focuses of conflict during the 1990s, and on communications routes such as roads. In the affected areas, landmines present both a threat to life and an important constraint on economic and social recovery. INAROEE data indicate that 963 people were victims of landmine incidents in 2000 and that, of these, 403 died.

Demining is a painstakingly slow and dangerous process and, at the current rate of clearance (15.2 square kilometers of land and 16,609 mines in 2000), it would take decades to rid the country of mines.[3] Until the restoration of peace, demining and mine surveys were constrained by persistent insecurity. Furthermore, new mines continued to be laid by both sides in the conflict, although the extent to which this is happening is difficult to determine.

Angola signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the Ottawa convention of 1997) and, in July 2000, the National Assembly approved the convention's ratification. However, the government has not yet formally deposited the instrument of ratification with the United Nations and has acknowledged that its forces have engaged in laying new anti-personnel mines in some areas [ICBL, 2001].

INAROEE has been the government body responsible for the coordination and implementation of mine action programmes, but most demining, mine surveying, mine awareness and rehabilitation activities have been conducted by NGOs, with donor funding. In a renewed commitment to tackling the challenge of landmines, the Government established a National Inter-Sectoral Commission on De-Mining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) in August 2001. This body is mandated to set the policy framework for mine action and is expected to draw up a National Mine Action Plan.

[3] In 1997-2000, about 6,000 km of roads were cleared.

2.2 The right to development and the fight against poverty

In December 1986, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development, proclaiming that "the right to development is an inalienable human right by which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized". The Declaration put people at the centre of development, stating that 'the human person is the central subject of development and should be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to development'. This concept was further developed by UNDP in the early 1990s through the concept of 'sustainable human development', a paradigm that stressed both the human focus of development and the importance of ensuring its sustainability, notably with respect to the environment.[4]

Just as development has come to be seen as a multi-dimensional process, focusing on people as its agents and beneficiaries, poverty is now widely understood as being a multi-faceted 'condition', trapping its victims in a vicious cycle of deprivation and disadvantage. This approach goes beyond the traditional concept of poverty as a purely economic phenomenon, focusing exclusively on the income, consumption or expenditure of households, and takes into account other dimensions of poverty, such as the degree of access to public goods and services, morbidity, illiteracy and inadequate skills, limited access to capital, land and other resources, poor environmental conditions and problems of social exclusion, lack of information and 'voicelessness'.

During the 1990s, the struggle against poverty came to the fore of the international development agenda, contrasting with the previously dominant emphasis on economic growth or, all too often in the 1980s, only the short-term requirements of macroeconomic stabilization.[5] This was reflected in important policy shifts by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which in 1999 decided to make poverty reduction the overarching goal of their lending to developing countries. These countries must now produce Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), as a basis both for their own actions and as a framework for obtaining support from the international financial institutions – and increasingly other multilateral and bilateral donors too. The Government of Angola began the process of preparing an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) in 2000-2001, as one of the measures included in the Staff Monitored Programme (SMP) agreed with the IMF.

The integrated, holistic approach to development and poverty reduction implies the need for action and progress in a wide range of different fields. Many of these will be addressed in subsequent sections of this chapter, as well as Chapter 3. This section is limited to a specific sub-set of developmental and poverty reduction issues concerning income, education, gender equity and environmental sustainability.

Income and standard of living

Through the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966 and ratified by Angola in 1991, states recognized the 'right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing'. As a result of the growing concern about poverty in the 1990s, successive international conferences, such as the WSSD in 1995 and the Millennium Summit in 2000, set out a broad framework of goals, targets and measures to achieve a substantial reduction in poverty. The

[4] The concept was first developed in the *Human Development Report 1990* (UNDP, 1990).

[5] In this respect, the World Summit for Social Development (WSSC), which brought together 186 states in Copenhagen in 1995, amounted to a landmark shift to support a people-centred framework for development and place the eradication of poverty at the centre of development policies and strategies.

Millennium Summit set the specific goal of achieving by the year 2015 a 50% reduction in the proportion of the world's people whose income is less than one US dollar a day.

In Angola, achievement of this goal will require a reversal of the trends of recent years, which, on the basis of the available data, suggest a substantial worsening of the poverty situation. However, it is difficult to estimate what proportion of the Angolan population is currently subsisting on less than $1 a day, particularly in 'purchasing power parity' (PPP) terms, which would provide a more objective measure than dollar income converted at current exchange rates.[6] Such data are not currently available, for two main reasons. First, surveys of household income and expenditure in Angola have had a quite limited geographical scope, mainly for security reasons. Second, there are no reliable PPP exchange rates with which to convert household incomes and expenditures.

Since 1995, three surveys by the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) have provided data on household income or expenditure, and two were used to construct poverty lines. The first, the *Inquérito Prioritário sobre as Condições de Vida aos Domicílios* (IPCVD), was conducted in 1995 and focused only on urban areas, including Luanda [INE, 1996]. It is therefore sometimes known as the 'urban poverty study'.[7] Data from the 1995 survey have provided a basis for subsequent in-depth analysis of various facets of poverty in urban Angola [Adauta de Sousa, 1998; UNDP, 2000].

A second survey was carried out in 1998 in Huambo, Huíla, Luanda and Uíge. This was the *Inquérito sobre a Disposição e Capacidade no Pagamento dos Serviços Sociais Básicos* (IDCPSSB). While focusing on the capacity and willingness of households to pay for basic social services, it also provided valuable data on household budgets, although without constructing poverty lines. Carried out shortly before the return to full-scale war at the end of 1998, the IDCPSSB was probably the most representative survey on household expenditure conducted to date, with 55% of the population sample in urban areas (including 24% in Luanda) and 45% in rural areas. The survey found an average per capita expenditure, converted at current exchange rates, of $68 a month, in short a little over $2 a day. Dividing the population into expenditure quartiles, the lowest quartile (the poorest 25% of the population) had average expenditure of only $11 a month, or 37 US cents a day. The second quartile had average expenditure of $30 a month, in short about $1 a day.

The most recent source is the *Inquérito aos Agregados Familiares sobre Despesas e Receitas* (IDR), which conducted in 2000/01 in seven provinces, mainly in urban areas, at a time when war prevented wider access.[8] Approximately 90% of the sample was urban. At the time of writing, INE has released only some preliminary results from the IDR.

Caution must be exercised in drawing conclusions from these surveys about trends over time: the survey data are not strictly comparable, because their geographical coverage was slightly different. Furthermore, the two surveys that defined poverty lines set them at slightly different levels in real prices.[9]

Urban poverty. Despite the caveat mentioned above, the 1995 and 2000/01 surveys do provide broad indications about the changes in urban poverty in the second half of the 1990s. The most worrying finding of the 2000/01 survey was that the proportion of urban households living in extreme poverty

[6] The PPP rate of exchange takes into account price differences across countries, making it possible to compares levels of income, output or consumption in real terms. One dollar in PPP terms in a given country is equivalent in purchasing power to $1 in the United States.

[7] The IPCVD 1995 was limited to urban areas in Benguela, Cabinda, Catumbela, Luanda, Lobito, Lubango and Luena.

[8] The IDR 2000/01 was limited to the provinces of Benguela, Cabinda, Cunene, Huíla, Luanda, Lunda Norte and Namibe. Only urban areas were included in Benguela, Cabinda, Huíla and Lunda Norte.

[9] The poverty line was equivalent to $1.64/day per adult equivalent in the 1995 survey and $1.68/day in the 2000/01 survey. The extreme poverty line was set at 60 US cents a day in 1995 and 75 cents a day in 2000/01. The 1998 survey did not establish poverty lines.

had more than doubled since 1995. The 2000/01 survey set the extreme poverty line at Kz175 per adult-equivalent per day, enough to obtain a basket of goods sufficient to meet only the barest minimum of dietary needs (the same definition used in the 1995 survey). This was equivalent to $0.75 a day at the informal market exchange rate. The survey showed that the proportion of households living below the extreme poverty line had risen to 24.7%, compared with 11.6% in 1995 [INE, 2001a]. By contrast, there was only a slight increase, from 61 to 63%, in the proportion of households living below the poverty line (Kz392 or $1.68 a day).

Figure 2.2

Percentage of urban households living in poverty, 1995 and 2000



NOTE: Poverty line equivalent to $1.64/day per adult equivalent in 1995 and $1.68/day in 2000; extreme poverty line $0.60/day in 1995 and $0.75/day in 2000; 1995 data for urban areas in Benguela, Cabinda, Huíla, Luanda and Moxico; preliminary 2000 data for Benguela, Cabinda, Cunene, Huíla, Luanda, Lunda Norte and Namibe, with 90% urban sample.

Sources: ICPVD 1995 [INE, 1996]; IDR 2000/01 [INE, 2001a]

The deepening of urban poverty has been related to the large influx of IDPs into the cities, as well as economically-driven migration, which has swollen the number of urban-dwellers competing for employment and income-earning opportunities. In addition, urban households hosting IDPs because of kinship obligations have been obliged to share limited resources, stretching coping systems to the limit and pushing many host families into extreme poverty. As Chapter 3 will discuss, the lack of job opportunities in the formal sector of the economy and low wage levels in the public administration and most state companies have driven most urban households to depend on the informal sector as their only or primary source of income. Women in particular have turned to informal sector activities for employment and income, but increasing numbers of young men have also entered the sector for lack of alternatives. Many poor families also attempt to generate additional income by sending children out to work (see Section 2.4). For both women and children, petty trading is the main income-generating activity. However, the informal sector has become increasingly saturated with low-skilled workers, putting strong downward pressure on earnings, particularly in urban areas outside Luanda, where most 'trickle down' income from the country's oil revenues is concentrated. There are no credible unemployment data in Angola, partly because unemployment is disguised by under-employment – a form of employment characterized by very low levels of productivity and incomes.

Rural poverty. Poverty is far more serious in the rural areas. This is evident from the fact that, as the 1998 IDCPSSB found, rural households have little to spend beyond meeting their basic food requirements. Overall, 76% of rural households' expenditure was on food, a proportion that rose to 81% in the poorest quartile [INE, n.d.]. As a result of the war, most rural households have receded to an almost entirely subsistence economy, with very limited trade links to the rest of the economy. Insecurity has limited the areas that can be cultivated, while rural households have lost their resources

(livestock, equipment, tools and seeds) and been cut off from markets. Conscription has also reduced the manpower available for land clearance -- probably a serious constraint on production in the 33% of rural households headed by women [INE, 1997]. Furthermore, in many parts of the country the rural population has been depleted by the successive waves of displacement to the urban areas. Only in some secure areas of the south-west are conditions for rural people better, with small agricultural surpluses and functioning trade circuits.

Gender disparities in economic opportunities

The right of women to equal economic opportunities is upheld by the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), ratified by Angola in 1984. Article 13 required States to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in economic and social life. This and other articles (notably 11, 14 and 15) established that women have equal rights to men with respect to employment, choice of professions, promotion, remuneration, access to bank loans and other types of credit, ownership of land and other forms of property, and inheritance. The international community has focused increasingly on the measures needed to realize these rights, notably through the Platform of Action adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, and the final declaration of the special session of the UN General Assembly held in 2000 to review the progress made since the Beijing summit.

In traditional rural society, there has always been a division of labour between the sexes. Women are responsible for most aspects of daily family subsistence, including the production of food crops, the raising of small livestock, the fetching of water and firewood, cooking and the care of children, the elderly and the sick, while men prepare the soil, cultivate commercial crops (greatly reduced in scope since the colonial era) and rear cattle. Household assets are generally the property of male heads of households, and inheritance, although traditionally matrilineal in most Angolan ethnic groups, usually benefits the male relatives of the deceased, leaving widows in a particularly vulnerable situation.

In the urban areas, economic pressures have driven women into the labour force, resulting in an almost equal labour force participation rate among men and women: data from the ICPVD in 1995 gave rates of 66.2 and 65.7% respectively in the male and female population ten years old and above [Adauta de Sousa, 1995]. Nonetheless, traditional cultural concepts about the inferior status and lesser rights of women are still strong, resulting in women remaining at a disadvantage to men in terms of employment opportunities, as well as ownership of assets and inheritance. Unequal employment opportunities are reinforced by higher levels of illiteracy among women than men, reflecting inequalities in educational access (see below).

As a result, women are concentrated in low-skill jobs, particularly in the informal sector. According to the ICPVD data, women held only 33% of jobs in the formal sector, but 63.5% of jobs in the informal sector [Adauta de Sousa, 1998]. Women working in the informal sector are concentrated overwhelmingly in retail trading and are almost all self-employed. In the civil service, approximately 60% of jobs are held by men, according to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Public Administration, Employment and Social Security in 1998 [MAPESS, 1999]. Men occupy 66% of professional posts (*técnicos médios* and above) and 72% of senior professional posts (*técnicos superiores*). The situation is similar in the liberal professions: for example, only 29% of lawyers are women [OAA, 2001].

Figure 2.3
Women's share of employment
(% of total)



Sources: IPCVD 1996 [Adauta, 1997]; MAPESS, 1999a

Box 2.1

The impact of war, urbanization and poverty on gender roles

Under the pressures of displacement, urbanization and the struggle for survival, traditional gender relations within the family appear to be changing, with women achieving greater economic independence relative to their husbands or male partners, but also working longer hours to combine income-earning activities outside the home with traditional home-keeping responsibilities.

In Angolan culture, there has been a deeply ingrained notion of male supremacy, shared by both men and women, in which men are responsible for leading and for making decisions, while women are subordinate to men and carry out decisions made for them. This notion was related to the division of labour in traditional rural society, which saw women's role as one of bearing and raising children, feeding and caring for their families, and carrying out productive tasks related to home-keeping, including the cultivation of crops, the rearing of small livestock, and the fetching of water and firewood. Men were responsible for family and community leadership and, in the productive sphere, for preparing the soil for cultivation, raising cattle and, in some areas during the colonial period, growing commercial crops or supplementing family incomes through migration. Despite male dominance within the family and community, women had some independence in economic matters, as they often engaged in petty trading to earn cash income, supplementing their farm produce, and they generally retained and spent their income without male control [Åkesson, 1992].

This trading role of women has dramatically increased in the past two decades, however, because of the displacement and urbanization of rural populations. In the absence of farm tasks, it is culturally accepted that women should seek to earn incomes through trading, which is also the easiest sphere of economic activity for most women in the urban areas to enter with minimal capital and skills. A recent study on IDPs, carried out mainly in IDP camps in Huíla, Benguela, Malange and Zaire in 1999-2000, found that men had lost their position of 'family provider' and were in a state of 'existential crisis', a condition that in some cases was conducive to heightened violence against women. At the same time, the study found that women were overburdened as a result of the combination of their traditional domestic duties with their greatly expanded role in the market-place as principal bread-winners [Fonseca et al, n.d.]. Similar findings have come from urban household studies, which have highlighted the increased importance, within the family, of the income generated by women in the informal sector in a context where salaries, earned mainly by men, were being wiped out by inflation during the 1990s in much of the formal sector, particularly the civil service and parastatal companies [Van der Winden, 1996; UNICEF/GURN, 1999].

This may help explain the unexpected findings in the household income and expenditure surveys in both 1995 and 2000/2001 [INE, 1996; AU, 2001] that a lower proportion of female-headed households than male-headed households are below the poverty line. Preliminary data from the 2000/2001 survey, carried out principally in urban areas, indicate that 63% of female-headed households were below the poverty line, compared with 68% of male-headed households. However, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions, as poverty in female-headed households was found to be deeper and more severe on average than in male-headed households, even though there were more male-headed households in poverty. Extreme poverty is highest in widowed and divorced male-headed households, followed by widowed female-headed households [AU, 2001]. Studies in the rural areas indicate that female-headed households are among the poorest and most vulnerable, because they are deprived of male labour for land clearance and ploughing [Robson, 2001].

The high proportion of female-headed households (33% in the rural areas and 29% in the urban areas according to the 1996 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey) is an important facet of contemporary Angolan society [INE, 1997]. Again, this is partly war-related, since large numbers of adult males have been killed or conscripted, while others have been separated by displacement or migration. Household surveys have found very low ratios of men to women, especially in the 15-34 year age-groups. However, the high proportion of female-headed households also reflects the trend towards non-co-residential forms of polygyny. This trend, which is found in many African countries, is partly a consequence of urbanization, which makes it more difficult for wives to live together in the same compound. The lack of legal recognition of polygyny may be another factor in Angola. Along with the slackening of the social norms and controls characteristic of close-knit rural communities, traditional forms of marriage have become looser and less stable, resulting in what some analysts have called 'serial polygyny' [Amado & Van-Dúnem, 1996]. Meanwhile, legally recognized marriage remains a limited phenomenon in Angola, due both to cultural factors and the breakdown of the civil registration system. The IDR 2000/2001 found that almost four times as many women were in de facto unions as in formal marriages [INE, 2001b].

There is circumstancial evidence, however, that female earning power in the urban areas has withstood inflation better than male earning power, precisely because of the greater concentration of men in formal sector employment, particularly in the public sector, where incomes have declined steeply in real terms since the early 1990s, despite periodic large wage adjustments. These issues are discussed further in Box 2.1.

Human settlements and housing

The International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights affirms the right to adequate housing as an integral part of the right to an adequate standard of living (Article 11). The plight of slum-dwellers around the world has been the focus of growing concern, notably at the Second International Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) in Istanbul in 1996 and at the Millennium Summit, which set the goal of improving the lives of 100 million slum-dwellers worldwide by 2020.

In Angola, poor housing is a key dimension of poverty in both urban and rural areas, even though construction materials are often more solid than in other parts of Africa, largely because the price of cement was low until price liberalization in the 1990s. Only 9% of housing in Luanda and 5% in other cities is 'traditional', in the sense of houses with mud-brick walls and non-rigid roofing materials, according to the 1998 IDCPSSB. 68% of Luanda households and 75% of other urban households live in 'conventional houses', meaning houses with walls made of materials such as cement or bricks, with roofing made of corrugated iron or similar rigid materials. In the rural areas, just over half (58%) of households have similar types of homes, while 42% live in traditional adobe/thatch houses [MINADER, 1997].

However, serious problems have arisen as a result of the development of huge informal settlements in the peri-urban areas, which now house the vast majority of urban-dwellers. These areas have had minimal if any town planning, resulting in serious overcrowding and an almost total lack of urban services, such as water supply and sanitation systems, as well as woefully inadequate investments in roads and social infrastructure. Over the past two decades, these spontaneous settlements have grown ever larger, as a result of the massive migration from the rural areas and the failure to plan for and invest in sites for low-cost urban housing. Houses have been built anarchically, without planning permission, on unserviced peri-urban sites, and in some cases, settlements have developed in dangerous zones, with high risks of erosion and land slides.

In addition, the housing stock has deteriorated in the 'modern' core of the cities, due to lack of maintenance. About 17-18% of households in Luanda and other urban areas live in these areas, mainly in apartment blocks. Nearly all these buildings were erected before independence and most have seriously decayed since then, due to the lack of maintenance in the years following their nationalization or confiscation. Although many apartments, as well as houses (*vivendas*) have been privatized since the early 1990s, most of the apartment structures remain in state hands and have continued without routine maintenance for a quarter of a century.

Box 2.2

Environmental challenges

Since the "earth summit" in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, there has been growing awareness worldwide of the importance of ensuring the sustainability of development, through improved conservation and management of natural resources, and also of the strong inter-relationship between the environment, development and poverty reduction. Article 24 of the Angolan Constitution invests the State with responsibilities for environmental protection. The Ministry of Fisheries and Environment has the main mandate in this respect and is preparing to draft a national plan for sustainable development. There are at least six principal areas of environmental concern in Angola: deforestation, soil impoverishment, erosion and, in the coastal regions of the south-west, desertification; the related problem of poor households' dependence on traditional energy sources; the depletion of fish stocks; pollution by the petroleum industry, notably through the flaring of gas; the loss of biological diversity; and poor environmental sanitation. Each of these will be discussed briefly below, apart from the challenge of environmental sanitation, which is considered later, in relationship to health.

Deforestation, soil erosion and desertification. At a national level, Angola has a high ratio of arable land to population: about 6-8 million hectares, most of which is uncultivated, for a rural population of no more than 6-7 million. It has been estimated that the total area planted in 2000/01 was about 2.2 million hectares [FAO/WFP, 2001]. These aggregate figures hide the fact that most of the rural population is concentrated in quite small areas, partly due to traditional demographic patterns (for example the heavy concentration of population in the high-rainfall areas of the escarpment and the western *planalto*), but even more so because of war-related insecurity. Population density is especially high in the 'green belt' areas around the major cities. In these areas, the small size of land-holdings and widespread use of continuous cultivation systems, in place of traditional land rotation, prevents the natural build-up of organic matter. The loss of animal traction during the war, along with low access to fertilizers, has also resulted in a lack of nutrient replenishment. Together with the loss of tree cover, these factors are resulting in serious soil impoverishment and erosion in densely populated pockets. In the south-west, where rainfall is lowest, there has been progressive desertification, with sand-dunes threatening the town of Tômbwa in Namibe.

Dependence on traditional energy sources. Deforestation around heavily populated areas is accentuated by the loss of tree cover, resulting both from land cultivation and heavy reliance on wood-fuel for cooking by populations in some urban areas. This is not a uniform problem: in Luanda, which is in an arid zone far from sources of wood and charcoal, the vast majority of the population uses cooking gas (88.5% of households according to the IPCVD 1995), but in most towns in the interior households depend primarily on wood and charcoal (98% in the case of Luena). 99% of rural households use these traditional energy sources for cooking, according to a survey of rural households conducted in 1997 (MINADER, 1997].

Loss of bio-diversity. The war has resulted in the breakdown of the protected area system (PAS) established prior to independence (covering 6.5% of the national territory), and there is a risk that some unique eco-systems will be lost. While wartime conditions have also provided some protection for both plant and animal species, due to rural depopulation, Angola's especially rich genetic resources in crop plants could be threatened by the large-scale introduction of imported commercial seeds during the post-conflict agricultural rehabilitation process [MINADER/FAO, 1996].

Depletion of fish stocks. There appears to have been considerable over-fishing off the Angolan coast, particularly in the south, which has traditionally had some of the richest fishing waters in Africa. These resources were the basis for a flourishing fisheries sector, both industrial and artisanal, in the colonial period. There has been a large decline in the quantity of fish landed, from 599,000 tons in 1973 to 191,000 tons in 1999 [DSE, 1974; GURN, 2001]. Although many factors have been responsible, large-scale fishing by foreign industrial fishing fleets, along with minimal national capacity for surveillance and interception of boats fishing illegally or exceeding their quotas, is a matter of major concern.

Pollution by the petroleum sector. Oil spills too pose a potential hazard for marine resources, since 98% of Angolan petroleum production is offshore. Apart from this, most of the associated gas extracted with petroleum is flared, in the absence of alternative, economically viable uses. Gas flaring is a major source of 'greenhouse gases', contributing to depletion of the ozone layer and global warming. The good news is that ChevronTexaco and Sonangol are appraising two major projects that, if found to be commercially viable, would make it possible to avoid flaring most of the associated gas. The first is a liquefied natural gas (LNG) project, which would make use of most of the gas extracted to the south of the Congo basin, and the second a project for gas reinjection and production of LPG and condensate off the coast of Cabinda.

Habitat has estimated that less than 20% of the urban population has security of tenure, in the sense of living in houses or buildings with a clearly defined legal status [Habitat, 2001]. In conjunction with the weakness of the banking sector, this has been a serious obstacle to the development of financial services for housing development. Although 63% of urban households own their homes, the lack of title deeds deprives urban-dwellers of collateral for borrowing. Besides closing off opportunities for the urban poor to gain access to credit for housing or to expand their income-generating activities, the lack of security of tenure puts the poor at risk of summary eviction, as happened to the residents of the Boavista neighbourhood of Luanda in 2001.[10]

This problem affects the residents of both the informal slum settlements and those occupying apartment buildings in the 'asphalt' centres of the major cities. In the latter case, most of the confiscations by the state after independence were never adequately documented in legal terms. Although a privatization law in 1991 made provision for the existing occupants to acquire these state properties (law 19/91), many of those who did so do not yet have title deeds. Others, who remained tenants of the state, do not have tenancy documents. The problem is much more serious for the residents of the peri-urban areas, where the majority of urban-dwellers now live. In these informal settlements, large numbers of residents, many of them *deslocados* or migrants from the rural areas, have spontaneously erected their dwellings, without adequate legal documentation, or have rented land or accommodation from private landlords without secure tenancy agreements.

Education

Education is an intrinsic human right, recognized as such in a succession of international human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The Angolan Constitution, in its section on fundamental rights and duties, states that it is incumbent on the family, with the support of the State, to promote and ensure the education of children and young people (Article 29). Education, as a key factor in human capital formation, is also one of the driving forces of development. Angola's long-term national development will depend in large measure on raising the levels of educational access and attainment, so that the country has a literate and well-educated population, with functional work-place and life skills.

Through a series of international conferences, beginning with the World Conference on Education for All, held in Jomtien, Thailand, in 1990, and the World Summit for Children, held the same year in New York, the world's governments have placed a high priority on translating this right into a reality, and have set out a basic policy framework, with time-bound goals and targets. These have been updated most recently at the World Education Forum, held in Dakar in April 2000, which launched a renewed drive to make the right to education a reality for the millions of children still deprived of schooling. The Dakar Framework of Action set the goal of ensuring that, by 2015, all children, boys and girls, 'have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality'. Other key goals were the elimination of gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005 and at levels of education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls' equal access to and achievement in basic education, along with a 50% improvement in adult literacy by 2015, especially in the case of women.

[10] In July 2001, the Provincial Government of Luanda began to evict more than 10,000 families from Boavista and demolish their homes. No legal process was employed and no alternative housing was provided for the residents, who were transported 40 km to a site near the town of Viana, far from their jobs or other sources of livelihood, and accommodated in tents. A similar fate may yet await hundreds of thousands of other poor residents of the slum settlements of the major cities, as powerful interests seek to acquire ownership of potentially valuable urban land sites.

The Millennium Summit, the following September, reiterated, in an abbreviated form, the core goals adopted at the World Education Forum, stating that the world community would strive to ensure that 'by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling and that girls and boys will have equal access to all levels of education'.

School enrolment. The post-independence government placed a high premium on education and, in a decree enacted in 1977 (decree 26/77) based the education system on the principles of universality, free access and equality of opportunity. The first level of *ensino de base regular* (the first four years of basic education) was made compulsory for all children. In the post-independence period, large investments were made in education in an attempt to overcome the failings of the colonial regime, which had left Angola with one of the lowest levels of school enrolment and one of the highest rates of adult illiteracy in the world (about 85% in the early 1970s). Large adult literacy campaigns accompanied a rapid expansion in school enrolment, particularly at primary level, where the gross enrolment ratio had been only 33% in 1973 [MED, 1995]. Primary enrolment (in the first six classes of *ensino de base regular*) reached 1.48 million in 1979/80, but, as the war spread in the 1980s, enrolment declined again, both in absolute terms (numbers of pupils) and relative to the school-age population, which continued to increase rapidly.

The decline in enrolment was only partly due to the direct effects of the war, which caused the destruction and abandonment of large numbers of schools in rural areas. Another key factor was the failure to train and deploy adequate numbers of teachers, with sufficient teaching and learning materials, to sustain the surge in post-independence enrolment. By the early 1990s, primary enrolment was down to about 1 million, although there were significant fluctuations in some years, reflecting shifts in the security situation. At the same time, the adult literacy campaign, which was reaching almost 200,000 adults a year in the early 1980s, had shrunk to 25,000 or less beneficiaries by the early 1990s [UNESCO/UNICEF/MED, 1993].

Conscious of the serious implications of these reverses, the Ministry of Education began a process of in-depth review of policy and strategies. A new education law was drafted and eventually passed into law in 2001. In 1995, the Ministry finalized a detailed plan for the recovery of the education sector, the *Plano-Quadro Nacional de Reconstrução do Sistema Educativo* [MED, 1995]. This was a three-phase plan, beginning with rehabilitation and moving on to consolidation and expansion, with the goal of achieving a net primary enrolment ratio of 67% by 2005, as well as a 50% reduction in female illiteracy.

The education system suffered new setbacks, however, as a result of the continuing state of insecurity (even before the full-scale resumption of the war at the end of 1998) and low budget allocations to the education sector (a problem discussed in Chapter 3). According to Ministry of Education administrative data, primary school enrolment stagnated around 1 million pupils in the mid 1990s, although there was a large increase to 1.4 million pupils in 1998 [MEC, 2001a]. However, primary enrolment was still slightly lower than it had been almost two decades earlier, in 1980, even though the primary school-age population had increased by almost two thirds in the same period. No administrative data are yet available for 1999-2001, and so it is not known how the resumption of the war at the end of 1998 affected enrolment.

Taking the Ministry of Education's data for 1998 and age-specific population projections for the same year, it is possible to make rough estimates of the gross and net primary enrolment ratios – although it cannot be stressed enough that these are no more than broad approximations, due to the unreliability of both the population data (see Chapter 3) and the school registration data collated by the Ministry of Education. The data give a net primary enrolment ratio of 47.4% and a gross enrolment ratio of 59.0% in 1998.[11]

[11] The net primary enrolment ratio is the number of children in the official primary school age-group (age 6-11) who are enrolled in primary school (classes 1-6 of *ensino de base*), divided by the same age-group population. The gross primary enrolment ratio is the number of children of all ages enrolled in primary school,

An alternative source of data comes from the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), conducted by INE in 1996 and 2001. Covering all 18 provinces, these surveys were designed to monitor the goals set by the World Summit for Children (WSC) in 1990. They provide data for a large number of social indicators, including on education. When comparing the data for 1996 and 2000, however, it must be borne in mind that, whereas the 1996 survey was carried out throughout the country, including in areas that at the time were controlled by UNITA, the geographical coverage of the 2001 survey was more restricted, due to war-related difficulties of access. It is therefore likely that the MICS 2001 data do not fully reflect the situation in the most war-affected areas, where social conditions, including access to education, are among the worst in the country. In addition, INE has not yet released comprehensive data from this more recent survey, limiting the scope of analysis, particularly regarding education.

The MICS 1996 gave a net primary enrolment ratio of 49.7%, a figure quite close to the ratio calculated from administrative data for 1998. However, it gave a much higher figure for the gross primary enrolment ratio (89.4%), compared with a figure of only 59.0% derived from the administrative data for 1998. This large difference, despite similar net primary enrolment ratios, suggests that there is substantial under-recording of the numbers of pupils in school, along with inaccuracies in the recording of children's ages.

The MICS 2001 reported an improvement in the net primary enrolment ratio (to 62.5%), but this figure may be exaggerated by the less representative nature of the 2001 survey, which did not cover inaccessible areas, where the education system was not functioning.

Figure 2.4

Net primary enrolment ratio, by gender

(pupils aged 6-11 enroled in classes 1-6 as % of population aged 6-11)



Sources: MICS 1996 [INE/UNICEF, 1997]; MEC, 2001; UNICEF, SOWC 2001; INE population projections

Irrespective of the data discrepancies, it is clear that Angola is far from achieving the international goals of universal access to and completion of primary school. In addition to low enrolment ratios, many children who enroll in Class 1 fail to complete a full course of primary education. This reflects the high drop-out rates in all primary school classes, averaging 24% of pupils in the first four classes in 1998, according to the administrative data [MEC, 2001a]. Significant gender disparities in access to education also remain, despite major advances in this respect since the colonial era (see Box 2.3). Figure 2.4, which compares gender-disaggregated net primary enrolment ratios for Angola, Sub-Saharan Africa and developing countries, indicates that Angola lags behind in primary school enrolment relative to other African and developing countries, despite its relatively high government revenues from oil.

In view of the setbacks of the 1990s, the Ministry of Education has reformulated the *Plano-Quadro*, setting new goals and targets to be achieved in 2015 [MEC, 2001b]. The enormity of the challenge is clear from the goal of increasing the number of pupils enrolled in primary school (equivalent to the first two levels of *ensino de base regular*) from an estimated 1.5 million in 2000 to 5 million by 2015,

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divided by the population of the official primary school age-group (6-11). The gross enrolment ratio is higher than the net enrolment ratio when some children enrolled at a particular level of the education system are outside the official age-group for that level.

in order to achieve universal enrolment and the completion of primary education by all pupils, while keeping pace with the rapid growth of the primary school-age population. The aim is to achieve two thirds enrolment by 2005 and raise this to 100% by 2015. The plan also sets the goal of tripling the number of secondary school graduates and eliminating adult illiteracy by 2015.

Box 2.3
Girls' education

Historically, there have been major gender disparities in access to education in most parts of the world, including in Angola. CEDAW and other international human rights conventions have embodied in international law the principle of non-discrimination in access to education, and this is also reflected in national legislation, notably in the Angolan Constitution, which outlaws discrimination on the basis of sex (Article 18), and in the post-independence legislation on education, which affirmed the principle of universality of access. Girls' education is critically important for harnessing the nation's human resources for development, as well as for opening up improved economic opportunities for women, raising their self-esteem and confidence, and widening their access to information and knowledge.

The world conferences have placed strong emphasis on achieving equal access to education for boys and girls, and on the closely related goal of reducing female illiteracy. The Millennium Summit, in September 2000, set the goal of ensuring that 'girls and boys will have equal access to all levels of education' by 2015.

In the post-independence period, Angola made major strides towards gender equality in access to education, significantly narrowing the major disparities characteristic of the education system in the colonial period. Although overall enrolment ratios, for both sexes, have declined since the early 1980s, this has not resulted in the reversal of the progress on gender equity. Nonetheless, significant disparities do remain. The MICS data for 1996 showed a gross primary enrolment ratio of 98% for boys, compared with 82% for girls [INE, 1997]. At higher levels, disparities widen: administrative data for 1998 show that in the third level of *ensino de base*, there were 84 girls for every 100 boys, while at Agostinho Neto University there were only 70 female students for every 100 male students [MEC, 2001a].

Vocational and technical education. While primary education is the key vehicle for establishing the basic skills of literacy and numeracy, vocational and technical education could be especially important in developing specific work-place skills. The capacity of existing vocational and technical schools is quite limited: there are currently 160 such schools (33 public and 127 private), with 10,799 students, and 72% of capacity is concentrated in just two provinces, Luanda and Benguela. Many of these schools face serious problems of dilapidated infrastructure and lack of teaching materials and equipment. Apprenticeships are another important vehicle for the transmission of work-place skills, but little is known about the scope and characteristics of such mechanisms, especially in the informal sector [De Vletter, 2002].

Adult literacy. Low levels of school enrolment, the poor quality of education and high drop-out rates result in many children reaching adulthood unable to read and write. In addition, the problem of adult illiteracy has been exacerbated by the decline of the adult literacy campaigns that were lauded in the post-independence period. The World Education Forum, held in Dakar in April 2000, set the goal of achieving a 50% reduction in levels of adult illiteracy by 2015, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults.

The MICS 2001 has provided the first national data for many years on adult literacy rates, showing that illiteracy is most serious among women and in the rural areas. While 18% of men were found to be illiterate, this was true for only 46% of women. Among rural women, 66% were illiterate (see Figure 2.5). In fact, these figures probably understate the problem of illiteracy, since the MICS 2001 was limited to accessible areas, because of the war. In most inaccessible rural areas, the education system had historically been quite limited and then was destroyed during the war, often as far back as the 1980s, resulting in very high illiteracy rates.

Figure 2.5

Adult literacy rates

(% of population aged 15 and above; Angolan data are for accessible areas)



Sources: MICS 2001 [INE, 2002]; data for Sub-Saharan Africa and developing countries from UNICEF, 2002

Quality, learning achievement and drop-out. Although there have not yet been scientific studies on pupils' learning achievement in Angolan schools, it is likely that achievement is poor, both because of inadequate educational inputs (shortages of qualified teachers and instructional materials) and unfavourable conditions at home (poverty, child labour and lack of space and lighting for homework). The high drop-out rates (see above) are an indirect indicator of these adverse factors, and a measure of the wastage of the education system.

The rapid expansion of private education since the legalization of private schools in 1991 (law 18/91) provides evidence of dissatisfaction with the quality of education provided in public schools. Private education has expanded most rapidly in Luanda, where 14% of pupils were in private schools by 1998. Although only a small minority of families can afford to send their children to such schools, most pupils in public schools (68% in the case of Luanda) would switch to private schools if they had the means to do so, according to a survey in 1998 on willingness and ability to pay for basic social services [INE, n.d.].

Education inputs. Teacher-pupil ratios in the public sector vary widely from province to province, with very high ratios in some provinces. Overall, the pupil-teacher ratio in the first level of *ensino de base regular* (30 in 1998 according to the Ministry of Education data) appears reasonable for the existing number of pupils, but it would be much higher if the large number of children currently out of school were enrolled. Furthermore, many teachers do not have the required qualifications (graduation from *ensino medio normal*): in Luanda, only half of the teachers in the first level of *ensino de base* in 1998 had this level of qualifications, most of the rest having completed only the third level of *ensino de base*. The situation is generally much worse in the other provinces: in Huíla, only 7% of teachers in the first level of *ensino de base* in 1998 had completed *ensino médio normal* [MEC, 2001a].

Low salary levels (and arrears in salary payments) have made teaching in the public sector an unattractive profession and also encourage teachers to engage in parallel jobs and the extortion of *gasosas*, creating a barrier for educational access by the poor and distorting the objectivity of the examination system. To these problems are added an acute shortage of classrooms, with a ratio of 64 pupils per classroom nationwide (and much higher ratios in some provinces) according to the administrative data for 1998 [MEC, 2001a], as well as shortages of textbooks, particularly outside Luanda and a few other large cities. The shortage of classrooms has resulted in the widespread use of a double or triple shift system, sometimes reducing the overall number of classroom contact hours, as well as obliging many pupils to attend school in the evenings. The state provides no free textbooks to pupils. Access to textbooks therefore depends entirely on families' ability to purchase textbooks in the market, where supply is inadequate and prices are consequently high.

Reasons for children not attending school. The 1998 survey on willingness and capacity to pay for basic social services [INE, n.d.] found that economic factors were the principal reason for children not attending school (see Figure 2.6). For those who had never attended school, 32% cited economic factors (lack of money, need to work or school/teacher demanding money) as the main reason. These

factors were also given as the main reason for dropping out of school (53% at the first level of *ensino de base* and 66% at the second level). The other major factors were children's lack of documents, such as birth certificates (the reason cited by 23% of those who had never been to school), and lack of places in schools.

Figure 2.6
Reasons for children not attending school, 1998



Source: Inquerito sobre a Disposicao e Capacidade de pagamento dos servicos sociais basicos, 1998 [INE, n.d.]

2.3 The right to survival and a long and healthy life

Like low levels of education, high rates of morbidity and mortality are another dimension of poverty, and also one of the underlying constraints on development. Like other parts of the developing world, Angola has succeeded in reducing the crude death rate (to an estimated 19 per 1,000 population). However, life expectancy is still low, at 42.4 years, according to the 1996 MICS [INE, 1997], compared with averages of 48 years for Sub-Saharan Africa and 62 years for developing countries [UNICEF, 2002]. Of particular concern are the extremely high rates of infant and under-five mortality, discussed below. These threats to survival, good health and longevity have multiple underlying causes, including unsanitary environmental conditions, the poor quality of water sources, income poverty and household food insecurity, lack of knowledge and poor health practices, and a health system in a state of serious decay. The threats are being compounded by the development of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which, in the absence of decisive measures to combat the disease, can be expected to reduce life expectancy and overwhelm the already debilitated health service.

Child survival

Article 6 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) upholds 'the inherent right to life' of every child. However, the CRC does not reduce survival rights only to the right to life; nor does the State simply have the negative obligation to refrain from taking away the life of a child. Rather, it has positive obligations to ensure children's survival. This is linked to upholding other rights, such as the child's right to health care [CRC, Article 24]. Worldwide concern about continuing high levels of mortality among children, mainly from easily avoidable causes, has been one of the main features of the international conferences, from the World Summit for Children (WSC) in 1990 to the Millennium Summit in 2000.

The WSC set the goal of reducing the infant mortality rate (IMR) and the under-five mortality rate (U5MR) by one third, or to 50 and 70 per thousand live births respectively (whichever was less), by 2000. Globally, these goals were not fully met: by 2000, the worldwide IMR and U5MR were respectively 57 and 83 per thousand live births [UNICEF, 2001]. Against this background, the Millennium Summit set the new goal of reducing infant and under-five mortality rates by two thirds by 2015.

It is difficult to track progress in Angola, due to the lack of baseline data from the start of the World Decade for Children (1990-2000) that followed the WSC. However, the MICS data in both 1996 and 2001 highlighted the seriousness of child mortality in Angola and how little progress has yet been made towards the international child survival goals. The data revealed an IMR of 166 and 150 per thousand live births respectively in 1996 and 2001. The corresponding figures for the U5MR were 274 and 250 per thousand live births [INE/UNICEF, 1997; INE, 2002].

Figure 2.7
Infant and under-5 mortality rates
(deaths per 1,000 live births)



Sources: MICS 2001 [INE, 2002]; UNICEF, 2002

The slight decline in the two rates since 1996 almost certainly does not reflect the real situation at a national level, since the geographical coverage of the 2001 survey was more restricted by problems of war-related inaccessibility than that conducted in 1996, when the country was in a period of relative peace. UNICEF's most recent estimates for Angola (IMR of 172 and U5MR of 295 per 1,000 live births) imply that Angola has the second highest U5MR in the world, surpassed only by Sierra Leone [UNICEF, 2002].

Mortality rates among displaced children in some parts of the country have been much higher than these national averages. A UNFPA study in IDP camps in Benguela, Huíla, Malange and Zaire in 1999 found an IMR of 271 per thousand live births and a U5MR of 401 per thousand live births [UNFPA, 2002].

The main direct causes of infant and child deaths in Angola are malaria, acute respiratory and diarrhoeal diseases, anaemia and vaccine preventable diseases (in particular measles). Malnutrition is an important underlying condition. The incidence of these diseases and conditions, and mortality from them, could be greatly reduced, through preventive measures against malaria, universal immunization, and improvements in child care, nutrition, environmental sanitation and water quality. In 1997, the Government decided to implement a national strategy for the integrated management of childhood

illnesses (IMCI). However, this requires, first and foremost, a more effective health care system, as well as measures to address underlying causes of the high rates of morbidity, such as malnutrition and inadequate access to safe water and sanitation facilities.

The challenge of malaria

Malaria is by far the largest single cause of mortality in all age groups, and particularly among children and expectant mothers. Because of its major contribution to morbidity, the high incidence of malaria also has far-reaching effects on economic productivity and household incomes, contributing indirectly to the high levels of poverty, as well on absenteeism from school. There has been growing concern worldwide about the failure to make headway against malaria, which remains the main cause of death throughout Africa, except in a few Southern African countries where it has been overtaken in recent years by HIV/AIDS. African heads of state held a Roll Back Malaria summit in Abuja, Nigeria, in April 2000, adopting a comprehensive action plan for the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of the disease, and the Millennium Summit in September 2000 set an international goal of halting and reversing its spread by 2015.

Although the quality of the routine epidemiological data is compromised by weak data management systems in the national health service, the available data leave no doubt about the role of malaria as the main cause of illness and mortality in Angola. These data show that malaria accounted for 80% of cases of notifiable diseases and 76% of deaths recorded in the national health service in 2000 (see Figure 2.8). A total of 2.1 million malaria cases were notified in 2000, giving an annual incidence of 155 cases per thousand population, and there was a fatality rate of 0.45%. The Ministry of Health has estimated that on average 15.4 million work-days are lost from malaria annually, out of a total of 28.4 million days of malaria-related sickness [MINSA, n.d.]. The high incidence of the disease in Angola is due not only to the tropical climate, but also to poor environmental sanitation, which creates breeding grounds for malaria-carrying mosquitoes. Another contributory factor is the low availability and use of preventive methods, such as nets, although a major initiative to make nets more widely available was launched by the Government, with the support of UNICEF, in 2000.

Figure 2.8
Recorded causes of mortality, 2000
(% distribution by diseases)



Source: MINSA, 2001

The rising spectre of HIV/AIDS

The Millennium Summit gave special attention to the challenge of halting the spread of HIV/AIDS, which threatens to reverse the progress made in raising life expectancy and undermine prospects for economic and social development, particularly in Africa, the continent most seriously affected by the disease. The HIV/AIDS epidemic began to gather pace in Angola slightly later than in most of Southern Africa, possibly because Angola is less integrated into the regional economy, in terms of transport, trade and migration. Nonetheless, by the late 1990s, HIV/AIDS had established a firm foothold in the population and was spreading rapidly. Without firm measures to combat the epidemic, it is likely have a devastating impact in the next few years, bringing a high death toll in the most productive age groups, plunging many families deeper into poverty, shortening life expectancy, overwhelming the health system and creating a generation of AIDS orphans.

Knowledge of the scope and progress of the epidemic in Angola is hindered by the fact that, to date, there have been no national HIV sero-prevalence surveys. This is a data weakness that urgently needs to be rectified. Estimates of national HIV prevalence have therefore been derived from localized surveys of specific population groups and may not provide a true picture of the overall pattern of infection. Nonetheless, data on HIV prevalence in Luanda among women 18-40 attending ante-natal sessions in public health facilities (a reasonable proxy for the sexually active adult population) show a dramatic increase in the past decade, from 1.1% in 1993 to 3.4% in 1999 and 8.6% in 2001 [INSP/UNICEF/CIRPS/WHO, 2002]. In short, the adult prevalence rate in Luanda appears to be close to the average for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, where the prevalence rate reached 8.6% in 2000. If the Luanda rate applied across the country as a whole, over 500,000 people would already be infected with the virus. Although rising, the reported number of AIDS cases is still small (925 in 2000 and 989 in the first nine months of 2001), due to failure to diagnose the majority of cases, as well as the time-lag in development of the disease after infection.

HIV prevalence surveys in two other provinces in 2001 (Huíla and Benguela) have given lower figures (4.4 and 2.6%) than in Luanda. However, it is likely that prevalence rates in some border provinces are higher, due to population movements (including by refugees) to and from neighbouring countries with very high rates of HIV infection. Unfortunately, no data are available from these provinces, except Cabinda, where a survey in 1998 reported a prevalence rate of 8%. HIV infection rates may be still higher in eastern and southern Angola, due to the large population movements across the borders with Zambia and Namibia, where the prevalence rates were 20.0 and 19.5% respectively in 1999 [UNAIDS/WHO, 2000b].

Figure 2.9

HIV prevalence rate in expectant mothers, Luanda, 1989-2001

(% of women attending ante-natal sessions)



Sources: GURN, 1999; INSP/UNICEF/CIRPS/WHO, 2002

Another point of entry into the general population is through high-risk groups, such as commercial sex workers and TB patients. A survey on commercial sex workers in Luanda in 2001, conducted by Population Services International, found an extremely high prevalence rate in this group (32.8%). Another survey reported a rate of 10.4% for TB patients in one Luanda hospital. By reducing resistance to infection, the spread of HIV is contributing to a resurgence of TB.

The main mode of HIV transmission is unprotected heterosexual intercourse. However, MINSA data on recorded AIDS cases in 1985-2001 (up to September 2001) indicates that 10% of cases were caused by mother-to-child transmission (MTCT), while 21% resulted from use of unsterilized instruments and 8% from the use of contaminated blood in transfusions. Unsterilized instruments are used not only by traditional healers and TBAs but also in hospitals, other health facilities and vaccination campaigns, due to inadequate awareness on the part of some health workers.

Various demographic, social, cultural and economic factors are driving the epidemic. These include the movements of troops around the country (and across the borders into neighbouring countries with very high prevalence rates), the large civilian population displacements (internally and across borders) and rapid urbanization. In addition, the practice of polygyny, wide-ranging sexual networking and the spread of sexual exploitation and abuse (reflecting deepening poverty and widening social inequality) are important factors. Sexual exploitation is facilitated in a situation where women, in particular teenage girls and young women, are economically dependent, often relying on much older men, and have weak bargaining power in negotiating sexual relations.

The spread of the disease is also being facilitated by low levels of awareness, high prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases,[12] low contraceptive availability and use rates, limited access to primary health care facilities and services for testing, counseling and treatment of HIV/AIDS patients, and poor blood safety controls. According to the MICS 2001, 32% of women aged 15 and above have never heard of AIDS (a proportion that varies geographically, from 10% in the capital and neighbouring provinces to 50% in the south of the country). Only 0.4% of Angolan women say that they or their partners use condoms. In short, a huge amount remains to be done in terms of knowledge, attitudes and practices. Some measures have been taken to improve the screening of blood in the national transfusion service. However, little is being done to curtail MTCT through the testing and counseling of expectant mothers and the treatment of HIV positive mothers and their newborn children with antiretroviral drugs (ARVs), which greatly reduce the risk of transmission.

Child immunization

Immunization coverage rates have been low in Angola for all the EPI antigens. Figure 2.10 shows the MICS 2001 data for immunization of children aged 12-23 months against tuberculosis (BCG) and measles, indicating that the coverage rates were comparable to the averages for Sub-Saharan Africa but significantly worse than the averages for developing countries. For the third dose of DPT (diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus), the coverage rate among one-year old children in Angola in 2001 was only one third (34%), a figure worse than the averages for Sub-Saharan Africa (46%) and developing countries (69%), according to the international data for 1999 [INE, 2002; UNICEF, 2002]. Immunization coverage rates are especially low in rural areas, as the figure shows. However, the MICS 2001 data do not fully reflect this disparity (and as a result also overestimate the national vacination coverage rates), since the survey was limited to accessible areas. Most children living in areas that have been inaccessible to health services during the war have never been vaccinated.

Figure 2.10
Immunization coverage rates
(% of children aged 12-23 months)



Sources: MICS 2001 [INE, 2002]; UNICEF, 2002

The threat posed by measles is the most serious, as periodic measles epidemics are a major cause of child mortality, with case fatality rates reaching 20%. Measles vaccination coverage (for children under one year old) has been in the 40-50% range in recent years, but was only 34% in 2000, according to administrative data. The MICS 2001 data gave a national rate of 53%, although this was probably biased upwards by the survey's geographical coverage.

The root causes of this situation have been the decay of health care systems and, with them, routine immunization services, along with security problems. Poor management, logistical problems, inadequate funding and low demand have been some of the main reasons for low levels of routine immunization.

As a result, there has been high reliance on costly one-off immunization campaigns, that are dependent on donor funding and inherently difficult to sustain. Only with a large donor-

[12] Prevalence rates for syphilis among pregnant women receiving ante-natal care were 19% in Luanda, 18.5% in Huíla and 14% in Benguela in 2001.

funded campaign has it been possible to mount annual nationwide vaccination campaigns against polio since 1998. Angola was one of the countries in Africa and Asia which, because of their continuing high risk of polio transmission, were targeted by the worldwide campaign to eradicate polio. The campaign involves a series of regional, national and sub-national immunization days, along with the strengthening of routine immunization services and the epidemiological surveillance system. Despite problems of access in some rural areas, Angola appears to be well on the way to achieving polio eradication: the number of new cases of wild polio virus fell from 98 in 2000 to twelve in 2001. Of these, the number confirmed in laboratory tests declined from 58 in 2000 to only one in 2001.[13]

Access to health services

Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes 'the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health' and, as one of the steps needed to achieve the full realization of this right, requires states to create 'conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness'. Other international human rights instruments, such as the CRC (Article 24) and CEDAW (Article 12), refer specifically to the right of access to health care on the part of children and women. The Angolan Constitution (law 23/92 of September 1992) reflects these internationally recognized rights, affirming in Article 47 that 'the State will promote the necessary measures to ensure the citizen's right to medical and health care'.

In the years following independence, the Government took on the obligation to provide such services directly to all. Law 9/75 provided for free medical care and medicines, banned private health care and obliged all health professionals to work within the National Health Service. National health policy was also strongly influenced by the concept of primary health care, which placed emphasis on the delivery of promotional, preventive and basic curative services at community level, through a network of health posts and health centres. In 1979, the Government subscribed to the Declaration of the International Conference on Primary Health Care, held in Alma-Ata in 1978.

In the early 1990s, when the Government retreated from the socialist policies it had adopted after independence, there were important shifts in health policy. In 1992, a new basic law on the national health system lifted the ban on private medicine, and also introduced the concept of cost recovery for health services, while also upholding the principle of equity in access to health services and maintaining the priority of primary health care, including a strong emphasis on preventive measures and health promotion [MINSA, 1997].

Charges for medical services were introduced in some public health facilities from around 1994, while in others informal charges, or *gasosas*, were illegally levied by health personnel, to compensate for low salaries, which had been eroded by inflation and were often paid months in arrears. At the same time, there was a rapid proliferation of private medical establishments, offering alternative services, although these are often of poor quality, despite their high charges.

The 1998 survey on basic social services provides data on the use of health facilities and issues affecting access, such as distance and costs. One of the most striking revelations of this survey is that only 42% of the population use Government health services (29% health posts/centres and 13% hospitals), while 26% make use of the private sector and 21% engage in self-treatment. A relatively small percentage resort to traditional health practitioners. The use of Government health facilities is

[13] In addition to laboratory confirmed cases, 11 cases were confirmed clinically in 2001 (down from 40 in 2000). In addition, three new cases of wild polio virus in Angolan refugee children in Zambia were confirmed in laboratory tests in late 2001, raising fears that wild polio virus is still present in parts of eastern Angola, where access to immunization teams had been hindered by the war. The one laboratory confirmed case within the country in 2001 was also in the east of the country, in Lunda Norte.

especially low (34%) in Luanda, where alternative private services are much more readily available and are widely used (34%).

The sharp decline in utilization of Government health services, in the few years since private medicine was legalized, can be explained by perceptions of the quality and convenience of services offered. When asked to identify the problems of the public health service, 46% of respondents in the 1998 survey cited the lack of medicines (see Table 2.1). The 'no drugs syndrome' is clearly the main cause of discontent with public health services. The second main problem is the length of time waiting in queues (16%).

It should be noted, however, that some respondents cited distance (6%) or the high cost of public health facilities (10%) as the main problems of public health facilities – *prima facie* evidence that, at least for some Angolans, there are physical or financial barriers of access to Government health facilities.

Table 2.1
Principal problems of health facilities, 1998
(% of problems cited by users of each type of service)

	Government	Private	Traditional
Lack of medicines	46.1	17.9	11.1
Long queues	15.7	10.3	3.3
Very expensive	9.9	23.8	16.6
Bad service	8.3	2.8	6.5
Very distant from home	5.7	4.9	9.4
Others	14.3	9.2	7.5
No problems	5.3	31.1	45.6

Note: Survey conducted in Huambo, Huila, Luanda and Uíge.
Source: IDCPSSB 1998 [INE, n.d.]

It is also important to stress that problems of access and quality of health services are much the most serious in the rural areas. In these areas, where private health facilities are often not available and populations overwhelmingly use Government facilities (60%) or self-treatment (18%), survey respondents cited the lack of medicines (32%) and distance (26%) as the main problems.

The financial barrier is much more significant in the case of private and traditional health services, where high costs were cited as the main problems by 24% and 17% respectively. Not surprisingly, only 9% of those in the poorest expenditure quintile used private medical services, compared with 33% in the highest quintile. Overall, 83% of those ill in the two weeks preceding the survey had to pay for some kind of treatment, with drugs taking up 61% of costs. Those using private services spent on average about twice as much as those using Government or traditional services. Average costs ranged from $6.5 per case of diarrhoea to $13 for malaria and $21 for respiratory infections. On average, health care accounted for 6.5% of total household expenditure, with households in the richest quintile spending 38 times more than those in the poorest quintile.

This survey also highlighted the problem that a high proportion of Angolans are obtaining drugs in the informal market, where products are often improperly prescribed, past their expiry dates, unregistered or even fake. About 40% of drugs were obtained in the market and only 22% from Government health facilities, the other less frequent sources being private clinics, private nurses and pharmacies.

Reproductive rights

Article 12 of CEDAW upholds the rights of women to have access to reproductive health services, and places an obligation on states to 'ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation'. These rights and obligations are far from being translated into reality in Angola, where few women have access to adequate reproductive health services. One of the most dramatic consequences is a very high toll in maternal mortality.

The high rates of maternal mortality in many developing countries have become a major focus of concern in the international community and, at the Millennium Summit, the world's governments set the goal of reducing maternal mortality by two thirds by 2015.[14] More detailed goals and targets had been set at a special session of the General Assembly in 1999 to review progress five years after the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), held in Cairo in 1994. In particular, the General Assembly set the goal of raising the proportion of births assisted by skilled attendants, in countries with very high maternal mortality ratios, to 40% by 2005, 50% by 2010 and 60% by 2015. The proportion of primary health care and family planning facilities offering a wide range of safe and effective reproductive health services, including essential obstetric care, should rise to 60, 80 and 100% respectively by the same dates. Achievement of these goals in Angola will require a large commitment of resources to develop adequate maternity services, including an effective referral system and essential obstetric services.

The right of women to safe motherhood is part of a wider set of reproductive rights, which goes beyond access to adequate services for pre-natal care and delivery by skilled health personnel. Reproductive rights concern the right of couples, including in particular women, to make informed choices about reproduction. The ICPD defined reproductive rights as resting on recognition of 'the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children and to have the information and means to do so, and the right to attain the highest standard of reproductive health'. It also referred to the right of individuals and couples to make decisions regarding reproduction free of 'coercion and violence'.

Maternal mortality. Along with the high rate of child mortality, the large number of women dying due to complications related to pregnancy and childbirth is one of the most serious health challenges facing the country. There are serious data deficiencies regarding maternal mortality in Angola, but the available information suggests very high mortality from causes that would be avoidable if adequate systems were in place for monitoring pregnancy and referring at-risk women to essential obstetric services. The Ministry of Health cites a national estimate of 1,850 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, which would be one of the highest maternal mortality ratios (MMR) in the world – about 230 times higher than in Portugal, for example, where the ratio is 8 per 100,000 live births [UNICEF, 2002]. If the estimates are derived from data on institutional births and deaths (i.e. those in health facilities), these may not be representative of the population as a whole. The administrative data on maternal deaths in health facilities in Luanda, produced by the *Coordenação de Atendimento Obstétrico de Luanda*, gave an MMR of 853 and 716 per 100,000 live births in 1999 and 2000 respectively [CAOL, 2001]. Data on maternal mortality are also not available from national surveys. All that is available are data from highly localized studies, carried out several years ago. For example, studies in Luanda in 1993 and Luena in 1994 reported an MMR of 1,281 and 1,481 per 100,000 live births respectively [Grave, 1994; UNICEF, 1999].

In the absence of national data on maternal mortality, estimates can be derived from a model, in which maternal mortality is a function of variables such as the proportion of deliveries with a skilled health care worker and the general fertility rate. A worldwide study by three UN agencies produced a model-based estimate of 1,300 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in Angola in 1995. The model gave a one in nine lifetime risk of a woman dying from maternity related causes, a risk value that compares with 1 in 70 in South Africa or 1 in 5,000 in Portugal [WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA, 2001].

Maternity services. Large numbers of women continue to give birth outside health facilities, in both urban and rural areas. Nationally, the MICS 2001 found that 45% of births were assisted by trained health personnel (doctors, midwives or nurses), compared with only 23% in 1996 [INE/UNICEF, 1997; INE, 2002]. This increase may reflect real improvements in some urban areas, such as Luanda, which has benefited from the CAOL programme, but is also probably distorted by the more restricted coverage of the 2001 survey in the rural areas, resulting from the war. Paradoxically, the two sets of

[14] A decade earlier, in 1990, the World Summit for Children had set the goal of reducing maternal mortality by half by 2000.

MICS data do not show any significant improvement in the proportion of expectant mothers receiving ante-natal care: both surveys showed about one third of women not receiving any ante-natal check-ups. Likewise about a third of pregnant women are not adequately vaccinated against tetanus. Other factors that contribute to the high risk of maternal mortality include the poor state of general health, including the high incidence of malaria, which is especially dangerous during pregnancy and childbirth, and poor nutrition, including iron deficiency anaemia.

Figure 2.11
Reproductive health indicators
(2001 data for Angola, 1995-2201 data for Sub-Saharan Africa and developing countries)



Sources: MICS 2001 [INE, 2002], UNICEF, 20002

Contraceptive use and fertility. One of the main constraints on the ability of couples to decide freely and responsibly on the number, spacing and timing of their children is the low access to modern contraceptives. Condoms and other modern contraceptives are available in only a small number of public health facilities and are financially beyond the reach of many Angolans. These problems, which are compounded by lack of knowledge and awareness (and the virtual absence of counselling services on reproductive health matters in public health facilities), result in extremely low rates of contraceptive use, with serious implications for the fight against HIV/AIDS as well as the exercise of reproductive rights.[15] According to the MICS 2001, only 6% of women practice any form of contraception, and only 4.5% use modern methods. For any method, the rates reported by the MICS were 8% in urban areas and only 2% in rural areas [INE, 2002]. These are exceptionally low rates, contrasting with overall figures of 22 and 62% respectively for Sub-Saharan Africa and developing countries, for any method [UNICEF, 2002].

Another consequence of low contraceptive use is that many women resort to abortions to terminate unwanted pregnancies. Since abortion remains illegal in Angola and is therefore carried out

[15] However, education on population and family life is being introduced into the school curriculum on a pilot basis.

clandestinely, often in unsafe conditions, abortion-related deaths are likely to be one of the factors contributing to the high maternal mortality ratio.

Along with the strong desire to have large numbers of children and the weak influence of female partners in decision-making on reproductive matters, the low level of contraceptive use results in high levels of fertility. The total fertility rate in Angola, reported by the MICS 2001, was 7.1 children per woman, a figure that compares with 5.4 for Sub-Saharan Africa and 2.9 for developing countries [INE, 2002; UNICEF, 2002].

Adolescence and reproductive rights. Adolescents, who account for about 18% of the national population, are a priority for reproductive health programmes, since they are one of the most sexually active age-groups and engage in large-scale sexual networking and experimentation, often with inadequate protection against the risks of unwanted pregnancies and of contracting sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. The risks are particularly high in the case of adolescent girls and young women, due to their economic dependence and weak bargaining power in negotiating sexual relations with male partners, especially when there is a large age difference. Adolescents account for a high proportion of unsafe, clandestine abortions.[16]

Nutrition and food security

There is a strong synergistic relationship between malnutrition and poor health. In young children, for example, bouts of diarrhoea result in inadequate nutritional absorption, while poor nutrition lowers resistance to diarrhoeal diseases and other infections, creating a potentially life-threatening vicious cycle. Likewise, malnutrition and anaemia among expectant mothers are among the principal causes of maternal morbidity and mortality, but are in turn exacerbated by other conditions, such as malaria.

In the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, access to food is identified as a dimension of the right to an adequate standard of living. The international conferences, including in particular the International Conference on Nutrition in 1993, gave special attention to the problem of malnutrition in young children, which is one of the main contributory causes of the high rates of under-five mortality in countries such as Angola. The World Food Summit in 1996 focused world attention on the challenge of ending hunger, setting the goal of reducing the number of undernourished people in the world by 50% by 2015, and this was reiterated by the Millennium Summit in 2000. A decade earlier, the World Summit for Children had set the goal of reducing the proportion of under-five children suffering from malnutrition by two thirds between 1990 and 2000.

The MICS 2001 reported high levels of stunting, or low height for age, in children under five years old.[17] Overall, 45% of children under five suffered from moderate or severe stunting in 1996, compared with an average of 41% in Sub-Saharan Africa and 32% in developing countries, according to UNICEF data for 1995-2000. The proportions of children under-weight (low weight for age) were also slightly higher than the averages for Sub-Saharan Africa and developing countries. Rates were much higher in rural than urban areas, as Figure 2.12 shows [INE, 2002; UNICEF, 20002].

Only in terms of wasting or low weight for height (6%) did Angola have lower figures in 2001 than the averages for Sub-Saharan Africa and developing countries. This surprising finding may reflect the fact that the MICS 2001 was only conducted in accessible areas and therefore did not reflect the nutritional emergencies occurring in some of the worst war affected areas. In 2001, such emergencies arose, for example, in Mussende, in Kwanza Sul province, and in Camacupa and Cuemba in Bié

[16] To address these problems, UNFPA has been assisting the Government since 1997 to set up 'youth friendly' health services, including counselling, within health centres in three pilot provinces (Luanda, Benguela and Huíla).

[17] Stunting is also known as chronic malnutrition, because it reflects an inadequate dietary intake over a prolonged period.

Figure 2.12
Child malnutrition
(% of children under 5 with moderate or severe malnutrition)



Sources: MICS 2001 [INE, 2002]; UNICEF, 2002

province. Among children screened by Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) in its therapeutic feeding centres in Mussende, 33% were suffering from moderate or severe wasting in March 2001, with a rate of 24% for severe wasting. The rates in Cuemba were even higher: 46% global wasting and 19% severe wasting, in April 2001. In such areas, there were exceptionally high mortality rates, particularly among young children [MSF, 2001].

Micro-nutrient deficiencies. Micro-nutrient deficiencies, such as deficiencies in vitamin A, iodine and iron, are an important additional cause of illness, disability and death, particularly among children (and women in the case of iron deficiency anaemia). These deficiencies reflect economic or war-related constraints on access to a balanced diet, as well as ecological and cultural factors, such as the level of iodine in the soil and water, the types of vegetables and fruits locally cultivated and cooking methods. In nutritional crisis areas, populations are exposed to abnormally high micro-nutrient deficiencies, resulting in dangerous conditions such as pellagra (a result of niacin deficiency). In July 2001, a study undertaken in Bié for WFP found that a prevalence rate of 10% for pellagra in IDP camps around Kuito and a rate as high as 30% in Camacupa [Golden, 2001].[18] The wartime situation is likely to have resulted in lack of access by rural populations in inland provinces to iodized salt, because of the disruptions to trade, resulting in iodine deficiency, particularly in the *planalto central*, where there is a lack of natural iodine in the soil and water, and thus in foods. In addition, the national capacity for production of iodized salt is only about one third of national requirements.

Breast-feeding. Another nutritional problem is the low rate of exclusive breastfeeding of infants. The early introduction of other liquids and solids exposes infants to otherwise avoidable infections, while the premature reduction or cessation of breast-milk reduces the child's intake of essential nutrients and natural protection against infections. The MICS 2001 showed that, although most children are breastfed for a long period, other liquids and solids are usually introduced very early in the child's life. Only 14% of infants under four months old were exclusively breastfed [INE, 2002].

Access to food. As defined by the World Food Summit, held in Rome in 1996, food security means ensuring that all citizens have physical and economic access at all times to the food necessary to lead an active and healthy life. Underlying the high rates of protein-energy malnutrition are economic problems relating to households' access to adequate food to meet their basic dietary needs. In this respect, food insecurity can essentially be analyzed at two levels: in terms of national supply (including distribution and markets) and at household level.

Nationally, as a result of war and other shocks to the agricultural sector, Angola has evolved from being a net food exporter in the early 1970s (when the country exported about 100,000 tons of maize a year) to a country with a large food deficit. Although the country meets its needs in some key staples

[18] Pellagra is caused by a dietary deficiency of niacin, pyridoxine, riboflavin and tryptpophan, and, although it is rarely a direct dominant cause of death, it contributes to death attributed principally to other illnesses. In its recommendations, the study in Kuito stressed the importance of improving the provision of micronutrient rich foods in the food baskets for both general distribution and vulnerable groups.

such as cassava and beans, by the 1990s it was only meeting about half its cereal requirements. In addition to large imports of wheat, which is not grown in the country, Angola has to import substantial quantities of maize and rice. FAO and WFP have estimated that, in 2001, the cereal harvest amounted to about 581,000 tons, exactly 50% of national requirements. Of the balance of outstanding needs, it was projected that 405,000 tons would be imported commercially and that 176,000 tons would be required in food aid [FAO/WFP, 2001].

The latter reflects the needs of IDPs dependent on international food aid, and not the inability of the country in balance-of-payments terms to cover its full food import requirements with its own resources: the total value of donor food assistance required in 2001 was unlikely to be more than $175 million, equivalent to less than 3% of Angola's gross annual export earnings from oil and diamonds.[19]

At a distributional level, the lack of freedom of movement of persons and goods, due to insecurity, resulted in the fragmentation of the national market into numerous isolated enclave markets, linked by occasional road convoys or by air transport, which greatly increased food costs. Thus, although there are small surpluses of cereals in parts of the relatively secure south-west, they could not easily be transported to the cities or other areas with high deficits. One consequence has been a wide geographical variation in prices for key commodities in different parts of the country.

At household level, access to food depends on household food production, the means to purchase food with cash and/or access to food aid. Overall, it has been estimated that 1.34 million Angolans, mostly IDPs, were in need of food assistance during 2001/02 [FAO/WFP, 2001]. This is equivalent to almost 10% of the national population. Studies of the household food economy in some of the most seriously war-affected cities, such as Huambo and Kuito, show that many IDPs are dependent on a combination of food aid, small amounts of own production and food purchased with the limited income earned from activities such as the sale of charcoal.

Figure 2.13
Percentage of expenditure devoted to food in poorest half of households
(in Huambo, Luanda, Lubango and Uíge, 1998)



Source: IDCPSSB 1998 [INE, n.d.]

Overall, the high proportion of household expenditure devoted to food, especially in the lower expenditure percentiles of the population, suggests a high level of potential vulnerability or risk with respect to food insecurity. The 1998 survey in Huambo, Huíla, Luanda and Uíge found that on average 64% of household expenditure is devoted to food. This proportion varies from 57% in Luanda to 70% in other urban areas and 76% in rural areas. As would be expected, the proportion of expenditure devoted to food is highest in the poorest households (77% in the poorest quintile, compared with 50% in the richest quintile).

By definition, all households living below the extreme poverty line are food insecure, in so far as the line was set specifically in the 2000/01 IDR at a level just sufficient to meet basic calorific needs. As will be recalled, 25% of urban households were found to be living below the extreme poverty line, according to the preliminary data from that survey, which did not include the worst war-affected parts of the country, where poverty and food deficiencies are much more serious.

[19] In May 2001, an FAO/WFP mission estimated that WFP assistance would be needed for about 88% of total food aid beneficiaries, the balance being met by agencies such as the ICRC, the European Commission and Caritas [FAO/WFP, 2001]. WFP appealed for $137 million for food assistance to Angola in 2002, in that year's consolidated appeal [OCHA, 2001c].

The achievement of food security is therefore closely related to the reduction of household poverty. In the rural areas, an agricultural development strategy that gives priority to raising the production and incomes of small family farmers, as well as assisting the revival of farming by returning populations, is the key to reducing vulnerability and ensuring households' adequate access to food. Improvements in their output and the related recovery of rural-urban trade are also crucial for the food security of urban households, by increasing the supply of food to urban areas and reducing prices in urban markets, as well as slowing down rural-urban migration. This would complement other measures aimed at raising the incomes of the urban poor and thus improving their economic access to food. While continuing to provide a targeted safety net for populations that remain in extreme vulnerability, food aid should be employed increasingly, as conditions permit, to promote the development of sustainable household food security, through the rebuilding of assets and the revival of production and markets.

Water and sanitation

The Millenium Summit set the goal of halving the proportion of the world's people who are unable to reach or afford safe drinking water. These goals are especially relevant in the Angolan context, where inadequate access to safe water and poor environmental sanitation one of the main contributory causes of the high levels of morbidity and mortality rates, particularly among children.

Very low levels of expenditure on maintenance and investment in extension of water mains systems in the urban areas, in a context of rapid growth of the urban population, has led to a situation where only about 56% of the population of Luanda and 32% of the population of other urban areas obtains piped water from the mains (either from taps at home, taps in neighbours' houses or public taps), according to data from the 1998 survey (see Figure 2.14). A large part of the Luanda population (42%) obtains water from tanks in neighbours' houses or from cistern trucks, which bring water from the River Bengo. These types of sources are far less important in most other cities, where populations depend heavily on wells, rivers, streams and similar sources, with unprotected sources accounting for 18%. Unprotected wells and springs, rivers and rainwater provided water for 60% of the rural population in 1998.

It is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions from these or any other figures about access to 'safe' water. While it is conventional internationally to consider water from taps linked to the mains, as well as boreholes and protected wells and springs, as 'safe' sources (62% overall in the MICS 2001 and 58% in the 1998 survey), it is well known that water from the mains in Luanda and other urban areas in Angola is very often not safe to drink, at least without boiling and filtering. There are no available data on tests of water quality. It is also important to note that, for many households, the 'formal' water sources are only functional some of the time.

With respect to physical accessibility, it should be noted that, according to the 1998 survey, 9% of households obtain water from a distance of more than half a kilometer and 1% from more than one kilometer. In those households, fetching water is a major burden, in terms of time, on women and girls.

Another critically important dimension of access is the cost of water, which, in the urban areas and especially in Luanda, has been biased against the poor. This is because the poorest layers of the population in Luanda depend mainly on informal sources of water supply (private tanks and cistern trucks), for which prices have historically been much higher than the official water tariffs charged for water from the mains (and often not paid due to illegal connections and the weakness of the revenue collection system). Consequently, water accounts for an exceptionally high proportion of total household expenditure in the poorest quartile of Luanda households (15.4% in 1998), compared with a national average of 3.7% [INE, n.d.].

The root cause of this problem has been the low level of investment in water systems in Luanda, due to low budgetary allocations and a level of official tariffs that has generally been so low that the public water company EPAL could neither assure adequate maintenance nor extend the water supply system to the expanding unserved peri-urban areas. Increases in water tariffs in Luanda to cost recovery levels under the Staff Monitored Programme, although not fully implemented to date, could lay the basis for a viable strategy to extend access in Luanda to an affordable, safe water supply through the mains.

Poor and inequitable access to water has been mirrored by similar problems with respect to environmental sanitation. The MICS 2001 reported that 60% of the population had adequate means of excreta disposal, with a large disparity between urban and rural areas (74% compared with 26%). Solid waste disposal poses enormous problems in the urban areas, with services effectively limited to the central parts of Luanda, through the Provincial Government's contract with a private service company, Urbana 2000. The peri-urban areas of Luanda and most other cities are largely unserved. Again, the poorest layers of the urban population are worst affected, resulting in extremely unhealthy living conditions in the informal housing settlements. Along with poor water quality, these environmental sanitation problems are among the principal causes of several major health hazards in urban and peri-urban areas, including malaria and acute diarrhoeal diseases.

Figure 2.14
Sources of water: percentage breakdown by areas, 1998



Source: IDCPSSB 1998 [INE, n.d.]

2.4 The right to protection

Several of the international conventions include articles that uphold what may be broadly described as protection rights, that is the right of individuals and groups who, by virtue of their vulnerable situation, require the protection of society or the state. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), in particular, has a large number of such articles, on the protection of children from abuse, negligence, violence and exploitation, as well as the right to special assistance measures in the case of children who suffer disabilities or who in any other way are especially vulnerable. The whole of CEDAW is fundamentally about the protection of women against gender-based discrimination, while the convention includes specific articles on such protection issues as trafficking in women, the exploitation of prostitution and forced marriage. Likewise, the ILO conventions provide for the protection of workers against a range of work-place hazards and unfair employment practices. Among them is the Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour [ILO Convention 182 of 1999]. Of special relevance in the Angolan context is the framework of international humanitarian law, codified in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which provide protection for civilian populations in time of war.

Protection of IDPs. Section 2.2 has already drawn attention to the serious abuses committed against civilian populations in the course of the war, in violation of the Geneva Conventions, and the large population displacements that have resulted from the practice, threat or fear of violence, pillage and abductions. Once displaced, IDPs remain highly vulnerable to abuse or exploitation, because of their destitute situation and dependence on assistance, and their lack of customary rights (to land for example) in communities where they settle. The Representative of the UN Secretary-General on IDPs, during his mission to Angola in October-November 2000, expressed serious concern 'at the lack of effective protection accorded to the physical security and human rights of the displaced' [UN, 2001a].

His report highlighted the problem that many IDPs, especially those who have fled from areas once controlled by UNITA, do not have formal identity documents, a problem which resulted in 'incidents of harassment of displaced persons' as well as limitations on access to education, health and employment. The Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs, conducted by OCHA in July 2001, reported that between 70 and 90% of the populations in the provinces of Bengo, Bié, Cunene, Huíla, Kuando Kubango, Kwanza Norte, Lunda Sul, Malange, Namibe and Uíge lack documentation, either because identity cards have been lost or stolen or because births have not been registered [UN, 2001b].

The Representative of the Secretary-General for IDPs also drew attention to reports of thefts of food from IDPs by UNITA, the FAA and the National Police, particularly after food distributions by international agencies and NGOs, as well as instances of rape and violence against IDPs in camps by members of the national police and incidents of forced recruitment, including of children. Another serious protection issue, highlighted in the Representative's report, has been the relocation of IDPs by provincial authorities in inappropriate areas, including outside security perimeters, 'raising concerns as to the possible use of the displaced as human shields' [UN, 2001a].

However, a significant step forward has been the promulgation of a set of Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Populations (Decree 1/01, of 5 January 2001). This provides a number of basic guarantees, including the principle of the voluntary nature of resettlement, the security of resettlement sites, the allocation of adequate land and the provision of certain basic amenities and services, such as water, sanitation, schools and health facilities. The challenge remained, however, of ensuring compliance with the norms, which are estimated to have been applied fully in only about 50% of cases of resettlement since the promulgation of the decree. The shortage of land in secure areas around cities with large concentrations of IDPs has been one of the main constraints on resettlement. The Government has followed up the decree with a draft *regulamento*, which further defines the norms and lays down operational procedures for their implementation.[20]

Protection of children. In a comprehensive situation analysis of children, prepared in 1997-98 [UNICEF/RA, 1999], UNICEF and the Government of Angola drew attention, *inter alia*, to a wide range of protection issues concerning children. These issues concern children with disabilities, displaced and refugee children, under-age soldiers, orphans, children separated from their families, children living on the street, child workers, child victims of sexual abuse and children incarcerated in prisons and police cells. It is possible in the space available here to refer to only a few highlights of the protection issues concerning these groups of children.

First, the deepening poverty situation in the country has obliged more and more families to send their children out to work, often in hazardous conditions and usually at the expense of their education. The IDR 2000/01, conducted with a 90% urban sample, reported that 3% of children aged 0-9 and 23% of children aged 10-14 are working [INE, 2001b]. The MICS 2001, conducted in accessible rural and urban areas, found 30% of children aged 5-14 working (20% in the 5-9 age group and 41% of those aged 10-14). Of those working in the 5-14 age range, 76% are engaged in domestic work (20% for more than 4 hours a day). This is a broad category that could include children working for distant

[20] The *regulamento* was being finalized for formal adoption by the Government at the time of preparation of the CCA.

relatives or informal foster parents in return for accommodation and food (sometimes in exploitative conditions), as well as those working at home for their parents. About 20% of working children in the 5-14 age group are working on the family farm or in trading (34% of working children in the rural areas and 15% in the urban areas). Some children engaged in petty trade work in dangerous conditions on the streets. The MICS found that 2.6% of working children (1.2% of children aged 5-19 and 4.2% of those aged 10-14) are in paid employment [INE, 2002].

In 2001, Angola ratified the ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, which are defined as those most likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children, as well as work that involved the trafficking of children and the involvement of children in prostitution. It should be a priority to follow up ratification by undertaking the consultative processes required under the convention to identify the types of child labour considered as most hazardous and harmful, and the measures needed to combat them.

Figure 2.15
Percentage of children 5-14 years old who work, 2001



Source: MICS 2001 [INE, 2002]

Another major focus of concern is the large number of children living outside a normal family environment. These include, first of all, children who have been conscripted by armies, in violation of the national law establishing a minimum age of 18 for voluntary conscription and 21 for compulsory conscription. A total of 9,124 soldiers under the age of 18, including 8,605 in UNITA and 519 in the FAA, were registered during the peace process that followed the Lusaka Protocol, according to data from April 1997 [UNICEF/GURN, 1999]. Following the resumption of the war in 1998, there was again large-scale recruitment of under-age soldiers, particularly by UNITA, which abducted numerous children for this purpose during raids on towns and villages.[21]

Children in conflict with the law are sometimes detained in prison and police cells, rather than sent to more appropriate institutions with a reformatory purpose and facilities appropriate for children. Many are held in preventive detention beyond the legal limit of three months and all too often child prisoners are mixed with adults in violation of Article 37 of the CRC.

Other children have become separated from their families, as a result of war-related displacements, household economic pressures or problems of abuse within the home. Some children have ended up living on the streets. Although their absolute numbers are quite small, such children are among the most vulnerable, in terms of nutrition, access to health care and education, violence and other forms of abuse. Other children deprived of a normal family environment include orphans and separated children placed in children's homes and similar institutions, instead of being adopted or fostered by extended family relatives or other families. Overall, 1.3% of children are orphans of both parents, while 10.2% have lost one of their parents, according to the MICS 2001 INE, 2002]. These figures could rise dramatically as a result of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

Children with physical and mental disabilities are another category of children in situations requiring special protection measures. The 1996 MICS found that 1.3% of children aged 0-17 have some form of disability. Paralysis of the limbs is the most common form of disability (34% of cases), followed

[21] In the most well-publicised such case, UNITA abducted several dozen children from Caxito, capital of Bengo province, on 5 May 2001. After a national and international outcry, UNITA released 60 children to a Catholic mission in the neighbouring province of Kwanza Norte, following 20 days in the bush. A further 35 children remained unaccounted for. For details, see OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation in Angola, Monthly Analysis, May 2001.*

by problems of deafness and dumbness (16%). Disabilities result from illness in 42% of cases (including polio, a cause of paralysis), from congenital causes (29% of cases), and from war, landmines and other accidents (together accounting for 23% of cases). There are only quite limited facilities and programmes to assist these children to obtain education, either through special schools (in extreme cases of disability) or, where possible, through integration into normal schools. In the worst cases, disabled children are subject to the worst types of exploitation, notably through their use in street begging [INE/UNICEF, 1997; UNICEF/RA, 1999].

It is important finally to draw attention to the lack of an effective, comprehensive system of vital registration, which deprives many Angolan children (and adults in later life) of the legal documentation needed to prove their identity and nationality. The MICS 2001 found that only 29% of children aged 0-59 months have birth registration documents (34% in the urban areas and 19% in accessible rural areas). Although the percentage rises progressively with age, 55% of children still are not registered by the age of 48-59 months [INE, 2002]. As Figure 2.16 shows, the high cost of registration is the main reason for non-registration (34% of children not registered). One unfortunate consequence of non-registration is that many children are denied access to school for 'lack of documents': the 1998 survey on the social sectors (IDCPSSB) found that 23% of children who had never been to school attributed this to their lack of documents [INE, n.d.].

Figure 2.16
Birth registration, 2001
(children aged 0-59 months, in accessible areas)



Source: MICS 2001 [INE, 2002]

Protection of women. Angola has ratified the main human rights instruments protecting the rights of women, including CEDAW, which was ratified in 1984. The Constitution upholds the equal rights and duties of women and men (Articles 18 and 29).

In legal terms, the enactment of the Family Code (law 1/88) in 1988 marked an important step forward in the protection of women's rights within the family, establishing equality between the spouses in all aspects of family life, including issues concerning property and inheritance. After the death of either spouse, the surviving spouse is entitled to half of the common estate. The law also provides protection to women in the event of divorce, notably by making both parents responsible for maintenance of children and dividing assets equally between them. Although the Family Code has been criticized for not taking into account the polygamous reality of the family in Angolan culture [Pehrsson, 2000], the law did provide better legal protection for women cohabiting with partners by legalizing monogamous *de facto* unions after three years and it also provided protection for children born in or out of wedlock. A draft law to revise the Family Code is currently being reviewed, along with a draft law to provide protection against violence within the family.

The labour law too provides important protection for women, in particular by establishing women's right to three months' maternity leave and, after her return to work, to breastfeeding intervals during the working day. Employers are also barred from dismissing a woman within one year of giving birth.

There are two main shortcomings with respect to this progressive legislation. The first is that in some respects it is not in tune with the social, cultural and economic reality of the country. The fact is that there is a dichotomy between the modern legal framework in civil matters and the customary law, which traditionally applies to issues such as marriage, divorce, property rights, inheritance and custody of children, particularly in the rural areas. Deeply ingrained cultural attitudes are often at variance with modern legal provisions, particularly with respect to practices such as wife-beating, which is widely accepted in Angolan society. Likewise, the labour law has no practical meaning beyond the formal sector of the economy, where only a small minority of workers are employed.

The second problem is law enforcement. The fact that protection of certain rights is embodied in the law does not mean that these rights are upheld in practice or that women can readily make use of the judicial system to protect their rights. For example, women often find themselves dispossessed in the aftermath of divorce, separation or the death of their spouses, despite the legal rights established in the Family Code. All too often husbands abandon their wives without providing for the maintenance of their children and in some cases dispose of the home, leaving both the former wife and her children homeless. After death, the next of kin of the deceased tend to divide the assets among themselves, leaving little if anything for the widow and her children. Women are usually unable to defend themselves because they are less educated and less aware of their rights, and because the judicial system does not provide a practical, credible means of redress (see below).

Many women are also victims of domestic violence and sexual abuse. Wife-beating, exercised within 'reasonable limits', is to a large extent culturally accepted in Angolan society, as a legitimate means of imposing discipline. There are no specific legal provisions concerning domestic violence or marital rape, either in the Family Code or in the criminal law, and it is especially difficult for women to pursue legal action against the perpetrators of violence both because of the weakness of the legal system and the strong cultural, family and psychological pressures on women not to take such action.

Problems of violence against women were especially serious in communities directly affected by the war. The UN's 2001 Rapid Assessment on Critical Needs noted that 'serious abuses, including sexual assault and rape, continue to occur, particularly in areas close to military posts' [OCHA, 2001b]. There were also numerous instances of women and girls being abducted by UNITA forces to act as 'wives' for rebel fighters or as porters to carry supplies. The condition of such women was akin to a form of slavery. Displaced women and girls are also particularly vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, because of the breakdown of societal norms in conflict situations and their situation of destitution and extreme dependence. A study conducted by UNFPA in IDP camps in four provinces (Huíla, Benguela, Malange and Zaire) in 1999-2000 found that 32% of respondents had experienced beatings, mainly at the hands of husbands and partners, and that 24% knew of women forced to have sex, with military and police personnel the aggressors in 44% of cases [UNFPA, 2002].

Access to justice. The weakness of the justice system is one of the main reasons why Angolan citizens, in particular women and the poor, are unable to obtain redress for violations of their rights. Across much of the country the formal justice system is simply not operating. A study by the *Ordem dos Advogados de Angola* (OAA), conducted in February 2001, found that only 7% of *municípios* had functioning municipal courts [OAA, 2001]. There are very small numbers of judicial personnel (0.7 judges/magistrates, 1.4 public prosecutors and 4.0 barristers per 100,000 population, according to data from the Ministry of Justice and OAA) and most of these personnel reside and work in Luanda. For example, 509 of the country's 550 barristers are in the capital [OAA, 2001].

Even where the formal justice system still operates, its effectiveness is undermined by the low salaries of the public officials working in the system, a prime cause of corruption, which results in the manipulation of the justice system at the expense of the poor and marginalized. The slowness and

high cost of judicial proceedings are a strong disincentive for women, the poor and other vulnerable groups to seek justice through the courts. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of a legal aid system – apart from the limited *pro bono* assistance provided by some human rights and women's organizations.

The inefficiency and delays in processing criminal cases, which involve the *Direcção Nacional de Investigação Criminal*, the *Procuradoria Geral* and the courts themselves, result in other lapses in justice and human rights, in particular the problem that many prisoners are held in preventive detention for prolonged periods, often greatly exceeding the limit of three months laid down by law. Data from the Ministry of the Interior indicate that, in April 2001, 79% of the prison population was awaiting trial.

2.5 The right to participation

The core political rights characteristic of a participatory and democratic system of governance are codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These include, among others, the freedom of opinion and expression, the freedom to seek, receive and impart information, the freedoms of assembly and association, the freedom to form and join trade unions, the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, and the right to vote and be elected. Similar rights are embodied in the African Charter on Human and People's Rights.

Angola ratified both the International Covenant and the African Charter in 1991, as a logical corollary of the reforms enacted in 1991-92, which ended the one-party system of governance established at independence. A pluralist system, with constitutional guarantees of the political rights on which such a system is based, was introduced through two Constitutional Revision Laws, in May 1991 (law 12/91) and September 1992 (law 23/92). Article 2 of the current constitution states that 'the Republic of Angola is a democratic state based on the rule of law and founded on the principles of national unity, the dignity of the human person, pluralism of expression and political organization, respect and guarantees for fundamental human rights and freedoms, both with respect to the individual and as a member of organized social groups.'

The adoption of the Constitutional Revision Law of May 1991 was accompanied by a series of other laws instituting reforms relating to political parties, associations, the media, the right to strike and the right to assembly. Among the most important were:

- the law on associations (14/91), which removed previous restrictions on the formation of civil society organizations, including professional associations and national NGOs;
- the law on political parties (law 15/91), which created a multi-party political system and laid down rules and procedures for the formation and registration of political parties;
- the law on the right to assembly and demonstration (law 16/91);
- the law on strikes (law 23/91);
- the law on the press (law 25/91).

Further reforms followed in 1992, including an electoral law, a law easing the registration requirements for political parties, new legislative measures on the press (see next sub-section) and further constitutional changes. These reforms took place in tandem with the post-Bicesse peace process, which culminated in the first multi-party general elections in September 1992. However, the hopes aroused in 1991-92 that Angola could establish a stable pluralist system of governance were quickly shattered by UNITA's rejection of the 1992 election results and the return to war. Over the past decade, the political reforms introduced in 1991-92 have remained in place, but their implementation has been circumscribed in practice, partly because of the continuing politico-military insecurity. No further national elections have been held since 1992 and elections have not yet been held at any sub-national level despite the provisions in the 1992 Constitution for elected local

authorities (*autarquias*). While the mass media have become more diverse, the development of the press has been held back by some remaining legal restrictions and a discouraging investment climate (see below).

Participation in public affairs has also been held back by insecurity, poverty and illiteracy, which tend to marginalize much of the population. Although large numbers of associations and NGOs have come into being, and trade unions have become independent of the State, active participation is limited to relatively small numbers of people, mainly from the more educated, higher income groups. Trade unions are weak, because of the small size of the formal sector labour force. For many IDPs and others in extreme poverty, illiteracy, limited awareness and the pressures of day-to-day survival limit involvement in representative organizations and self-expression. A continuing sense of fear, after years of political violence and intolerance, also tends to make many Angolans cautious about engaging in political activities, particularly in the rural areas.

Political participation. Article 3 of the Constitution affirms the principle of representative government and participation in public affairs, stating that 'the Angolan people exercises political power through periodic universal suffrage to choose its representatives, through referendums and through other forms of democratic participation by the citizens in the life of the Nation.' Under the new legislation on political parties introduced in 1991, numerous new parties were registered before the parliamentary and presidential elections in September 1992. Overall, 91% of the registered electorate of 4.82 million cast votes, showing a high degree of enthusiasm to participate in the political process. In addition to the MPLA, which won 129 of the 220 seats, and UNITA, which won 70, ten minor parties shared between the remaining 21 seats. Since then, the number of political parties has continued to increase, partly as a result of splits in the older parties, and by 2000 there were 125 registered political parties, although only about 25 were active [Pinto de Andrade, J., 2000].

Technically, the 1992 elections were not fully concluded, because the presidential contest did not produce an absolute majority of votes for any candidate: the legally required second round could not be held because of the slide back to war.[22] In addition, the unstable state of 'neither war nor peace' in 1994-98, during the period of the post-Lusaka peace process, made it impossible to hold new elections when the four-year mandate of the National Assembly expired in 1996.[23] The return to war at the end of 1998 resulted in the further postponement of the elections. The Government has stated that it aims to hold elections in 2003 or 2004, but no specific date has yet been set.

The poor security situation across much of the country has been the principal reason for the delay in holding elections, but security is improving rapidly in the aftermath of the cessation of hostilities. Other essential pre-conditions for new presidential and parliamentary elections include the registration of voters (a huge task in a country where many adults have no ID cards or other forms of identity) and the establishment of an independent electoral commission.

While no elections have now been held at national level for almost ten years, there have never been multi-party elections at provincial or local levels. Prior to the 1991 reforms, there had been provincial 'people's assemblies', elected within the single-party system of the time. This framework for popular participation in public affairs at the provincial level ended in 1992, when the provincial people's assemblies were dissolved. As a result, there has been no formal system of accountability of provincial governments to their respective populations, a major limitation on political participation at the sub-national level. The 1992 Constitution made provision for the establishment of elected local governments (*autarcias locais*) and stated that a new law on local government would be enacted to define their mode of constitution, organization, competence, functioning and regulatory framework (Articles 145-146). However, this law has not yet been enacted and, as a result, the *autarcias* have still not been established. Early in 2002, the Government indicated that it would move forward with

[22] José Eduardo dos Santos won 49.6% and Jonas Malheiro Savimbi 40.1%.

[23] The president has a five-year mandate under the Constitution.

plans to set up the *autarquias*, but only at municipal level. It has ruled out elections for provincial governments.

Right of association and the development of civil society. The legal changes in 1991 that lifted the restrictions on associations and trade unions created a more favourable environment for the emergence and development of independent civil society organizations. Various types of associations came into being during the 1990s, among them service delivery NGOs, professional associations representing groups such as lawyers, economists and architects, and advocacy organizations engaged in campaigns on issues such as the environment, women's rights and landmines. A particularly striking development has been the emergence of a large number of national NGOs, participating in humanitarian relief, recovery and development activities. About 340 national NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance were registered by OCHA in mid-2001 [OCHA, 2001c]. However, most national NGOs remain weak in terms of institutional capacity and are still overshadowed by more experienced and better-resourced international NGOs, of which about 100 are present in Angola.

As a result of the reforms in 1991, the trade union federation previously linked to the ruling party, the *União Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Angola* (UNTA), became independent as UNTA-Confederação Sindical, while a second, alternative union federation, the *Confederação Geral dos Sindicatos Independentes de Angola* (CGSILA), came into being, along with autonomous unions, in particular the *Sindicato Nacional dos Professores* (SINPROF). Law 23/91 lifted restrictions on the right to strike. While these were positive developments, the trade union movement has remained weak, because of the small size of the formal sector workforce (about 200,000 in the civil service, 100,000 in parastatal companies and 400,000 in the private sector).[24] The total combined membership of UNTA-CS and CGSILA is estimated to be a little under 150,000.

The churches are an especially important institution, as the overwhelming majority of Angolans regard themselves as Christians and a high proportion attend church services on a regular basis. In a survey on Angolans' perceptions on a wide range of development-related issues, conducted in 2001 in five provinces (Cabinda, Luanda, Kwanza Sul, Benguela and Huambo), respondents cited the churches as the institutions in which they had the highest confidence (92%), well ahead of the central Government (48%) or international organizations (47%). The Catholic Church has the largest number of adherents (58%), followed by protestant churches (17%) and 'others' (20%).[25] According to the survey, 56% of Angolans regularly attend church services [UNDP/MINSA/ASDI/UNESCO, 2002]. The Catholic Church has become increasingly prominent in initiatives to promote peace, sponsoring a *Congresso Pro Pace* in July 2000 and joining protestant churches in an ecumenical pro-peace movement, the *Comité Inter Eclesial para a Paz em Angola* (COIEPA), set up in April 2001. COIEPA brings together the *Conferência Episcopal de Angola e São Tomé* (CEAST) with the two main protestant umbrella groups, the *Conselho das Igrejas Cristãs em Angola* (CICA) and the *Aliança Evangélica de Angola* (AEA).[26]

Free expression and access to information. Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees 'freedom of expression, assembly, demonstration, association and all other forms of expression'. In practice, however, the authorities rarely authorize demonstrations opposed to government policies: several such demonstrations were prohibited in 2000-2001.

Prior to 1991, all media were state-owned. This changed following the reforms in 1991-92, which included legislation permitting pluralism in at least a part of the mass media. Article 35 of the 1992

[24] The IDR 2000/01, which covered the major urban areas with the overwhelming majority of formal sector employees, found that only about 34% of the employed population is working in the formal sector. It estimated that there were 187,798 Government employees, 88,220 employees of parastatal companies and 350,967 private sector employees in the areas covered by the survey [INE, 2001b].

[25] The 'other' category includes various independent churches, including Africanist churches such as the Kimbanguist cult.

[26] For a detailed discussion of the role of the churches in the peace movement, see Howen, 2001.

Constitution guarantees press freedom and prohibits censorship, while adding that the law regulates the forms in which press freedom is exercised and establishes the mechanisms by which abuses of press freedom are to be prevented and suppressed. The press law in May 1991 (law 25/91) created a legal framework for the publication of private newspapers, and further laws in 1992 permitted the establishment of private FM radio stations and set up a National Press Council (*Conselho Nacional da Comunicação Social*) as a watchdog body.

Despite these positive changes, a number of constraints have held back the development of the mass media. The first constraint has been the maintenance of some legal restrictions. For example, television and short-wave radio broadcasting remain a state monopoly (of *Televisão Pública de Angola* and *Rádio Nacional de Angola* respectively). In addition, laws on defamation have been used to curb freedom of expression.[27]

A second constraint is poverty and illiteracy. Both factors, along with high production and distribution costs, greatly limit the market for the printed press and discourage investment in the printed press, resulting in a situation where there is still only one daily newspaper, the *Jornal de Angola*, which is owned by the Government. The *Jornal de Angola* costs the equivalent of about 80 US cents per issue, putting it far beyond the reach of the mass of the population. As a result, daily newspaper circulation is only about nine per thousand population, one of the lowest in the world. The private press consists of a small number of weeklies and other less frequent periodicals, most costing well over one US dollar. These newspapers circulate only on a very limited scale beyond Luanda and a few other large cities such as Benguela, Lobito and Lubango.

Radio is by far the most important medium of mass communication. Figures from the 1996 MICS indicate that 51% of urban households and 22% of rural households have radio sets, giving a national average of 33% [INE/UNICEF, 1997]. Much larger numbers of households have access to radio, through neighbours' sets. This is also true of television, where far more households have access than would be suggested by the 1996 MICS figures for ownership (9% national, 22% and 1% rural). The fact that an increasingly large proportion of the population is living in the urban areas means that more Angolans are coming into contact with independent radio stations, including the Catholic station *Rádio Ecclesia*, the main independent source of news and discussion of political affairs. This station plans to extend its broadcasting, currently limited to the capital, to several other cities in 2002.

Women's participation and empowerment. CEDAW and various other international human rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1953) and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, include articles on the right of women to participate in political life on an equal basis with men. This right is also upheld by the non-discrimination articles in the Angolan Constitution. Suffrage is universal in Angola and women have the same rights as men to stand in elections and hold public office.

In practice, however, cultural, educational and other factors place women at a disadvantage in the political arena, as in many other parts of the world. While women voted in 1992 in equal numbers as men, relatively few women were elected as deputies. As of March 2002, 16% of parliamentary deputies were women. Only one of the political parties represented in the National Assembly is headed by a woman.

In the executive branch, 15% of ministerial and vice-ministerial posts are currently held by women. The gender imbalance is far more extreme at sub-national levels of government: there are currently no female provincial governors or vice-governors and it is rare to find a female municipal or communal administrator. This situation reflects ingrained cultural attitudes that women's role is primarily in the

[27] A case in point was the arrest, prosecution and imprisonment of the journalists Rafael Marques and Aguiar dos Santos, editor of *Agora*, after the publication of an article that allegedly defamed the head of state. The case provoked strong protests from international human rights organizations in 1999-2000 and the prison sentences were eventually suspended on appeal in October 2000.

home. Very rarely have women acted as *sobas* or *regedores*, or held other traditional political positions, despite historical examples of outstanding female politico-military leaders, such as Queen Nzinga, who ruled the Mbundu kingdoms of Ndongo and Matamba in the 17th century, leading resistance to the Portuguese. In addition to cultural attitudes, the lower levels of education and literacy among women tend to reinforce the subordinate position of women in the political arena. However, modernization and urbanization are changing perceptions and aspirations and, compared with most other African countries, female participation at the parliamentary and executive levels of Government is high compared with most African countries. The proportion of female ministers and vice-ministers is more than double that in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, where the average was 7% in 1998 [World Bank, 2001]. The promotion of political participation by women is one component of the national strategic plan on gender and the promotion of women, for the period 2002-2005, which was endorsed by the Council of Ministers in November 2001.

Chapter 3
Key issues for future progress

3.1 The challenge of post-war recovery

This chapter examines the factors that underlie the shortfalls in rights discussed in Chapter 2 and discusses the main challenges that will need to be addressed if the country is to move forward to recovery and development, taking full advantage of its favourable resource endowment and the return to peace. To a considerable extent, the seriousness of the problems revealed in the preceding assessment can be explained by the devastating effects of the past four decades of war. The cessation of hostilities in March 2002 therefore opens a new chapter in Angola's history, with much better prospects to tackle the country's deep-seated problems. However, not all these problems resulted directly or entirely from the war. Institutional and policy factors have also been important. In the new context of peace, it will therefore be crucial to address these issues, if the country is to make rapid headway towards overcoming the legacy of the past and meeting the social, economic, civil and political rights of its people.

Historical background. It is necessary, first of all, to set Angola's problems in context. The war and most of the country's other main problems had their roots in a colonial system that benefited settlers at the expense of Africans, was politically repressive and made no preparation for independence. This was the background to a war that began in 1961 as a war for national liberation, but then degenerated into a ruinous post-independence conflict, exacerbated until the early 1990s by external intervention. The related mass exodus of Portuguese settlers in 1975, during and after the transition to independence, resulted in a dearth of skills and the abandonment of thousands of commercial farms and businesses. There was a steep decline and subsequent stagnation of production in the non-oil sectors of the economy, accompanied by chronic macroeconomic instability. Meanwhile, large population displacements, triggered by the war, brought about rapid urbanization. Finally, the quality of governance suffered from an acute shortage of qualified personnel in the public administration, as well as from the disadvantages of a centralized, one-party system, which continued until the constitutional reforms in 1991-92.

The 1990s opened on a note of optimism, as the end of the cold war and the collapse of the apartheid system in South Africa created a more favourable international context in which to resolve the Angolan conflict. The country entered a series of closely inter-related, parallel transitions: from war to peace; from a one-party regime to a pluralist system of governance; from humanitarian crisis to social and economic recovery; and from a state-dominated economy to one based on private capital. However, the return to war following the elections in 1992 and again after the collapse of the Lusaka Protocol in 1998 undermined the hopes for a better future, plunging the country once more into a renewed humanitarian crisis, while jeopardizing economic and social recovery, further accelerating urbanization, and creating an unfavourable environment for the consolidation of the political reforms begun in the early 1990s.

The legacy of the war. The importance of the war as the fundamental cause of the country's difficulties cannot be underestimated. The war had far-reaching, multiple effects, at many different levels -- economic, social, cultural and institutional. Economically, the consequences were especially serious in the agricultural sector, due to the large reduction in the rural labour force and the breakdown of trade between the urban and rural areas, which forced isolated rural populations into a precarious state of economic autarchy at or below basic subsistence levels. As a result, Angola moved from being a food-surplus to a food-deficit country, while its once important agricultural export industries, such as coffee, were virtually destroyed. By disrupting agriculture, transport and trade, the war also contributed to the de-industrialization of the country, by cutting off low-cost sources of supply for manufacturing industries, most of which had been established before independence to process locally produced agricultural commodities.[1] Basic infrastructure, such as electricity systems, bridges and railway lines,

[1] In some cities of the interior, such as Huambo and Malange, once significant manufacturing sectors were completely destroyed.

were destroyed or severely damaged in many places, and roads were mined, disrupting communications and raising the costs of production. Furthermore, the war fragmented the national market into a patchwork of isolated enclave markets, connected in some cases by occasional road convoys and in many others only by costly air transport. The heavy burden of military expenditure on the Government budget diminished the resources available for investments in infrastructure or social services, further holding back the recovery of the economy or improvements in human well-being. In short, the war was the main reason for the decline or stagnation of the economy, outside the offshore oil sector, closing off opportunities for urban employment outside an import-dependent and largely 'informal' trade sector, sustained by demand generated by the 'trickle down' incomes resulting from oil revenues.

In addition, the 'crowding out' of social sector expenditure by high levels of defence and security expenditure, along with the destruction of social infrastructure in rural areas, contributed to the decay of the social sectors. Meanwhile, the waves of displacement reduced large numbers of Angolans to a state of virtual destitution. IDPs lost their main asset (land) and most other possessions, leaving them dependent on humanitarian assistance, while their arrival in huge numbers in host communities strained the coping mechanisms of existing residents -- through the sharing of meagre household resources by hosts with needy kin. By accelerating urbanization, the successive waves of displacement intensified competition for limited employment and income-generating opportunities in the depressed urban economy, while also adding to the pressures on school capacity and other social services in these urban communities.

The war also did immense damage to institutions, including in particular local government structures, as public employees fled from the hinterland to Luanda and a few other major urban centres on or near the coast. Displacement and urbanization weakened traditional community structures, as well as straining the traditional solidarity mechanisms of the extended family. Other consequences were the militarization of Angolan society (through the high levels of conscription, the extensive arming of the civilian population and many Angolans' direct experience of military incidents), the high levels of criminality, and the cultural or psychological effects of the war and displacement, including the fatalism of a population battered by its experiences and for the most part unable to pursue expectations beyond the struggle for day-to-day survival, or fearful of the risks of asserting its rights.

Peace-building and recovery. The cessation of hostilities in March 2002, following the death of the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, has once again raised hopes of achieving real peace. This time, the overwhelming military superiority of the Government forces, which contrasts sharply with the 'freezing' of the military stalemate that prevailed at the time of the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol, makes peace much more likely to endure than after those earlier attempts at conflict resolution. The country clearly has its best chance yet to build a sustainable peace and move forward to economic and social recovery.

Nonetheless, the legacy of the war will not be quickly overcome. A serious humanitarian crisis will continue for some time, at least until the harvest in 2003, and some consequences of the war, in particular the high degree of urbanization, are likely never to be reversed. The consolidation of the peace will require a number of specific peace-building measures, aimed at promoting national reconciliation, demilitarization and recovery. True national reconciliation will require the implementation of policies that promote inclusion, so that all Angolans, irrespective of their ethnic or geographic origins or their political affiliations, see that they have a stake in the new post-war Angola, on a basis of equity, without facing any kind of discrimination.

A major programme of demobilization will be required, to reduce the number of men under arms to a level adequate for national defence in a context of peace. Demobilization will need to be supported by programmes that promote the successful reintegration of former combatants into economic and social life. Another major challenge will be to assist large numbers of IDPs and refugees to return to their areas of origin. While many of those displaced during the war are now well integrated into urban host communities, several hundred thousand are likely to want to return to the rural areas. This will also be true of the more than 450,000 refugees in neighbouring countries. They will need transport home,

recapitalization (principally seeds, tools and animals), transitional food rations (until the first harvest), the rebuilding of basic infrastructure (water systems, access roads and social infrastructure) and the restoration of basic social services in the areas of return. As in the case of resettlement, the return of IDPs and refugees to their areas of origin should be based on a code of conduct that respects their basic rights, including the principle of voluntary return, verification of security (notably with respect to landmines) and adequate access to land. The customary land rights of returning IDPs should hold precedence over any land claims made by outsiders.

While some of these measures will need to be targeted, to assist specific population groups, lessons from post-conflict situations in other parts of the world indicate that the most effective strategy will be one that promotes a broad-based process of economic and social recovery. This would aim at improving the lives of the poor and rebuilding communities, creating conditions that would also be as favourable as possible for the successful reintegration of demobilized soldiers and returning IDPs and refugees.

Mine action will be another important dimension of post-conflict programmes, aimed at facilitating the return of IDPs and refugees, as well as the reopening of vital communications routes to revive domestic trade and support the recovery of the economy. Mine action will include mine surveys (to update and build on the initial surveys conducted in the post-Lusaka period) and mine awareness, in addition to mine clearance and the removal of UXOs.

Policy and institutional issues. While the war has unquestionably been the single most important constraint on development, as well as the immediate cause of the humanitarian emergency, other factors, of an institutional and policy-related nature, have exacerbated the serious situation experienced by Angola's people. For example, the inadequacy of public expenditure on basic social services and physical infrastructure has not been due exclusively to the need to finance strong armed forces in a context of war. The situation was made worse by lack of rigour in budget management, the waste of resources and the distortion of budget priorities within sectors. Even with large defence allocations, it would be possible to achieve much more in these other sectors, if budget mechanisms were more transparent and subject to effective public oversight, expenditure controls were tighter, proper procurement systems were in place and budgetary allocations within sectors were better attuned to priorities (issues discussed further in Sections 3.6 and 3.7).

Likewise, while the restoration of security is a fundamental pre-condition for the recovery of agriculture, land transport, internal trade and many branches of industry, economic performance has also been adversely affected by policy and institutional factors. These include constraints on competition, which have artificially created high-cost oligopolistic market structures, the limited services provided by the under-developed banking system, and the weak support for micro-entrepreneurs in the informal sector, which has become the main source of employment and income for the urban population. Other constraints include the insecurity of tenure of urban residents and their consequent inability to use housing as a means of collateral, and the ineffectiveness of the judicial system in upholding contracts.

In the rural areas too, the ending of the war removes the most important constraint on development. However, a range of other issues will need to be addressed in order to promote rural recovery and the re-integration of returning populations, the reduction of rural poverty, increases in agricultural production, the marketing of food surpluses and cash-crops, and the improvement of food security. These policy and institutional issues include the protection of the land rights of the rural poor, as well as the development of marketing systems and extension services attuned to the needs of small family farmers.

Until now, these issues have tended to be obscured by the preoccupation with the war, which has dominated the attention of policy-makers and even provided a pretext to justify failures or inaction in other domains. Tackling these issues will now be of critical importance for social and economic recovery, poverty reduction and the fulfillment of rights in the post-war period, and ultimately for ensuring the long-term sustainability of peace by avoiding the emergence of new sources of frustration and potential conflict.

The subsequent sections of this chapter focus on six major sets of issues, or challenges, that should feature prominently in any post-war recovery strategy, along with the specific post-conflict measures already discussed, such as demobilization, the return of IDPs and refugees, and community regeneration. The UN Country Team in Angola would expect these issues to be a core focus of the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP), which has been under preparation by the Government since mid-2000. Presented graphically in Figure 3.1, these challenges are:

- The reduction of urban and rural poverty through policies that promote improved access of the poor to employment, land and other resources;
- An adequate response to the high levels of urbanization and the country's other demographic problems;
- The diversification of the economy, away from extreme oil dependence through policies that promote development of the non-oil sectors;
- The rebuilding of the social sectors, with particular emphasis on basic social services;
- The mounting of an effective national response to HIV/AIDS;
- The development of political participation and democratic accountability, and the strengthening of public administration, including systems for ensuring rigour and transparency in the management of public resources.

Figure 3.1
Key challenges for post-war recovery and the realization of rights



3.2 Breaking out of the poverty trap

The overarching goal of development policy should be to reduce the high levels of poverty, and in particular to improve the situation of the large numbers of Angolans currently living in conditions of extreme poverty – or virtual destitution in the case of most recent IDPs and other especially vulnerable groups. The I-PRSP should set a strategic policy framework for a multi-pronged assault on poverty, in order to reverse the trends discussed in Chapter 2 and achieve the goals set by the Millennium Summit and other global conferences. A broad inter-sectoral approach is required because poverty is a multi-dimensional 'condition', trapping the poor in a vicious cycle of lack of opportunities and resources and, all too often, lack of information and means of redress. The response must address all these dimensions if it is to make real progress towards empowering the poor to assert their rights and achieve real improvements in their incomes, living environment and access to social services. Many of these issues are discussed in other sections of this chapter. Here attention will focus on two critical dimensions of the poverty trap: the trend towards growing income inequality in Angolan society and the limited access of the poor to employment opportunities, land, credit and other resources.

While rural people have been reduced to bare subsistence levels or forced to flee their homes, abandoning their assets and means of livelihood, there has been a worsening of extreme poverty in the urban areas, where the majority of the population now lives. To facilitate the presentation, the nature of problems facing the urban and rural poor, as well as the types of policy response required to address them, are discussed separately for urban and rural areas.

Perspectives for reducing urban poverty

Income inequality. The large increase in the proportion of the urban population in extreme poverty (see Chapter 2) reflects the limited opportunities for employment and income among the mass of low-skilled urban residents, which have been depressed further by the 'competition' from the ever-larger numbers of IDPs and migrants arriving from the rural areas. At the same time, living standards have improved significantly for the better-off in the urban areas, who have been the main beneficiaries, mainly via Government expenditure, of the 'trickle down' effects of the boom in the oil sector.

Figure 3.2
Distribution of urban household income by deciles, 1995 and 2000
(% of household income)



NOTE: ICPVD 1995 survey was only in urban areas; in IDR 2000/01, sample was 90% urban. IDR data are preliminary for first six months of survey.
Sources: ICPVD 1995 [INE, 1996]; IDR 2000/01

This widening inequality in the urban areas is shown by the preliminary data from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (IDR) in 2000/2001, which can be compared with the data for 1995 from the survey on urban living standards (ICPVD). Although the geographical coverage of these two surveys was slightly different (see Chapter 2), they do provide a clear indication of the shift in the distribution of household incomes in the urban areas in the second half of the 1990s.[2] The Gini coefficient, which is a measure of the degree of income equality in a range from zero (perfect equality) to one (perfect inequality), rose from 0.45 in 1995 to 0.51 in 2000. This widening of inequality is explained by a shift in relative incomes to the advantage of the richest 10%, or population decile, at the expense of all other nine deciles. The share of the richest population decile in total household expenditure rose from 31.5% in 1995 to 42.2% in 2000, as Figure 3.6 shows. By contrast, the share of the poorest two

[2] While the ICPVD's geographical coverage was purely urban, the IDR's sample was 90% urban and 10% rural.

population deciles declined from 7.0% to 4.4%. Indeed, in 2000, the richest 10% received the same share of income as the bottom 80%.

This suggests that an effective poverty reduction strategy would require not only high rates of economic growth, but also measures to halt and reverse the trend towards increased inequality in income distribution. A strategy focused on growth alone would require very high growth rates to make a serious dent in poverty. There are two reasons for this. First, the low growth elasticity of the poverty headcount; and second, the high population growth rate. An analysis based on preliminary data from the IDR indicates that the growth elasticity of the poverty headcount is only 0.7, meaning that a 1% rise in average household income produces only a 0.7% reduction in the proportion of households below the poverty line. This is itself due to the high income inequality and the large proportion of households below the poverty line.

Second, even if positive growth and constant income distribution make it possible to reduce the *proportion* of households in poverty, the high population growth rate (3.0%) means that the *absolute* number of those living below the poverty line would continue to rise unless the growth in income exceeded 7.3% a year. In other words, given the current population growth rate and assuming no change in income distribution, overall household income would have to rise by 7.3% a year *simply to avoid the absolute number of poor from rising*.[3]

Employment and income-generating opportunities. The main factor preventing the urban poor from improving their livelihoods is the scarcity of employment and income earning opportunities in an urban market that has been saturated by the influx of IDPs. Although the revenue from oil has some multiplier effects in the rest of the economy, mainly via Government expenditure, thereby generating demand for goods and services and providing some opportunities for employment and income generation, this impact remains quite limited. Most of the demand generated is concentrated in Luanda, where household incomes are significantly higher than in most of the rest of the country. Even there, job opportunities are mainly in the form of self-employment in the informal sector, especially informal retail trading.

Large-scale job creation would require the diversification of the economy, which is currently dominated by the oil sector (an industry directly generating very little employment) and an import-dependent trade sector. While investment in the non-oil sectors of the economy may only gradually begin to generate large numbers of new formal sector jobs, there are two other potential sources of employment and income for the urban poor in the short to medium term. First, during the post-war reconstruction phase, large numbers of jobs could be generated by programmes of public works aimed at rebuilding destroyed and damaged infrastructure. Second, support could be provided for the development of micro-business activities in the informal sector, which has become the principal source of urban employment.

Micro-business activities in the informal sector. In a context where relatively few jobs are being generated in the formal private or public sectors, the urban poor have found refuge in the informal sector, particularly in petty trading. Furthermore, the erosion of the value of salaries in the public sector by inflation during the 1990s forced many households to diversify their sources of income, in particular by sending more family members, including in some cases children, into income-generating activities in the informal sector. Data from the urban household living conditions survey (ICPVD) in 1995 showed that 55% of urban household income came from self-employment, while only 43% came from salaries. More than half of those working in the urban areas were employed in the informal sector. Overall, 72% of households had at least one member working in the informal sector, with the highest proportion in Luanda (78%) [INE, 1996; UNDP, 2000].

[3] This implies a GDP growth rate of 7.3% only if the share of household income in GDP remains constant.

Figure 3.3
Percentage distribution of urban employment, 2000/01



NOTE: Survey covered cities of Cabinda, Catumbela, Benguela, Lobito, Lubango, Chitato, Dondo, & provinces of Luanda, Cunene and Namibe.

Source: IDR 2000/01 [INE, 2001b]

The importance of self-employment has been confirmed by more recent data from the IDR 2000/01. As Figure 3.3 shows, 43% of those in employment in the urban areas in 2000/01 were self-employed, while 6% described themselves as 'businessmen'. Only 19% worked in the private sector and 5% in state-owned companies, while 10% were employed in the public administration [INE, 2001b].

However, income earning opportunities in the informal sector are held back by the increasing competition from an ever larger number of market participants. This reflects not only the rapid growth of the urban working population, but also the low level of development of the informal sector, which is characterized by the overwhelming dominance of petty trading, low levels of skills and lack of finance for the development of business activities by the poor. The 1995 data showed that more than three quarters of informal sector participants were engaged in informal commerce [UNDP, 2000].[4] This is the activity with the lowest barriers of entry for those with low levels of education, limited skills and virtually no capital. In the case of more formal micro-businesses, costly, bureaucratic licensing procedures and high rates of taxation (around 47% on business profits) are additional barriers to business development, as well as factors encouraging the 'informalization' of activities and fiscal losses for the state [De Vletter, 2002].[5]

The future potential of the micro-business sector to provide adequate employment and incomes for a large part of the urban population will depend in large part on aggregate demand in the economy as a whole. However, the development of the sector itself should also be promoted, given its importance as a major source of employment and incomes for the poor. This will require a more favourable regulatory framework, improved access to credit and investments in education and apprenticeship schemes to raise the levels of skills.

Opportunities for saving and micro-credit. One of the most important dimensions of the poverty trap is the difficulty the poor face in accumulating savings or borrowing capital, so that they can develop their income-generating activities or meet other needs -- for example, house construction or improvements, or the payment of large unexpected costs, such as those arising from illness or death. In part, the difficulty of saving reflects the low level of income. But it is also a consequence of the low level of development of the banking sector, in terms of its branch network, clientele and range of services, and the very limited availability of non-bank financial services oriented to meeting the needs of the poor. The commercial banks have not sought to attract savings from poor clients: indeed, most require a minimum deposit of $500 to open accounts. With the exception of the new Banco Sol, founded in 2001, the banks have also shown little if any interest in micro-credit facilities, both because of the high administrative costs and the difficulty of securing indemnity for the risk of default, given the inability of borrowers to provide land, residences or other property as guarantees. The poor have also not benefited from the business promotion funds set up by the Government, which have focused on

[4] Only about a tenth of informal sector participants were involved in what could be considered productive activities, such as baking, carpentry or mechanical trades.

[5] In February 2000, the Government adopted decree 7/00 establishing the *Guiché Único da Empresa* to simplify licensing procedures, but by early 2002 this was still not fully functional.

larger, more formal enterprises. The only micro-credit services currently available have been launched on a pilot basis by a few NGOs, mainly in Luanda, and by the new Banco Sol, founded in 2001.[6] It has been estimated that together these programmes reach only about 5,000 beneficiaries – a drop in the ocean compared with the potential demand for such services [UNDP, 2002]. The only other sources of funds available to the poor are loans from family or friends and the facilities provided by a few traditional rotating savings and credit associations, the *kixikila* groups, which are found mainly in Luanda.

While the NGO programmes and *kixikila* groups have used the 'solidarity' mechanisms of group-based lending to ensure repayment, a major obstacle to the wider development of micro-credit is the lack of mechanisms for individual guarantees, such as the mortgaging of property. Besides reflecting the weakness of the judicial system (as a mechanism for enforcing loan recovery), this is a consequence of the confused situation regarding housing: although large numbers of urban households own their homes (63% according to the IDR 2000/01), very few have formal property titles. As a result, they are not only at risk of summary eviction, but they cannot use their dwellings, a potential form of capital, as collateral for credit, to improve their livelihoods. This underscores the importance of legally documenting the ownership of land and housing by the poor in the urban areas, as well as encouraging the development of micro-finance programmes, building on the initial success of the small schemes launched since the late 1990s.

Perspectives for reducing rural poverty

In the rural areas, there has been an almost total disruption of normal life, due to the war, except in certain secure areas, notably in the south-west. In most parts of the countryside, communities have been reduced to the most elementary level of self-subsistence, often without being able to meet their most basic needs. In these areas, the deepening of poverty has been a consequence of the disruption of market links, the reduction of the areas farmed (due to insecurity and a shortage of male labour for land clearance) and 'decapitalization', resulting from the loss of animals, tools and seeds. Many rural communities have suffered repeated pillaging by troops and have lost most or all of their livestock and other assets. The consequent hunger, lack of access to health care and other forms of deprivation, in addition to the insecurity in rural areas, have been key factors driving rural people to abandon their homes and move to areas in or around the cities, in search of humanitarian assistance as well as protection from attack.

Although much is known about IDPs in their places of refuge, there is a dearth of information about the situation in the areas from which they have fled, due to the difficulties of access. This also true of many other rural areas, where populations have remained in conditions of virtual autarchy, cut off from markets and services provided by Government ministries, UN agencies and NGOs.

Rural recovery. One of the main challenges of the post-war period will be to regenerate rural communities and revive the rural economy, after years of disruption of agriculture and rural trade, destruction and decay of rural infrastructure, and decapitalization and displacement of rural populations. Angola has the potential to develop a flourishing rural economy, because of its enormous agricultural resources: it has generally good rainfall patterns, an abundance of arable land and a range of different climatic zones. The country has the potential to become once again self-sufficient in a wide range of food products and, as in the past, agricultural commodities could contribute to the country's exports and provide the basis for a range of agro-processing industries.

A multi-sectoral approach to rural recovery is required, to overcome the devastating effects of the upheavals and conflict in the rural areas over the past decades. In addition to the revival of agriculture,

[6] Particularly noteworthy are the NGO programmes supported by the UK's Department for International Development (DfID) through its Luanda Urban Poverty Programme. These programmes have applied good micro-finance practices, including the avoidance of subsidized interest rates (a crucial condition for long-term financial sustainability), and achieved high repayment rates, using group solidarity principles.

rural trade and other economic activities, the restoration of basic social services and key physical infrastructure, including schools, health posts, water systems and access roads, will be crucial components. This is critically important for the revival of rural communities and the reintegration of returning IDPs, refugees and demobilized soldiers, as well as to slow down future migration to the urban areas.

Agricultural recovery focused on small-holders. The return to peace should make it possible, for the first time in many years, to develop and implement strategies to enable rural people to rebuild their livelihoods. These strategies need to start from the premise that the vast majority of rural people, including returning IDPs, refugees and demobilized soldiers, have virtually no assets of any kind, apart from customary land rights. The key will be to ensure that the rural poor, including these returnees, obtain access to adequate arable land, agricultural tools, seeds, animals and other key assets and inputs, as well as opportunities to access markets.

The strategy for agricultural recovery and development was the subject of an in-depth review, completed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in 1996 [MINADER/FAO, 1997]. One of its main conclusions was that the strategy should focus mainly on the development of the small-holder sector. It observed that growth in food production on small family farms would have a much larger impact on the eradication of poverty and malnutrition than a similar increase in output obtained on a relatively small number of large, highly mechanized holdings, employing relatively few of the rural poor. Small farms would make better use of domestic resources, especially land and labour, and have lower requirements for foreign exchange for farm machinery, fertilizers, pesticides and foreign technology. Above all, a policy favouring small farmers would result in a more equitable spread of the benefits of economic growth, contribute to higher rural living standards and create a broad-based market for consumer goods, thereby helping to stimulate industrial expansion. A prosperous rural small-holder economy would reduce the 'push' factors inducing rural-urban migration, and therefore also have a positive effect on urban society in Angola. An expansion in output by small farmers would thus become the motor of rural development, while also contributing to the reduction of structural poverty in urban and peri-urban areas.

Access to land. From this perspective, it will be critically important to reverse the trend of the past decade toward increasing land concentration. The erosion of rural communities' land rights has been a long historical process that began during the colonial period with the alienation of land from African communities by white settlers. The settlers obtained a large part of the land that was most fertile and propitious for the cultivation of valuable cash crops, such as coffee, and were able to do so with the support of a colonial regime that did not recognize the customary land rights of traditional African communities. In the south-west, where conditions are best for cattle-raising, the traditional transhumance systems of agro-pastoral communities were curtailed by commercial farmers who fenced off large areas of ranch-land.

After independence, when the vast majority of settler farmers fled, the new Government nationalized the abandoned commercial farms (*fazendas*) and consolidated them into large state agricultural companies. These companies failed, however, to revive commercial farm production and by the mid-1980s most were in a state of virtual collapse. Local rural communities spontaneously alienated these companies' land, livestock and machinery. Beginning in the mid-1980s, there was a brief period of encouragement for peasant farmers, highlighted by the creation of the *estações de desenvolvimento agrícola* (EDAs), which provided machinery and extension services to peasant farmers, and the formation of the *União Nacional das Associações de Camponeses Angolanos* (UNACA) in 1990.

However, the large-scale privatization of state-owned farmland, which began in the early 1990s, marked the start of a new phase in which Government policy was directed principally at the restoration of commercial farming. Most of the former state agricultural companies were broken up and sold off to new Angolan *fazendeiros*, at the expense of the local rural communities who had been occupying and enjoying the usufruct of the land previously owned by the settlers and the state agricultural companies. As was generally the case with the privatization of state companies in the early 1990s, there was no

proper valuation of the assets to be privatized, there was no competitive bidding and the interests of local communities were not taken into account through consultative processes. By 1999, land concessions totaling more than 2 million hectares, or 50% of the area held by commercial farmers in the colonial period, had already been granted [Pacheco, 2002]. This has sowed the seeds of land disputes, a problem that first erupted in the Gambos district of Huíla in 1999 and could become a major post-war source of future conflict.

Indeed, there is a risk that the problem will be accentuated if lands abandoned by displaced populations during the war are also ceded to outsiders on the grounds that the land is unoccupied. Although the current land law, which dates from 1992 (law 21-C/1992), provides some protection for the land rights of rural communities, in terms of access and usufruct, within a framework that invests all legal ownership of land and natural resources in the state, this protection may be undermined in practice in a situation where traditional, communal land tenure rights are not registered, communities are unaware of their legal rights and they have limited, if any access to the justice system.[7] The protection of the land rights of the rural poor should be one component of a comprehensive sectoral strategy for the recovery of agricultural production and the achievement of national and household food security.[8]

Other components of a rural recovery strategy. In the immediate post-war period, one of the top priorities will be to provide assistance to returning IDPs, refugees and demobilized soldiers, as well as decapitalized rural communities, to restart basic agricultural activities. This assistance would include the provision of seeds and tools, as well as food rations until the first harvest and other essential support items. Over the longer-term, recapitalization would require mechanisms to assist the reconstitution of the livestock inventory.

Another vital component in the rural recovery process will be the revival of rural-urban trade, to give farmers the opportunity to exchange surpluses for consumer goods and for vital inputs, such as seeds, tools and fertilizers. This will need to be accompanied by the demining and rehabilitation of roads, as well as a crackdown on illegal levies on traders by security forces and police, which are a disincentive to trade and increase the costs of food items in urban markets.

To help finance the recovery of agriculture, trade and other rural economic activities, it will be critically important to develop credit mechanisms. Since the collapse of the rural credit system that operated in colonial times, through the commercial banks and the village-level traders (*comerciantes do mato*), there has been no functioning system for financing rural economic activities. At present, very little credit for financing rural trade and farming is available from the banking system or non-bank financial institutions.

Another important part of the strategy should be the rebuilding of the research and extension system, with programmes oriented in particular to supporting the family farming sector. The system still exists, through the network of the *Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agrário* (IDA), but is institutionally weak and requires capacity building support, so that it becomes an effective source of assistance to small-holders.

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[7] A new draft land law, which has not been published and has not yet been approved by the Council of Ministers, is believed to be less protective of customary land rights than the 1992 law.

[8] In the 1996-97 agricultural development review, FAO and MINADER concluded that the 'strong tendency for the concentration of land in a few hands' was counter-productive in terms of agricultural efficiency and production, as well as being contrary to the goal of poverty reduction. While commercial farms could contribute to increases in national production, they would be more dependent on capital (and imported inputs and technology) than domestic labour. The review concluded that 'the benefits to the economy at large and to the living standards of the majority of the population would be minimal'. By contrast, a strategy oriented to developing the production of small farmers would have the advantage of mobilizing domestic rather than external resources, the principal inputs being land, family labour, draft animal power and on-farm sources of fertility, such as compost and manure. Increases in the output of small farms would 'have the combined effects of contributing to the achievement of national production goals, alleviating poverty and household food insecurity, and stimulating broad-based economic development' [FAO/MINADER, 1997].

In addition to reviving agriculture and livestock-raising, the rural recovery process should include measures to establish effective systems of forest management, aimed at the sustainable use of forest resources. Except in the areas of heavy population concentration around the towns, the utilization of forest resources has been limited during the conflict, due to rural depopulation and the breakdown of markets. However, this could change in the post-war period, du to improved access to rural areas.

Finally, the success of the small-holder focused strategy for rural recovery and development requires the empowerment of the small family farmers. This begins with the restoration of their dignity, by reducing their dependence on emergency assistance and rebuilding their confidence and means of livelihood, and could eventually move on to the emergence of representative organizations of peasant farmers, such as farmers' associations and unions, to promote and defend their rights and interests. The branches of UNACA, which exist in some relatively stable rural areas, are incipient forms of self-organization.

3.3 The implications of rapid population growth and urbanization

A major structural factor affecting human well-being in Angola has been the country's transformation, in just three decades, from an overwhelmingly rural to a highly urbanized society. In addition, the population growth rate remains very high, resulting in a population age-structure dominated by children and adolescents. Angola also has a large proportion of female-headed households.

Population estimates in Angola are unreliable, since there has been no census since 1970 and the population distribution has been greatly altered since then by population displacements and migration, both within the country and across borders. However, the 'big picture', presented below, is clear enough. In the more stable situation created by the ending of the war, it should be possible to organize a national population census, to serve as a key data source for national planning.

Population growth and age-structure

Based on extrapolations from the national census in 1970 and the censuses carried out in some provinces in 1983, the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) estimates that the total population rose from 5.6 million in 1970 to 13.8 million in 2001. Although the overall population density remains quite low, with 11.1 inhabitants per square kilometre, which is about a quarter of the world average, the population is growing rapidly. Angola is in the stage known as the 'demographic transition', when fertility and the birth rate fall more slowly than the death rate, producing a high population growth rate, currently estimated by INE to be around 3.0% a year. At this rate, the population would double again by the year 2025, although this growth rate could slow down if the HIV/AIDS epidemic progresses, raising mortality rates.

The MICS 2001 provides the most recent estimate of the total fertility rate (the average number of children to which a woman will give birth in her lifetime at prevailing age-specific fertility rates). At 7.1, this TFR is one of the highest in the world: in 1999, the average was 5.4 for Sub-Saharan Africa and 2.9 for developing countries [UNICEF, 2001].[9] The crude birth rate is estimated by UNICEF at 48 per thousand population, again one of the highest rates in the world, comparing with averages of 40 and 25 respectively for Sub-Saharan Africa and developing countries. What is most striking is that the crude birth rate in Angola has scarcely changed in the past three decades, whereas it has fallen by a sixth in Sub-Saharan Africa and by a third in the developing world as a whole over the same 30-year period.

The high fertility and birth rates reflect the high cultural premium attached to children and the large family size desired by most Angolans (the average woman aspiring to bear 6.3 children according to the MICS 1996), as well as the low access to and use of contraceptive methods and the early age at which

[9] UNICEF's *State of the World's Children 2001*, which put Angola's TFR at 7.2 in 2000, indicated that Angola had the fourth highest TFR in the world, exceeded only by Niger (8.0), Yemen (7.6) and Somalia (7.3).

women begin their reproductive life: 21% are pregnant by the age of 16 and 61% by 19, according to the MICS 1996 data. Other underlying factors are likely to be the high child mortality, which makes some children 'replacements' for those that die, and the low level of female education, which makes women less aware of the risks of early or poorly spaced pregnancies, less aware of contraceptive methods and less able to negotiate reproductive decisions with their partners. These factors contribute to the high rate of maternal mortality, discussed in Chapter 2, as well as to the difficulties faced by parents in caring adequately for their children.

One of the main consequences of these population dynamics is that Angola's population has a pyramid-shaped age structure, with an especially large base for the youngest age-groups and a very narrow summit. The 1996 MICS found that 50% of the population is under the age of 15 and almost 60% less than 20 years old [INE/UNICEF, 1997]. This youthful age-structure produces a high dependency ratio of 92.3, meaning that for every 100 persons of 'working age' (conventionally defined as the age-range 15-64) there are 92.3 dependants (children under the age of 15 or elderly people 65 years old and above). In reality, many children under the age of 15 work in Angola, a fact that in itself reflects the difficulty that many poor parents face in raising large families.

Box 3.1

Angola's youth: the risks of a frustrated generation

In few countries is the inherently difficult transition from childhood to adulthood so beset with risks and frustrated hopes as in Angola. The war and military conscription, inadequate education and lack of skills, an economy that offers few prospects for gainful employment, and the start of sexual relations in a context of HIV/AIDS – these are some of the daunting challenges facing the Angolan teenager, and which can so easily lead to frustration and despair. Adolescents constitute a large part of the total population (about 18-19%) and their numbers are rising rapidly.

HIV/AIDS is an especially serious risk in this age group, as teenagers enter a stage of sexual discovery and experimentation, often engaging in extensive sexual networking with inadequate knowledge about HIV/AIDS, other sexually transmitted diseases and means of preventing infection. Among young women, economic dependency and lack of bargaining power with older men in sexual relations amplify the risks.

Most young people enter the employment market with limited skills and few opportunities. This is true for both sexes, but especially for young women, due to the gender disparities in education. Besides achieving universal primary education and expanding secondary and technical education, there is a need to provide flexible means for young people, in particular young women, to make up for missed years of schooling. Not surprisingly, the majority or urban youth end up self-employed in the informal sector: 56% of those employed between the ages of 20 and 24 are working for themselves, compared with 44% in all age groups, according to the IDR 2000/01 [INE, 2001b]. Most are scraping a living by hawking goods in the markets and the streets.

Yet, while their prospects are so poor, their aspirations have been expanded by access to the media, in particular television, which, through the *telenovelas* and other programmes, parades the wealth and living styles of other societies – and all too often their more comfortable classes. The contrasts feed the sense of frustration and also drive young Angolans to seek ways of migrating, illegally if necessary, to more developed countries, in particular South Africa and Europe, in search of a better life or to avoid conscription.

As events in other crisis countries have shown, frustration among young people all too often finds its outlet in crime, vigilantism, ethnic conflict or other forms of violent self-assertion, that are prone to manipulation and risk plunging societies into a cycle of destruction. The risks are heightened by the combination of frustration, military experience and the negative cultural effects of the war. All males aged 21 are liable for compulsory conscription, while voluntary conscription is permitted from the age of 18, although some children under the age of 18 have also been conscripted in violation of the law [UNICEF/GURN, 1999]. In all, at least 100,000 young men are enrolled in the armed forces at any time, while thousands more have fought in the rebel forces of UNITA. Quite apart from their direct military experience, Angola's young people have grown up in a country that has been at war all their lives. It is hardly surprising that some young people come to see violence as a 'normal' social condition and force as a normal means of personal survival or material advancement.

Such rapid population growth has important policy and planning implications. First, it requires huge investments to provide education to the growing number of children reaching school-age, and a buoyant economy capable of integrating increasing numbers of new job-seekers into the labour market. As Chapter 2 has already shown, it will be necessary to raise the number of primary school pupils from 1.5 million in 2000 to 5 million by 2015, if universal primary education is to be achieved while keeping pace with the rise in the number of primary school-age children. Moreover, unless current trends are reversed, more and more adolescents will approach adulthood poorly educated, with very limited employment prospects, and frustrated by their lack of opportunities (see Box 3.1).

Second, the widening of access to reproductive health services, including modern contraceptive methods, is not only a right, as discussed in Chapter 2, but an essential dimension of a poverty reduction strategy. Improved access to such services needs to be accompanied by progress in other fields that are known to have a causal relationship with the fertility rate, notably female education and child mortality.

Urbanization and urban development

Another major challenge facing the country is how to adjust to the demographic changes resulting from rapid urbanization. The normal process of migration from rural to urban areas, which is typical of all developing countries, has been dramatically speeded up in Angola by the displacement of rural populations during the war. Only a small minority of IDPs returned home during the brief periods of peace in 1991-92 and 1994-98 and many of those have been displaced again, making IDPs still more cautious about returning to their areas of origin. In practice, therefore, most IDPs have tended to become absorbed into host communities, eventually settling there in a permanent manner or moving on to larger cities. This process has been reinforced by the youthful nature of the population: born in the urban areas, the children of IDPs grow up in an urban environment with no knowledge of rural life and a negative view of the rural areas as dangerous, impoverished and bereft of opportunities.

As Figure 3.2 shows, only 14% of the population was living in the urban areas at the time of the last national census, in 1970. In the absence of more recent national census data, it is impossible to know with any exactitude the urban share of the population today. However, in designing the population samples for the two MICS, INE worked on the assumption that 42% of the population was living in the urban areas in 1996 and 60% in 2001. This would imply one of the highest rates of urbanization anywhere in the world. These estimates are lent some credence by information that is available about the population of the capital, which has risen more than sixfold in 30 years. Luanda's population more than doubled in the 1960s, reaching 480,613 in 1970, and then almost doubled again in the period from 1970 to 1983, when a provincial census recorded a population of 927,867. Since then, the population has tripled, reaching 3.28 million, according to calculations

Figure 3.4
Urbanization, 1950-2001



1/ Including Cacuaco and Viana.

Sources: INE; Pepetela, 1990; Amado, Cruz & Hakkert, 1992

based on an aerial survey conducted prior to the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (IDR) in 2000.[10] This alone would be equivalent to 22% of the national population.

There are important policy implications. First, rural development must be given high policy priority in order to reduce the rate of rural-urban migration.[11] Second, however, development planning and recovery strategies must be premised on the fact that Angola is already a predominantly urban society, and that this will not change, despite the end of the war. 'Resettlement', as an exercise in artificial demographic engineering, will not alter this reality – quite apart from the rights abuses that would be inherent in any attempt to force part of the urban population to leave the cities. The shift in the urban-rural balance of the population means that most jobs and incomes will have to be generated in the urban areas. It also implies the need for much greater attention than in the past to urban planning, investments in urban infrastructure (roads, water supply and sewage systems) and the development of low-cost housing on serviced sites, with related financing mechanisms. All of these have been lacking, resulting inevitably in the spontaneous development of vast shanty settlements in the peri-urban areas, such as the *musseques* of Luanda, without adequate planning, security of tenure or provision of basic infrastructure and services.

3.4 Economic diversification and development

Another structural shift over the past three decades has been the skewed development of the economy resulting from the combination of a rapidly expanding oil sector and the collapse, decline or stagnation of most other sectors of the economy. As a highly capital intensive industry, the oil sector directly generates very few jobs (currently about 10,000).[12] However, the country's substantial and rising oil revenues could be a major internal resource for investment in physical infrastructure and human capital, contributing to the development of other sectors that generate much larger numbers of jobs. To date, however, oil revenue has contributed little to broader economic and social development, partly though not entirely due to the effects of the war.

An economy overwhelmingly dependent on oil

Role of oil in the economy. The rise of Angola's oil industry, which has been protected from attack by its predominantly offshore location[13] and has benefited from a supportive policy framework and attractive fiscal incentives, has been one of the remarkable achievements of the past two decades. More than 8 billion barrels of oil have been discovered in deep waters off the Angolan coast in the past decade, making Angola one of the most successful areas for oil exploration in the world -- and one of the most sought-after by the oil companies.[14] Most of the new fields are yet to come on stream, but Angola has already increased its oil production by more than 550% since 1980, to over 900,000 barrels a day (b/d) in

[10] These figures includes the population of Cacuaco and Viana. Excluding those *municípios*, the total population of the city of Luanda was estimated to have risen to 2.98 million by 2000.

[11] In addition to being an important objective in its own right, to promote rural recovery from the devastating effects of the war.

[12] 10,562 people were directly employed in the oil industry in 2000 [MINPET, 2001], and a significant proportion of these were expatriates. Somewhat larger numbers are thought to be employed in service industries related to the oil sector.

[13] There have been attacks on onshore oil installations in the Soyo area, but currently less than 3% of Angola's oil production is onshore.

[14] Assuming an average price of $20 a barrel, Angola would earn $160 billion from the oil in these deepwater fields, spread perhaps over 20 to 30 years. Of course, further discoveries, which are likely given the exploration successes achieved so far, could raise this figure even higher. By comparison, Nigeria, Sub-Saharan Africa's largest oil producer, has earned about $320 billion from oil in the past 30 years. Angola's net earnings would be lower than the gross figure (perhaps $110-120 billion), due to profit repatriation by the international oil companies, the substantial investment costs of developing the new deepwater fields (an estimated $3.50 per barrel) and the fields' operating costs (about $2 per barrel).

early 2002. For more than a decade, Angola has been the second largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa (after Nigeria).

As a result of the expansion of the oil sector and the contraction of most other sectors of the economy, the oil sector's share of GDP rose from 20% in 1991 to 54% in 2001, according to national accounts data from the Ministry of Planning. Dependence on oil is even more marked in terms of export earnings or Government revenue. In recent years, the oil sector has accounted for over 80% of Government revenue and close to 90% of merchandise exports (see Figures 3.5 and 3.6).

Figure 3.5
Structure of GDP, 2001
(% of GDP at market prices; estimates)



Source: IMF, derived from Ministry of Planning estimates

This heavy dependence on oil is both an advantage and a risk. It gives Angola much higher foreign exchange earnings and Government revenues than in most African countries: in Sub-Saharan Africa, Angola's merchandise exports are exceeded only by South Africa and Nigeria. About half of the gross value of oil sector exports ($5,976 million in 2001, according to preliminary data) accrues to the Government as fiscal revenue ($3,179 million in 2001), giving the Government one of the highest domestic resource bases on the continent.[15] Overall, Government revenue in 2001 amounted to $3,938 million [FMI, 2002].

Figure 3.6
The role of oil in the Angolan economy, 1993-2001



Sources: IMF, 2002b; INE; MINPET, 2001

However, the volatility of oil prices makes Angola susceptible to sudden large falls in exports and fiscal revenue, making macroeconomic management more difficult than in a country with a more diversified economy. In addition, the petroleum sector drives up the salaries of trained personnel, thereby reducing the competitiveness of other sectors in international markets. The scale of oil revenues may also have

[15] In most years, about half of gross export earnings from oil flow out of the country, to reimburse the development costs and operating costs of the oil industry and to repatriate oil company profits. Costs are especially high at present, and will remain so for several years, because of the large investments being made to develop the new oilfields discovered in the deepwater blocks in the past decade.

the psychological effect of diminishing the attention paid to reviving or developing other sectors of the economy, which may appear to be relatively unimportant, even though they are the source of employment and incomes for the vast majority of the population.

The non-oil sectors. Angola is the fourth largest producer of diamonds in the world after Botswana, Russia and South Africa. However, the diamond industry makes a far smaller contribution to GDP, exports and fiscal revenue than the oil industry. In 2000, it contributed 6% of GDP, 9% of exports and less than 2% of fiscal revenue, despite a recovery in the 'official' industry since the FAA's reoccupation (in 1997-99) of the main diamond mining areas once held by UNITA and the start-up of Angola's first kimberlite mine at Catoca in 1997. Angola's overall diamond exports were around $1.1 billion in 2000, with $739 million sold through official channels [Ascorp, 2001] and $350 million through smuggling networks, including about $100 million by UNITA, according to estimates of the UN Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA [UN, 2001]. The low fiscal revenue from diamonds ($66 million or less than 10% of the value of official diamond sales in 2000) indicates that the state is benefiting little from this industry. By contrast with the oil industry, however, the diamond sector is a major source of employment, especially in the informal, artisanal mines, where more than 100,000 *garimpeiro* miners are thought to be working.

Most other sectors of the economy have suffered a steep decline in production since the mid-1970s. This decline began in the immediate post-independence period, as a result of the outbreak of the war, the settler exodus and the abandonment of thousands of small businesses and commercial farms. Some industries, such as iron ore mining and the production of sisal, which were respectively the fourth and fifth main source of export income (after oil, coffee and diamonds), collapsed at that time, never to be revived. Some industries experienced a partial recovery in the late 1970s and during the 1980s, but many others stagnated, declined further or halted production, due to the escalation of the war and the poor management of state-owned companies set up after independence. The return to war in late 1992 inflicted another severe shock on the non-oil sectors of the economy, particularly as major urban centres became the theatre of combat for the first time since 1975. In 1993, non-oil GDP slumped by 31% in real terms. There has been a gradual recovery since 1995, but it was not until 2000 that non-oil GDP finally exceeded its 1992 level.

The share of agriculture in GDP declined from 18% in 1990 to only 8% in 2001. The country was converted from a net exporter of food to one dependent on imports and food aid for about half its cereal requirements by the 1990s. With respect to export crops, by the 1990s Angola was producing less than 1% of the volume of coffee it used to produce in the early 1970s, when coffee was the second main export and Angola was the world's fourth largest coffee producer. Production of other once important crops, such as cotton, tobacco and sugar cane, had halted almost entirely by the early 1990s. Numerous agro-processing factories, which constituted the core of the manufacturing sector, closed down in the second half of the 1970s or during the 1980s, and manufacturing now accounts for only 4% of GDP. In addition, much of the railway system has stopped functioning: the international freight traffic on the Benguela Railway, which linked the port of Lobito to the mining economies of Zambia and south-western Zaire (now DRC), has been at a standstill since the late 1970s.

Import dependence and the trade sector. Due to the decline of the productive sectors of the economy, apart from oil and diamonds, Angola now imports almost all its consumer goods (except some food), as well as services, inputs for the few local industries and large amounts of military materiel. Angola is living off its revenue from oil and to a lesser extent diamonds (both non-renewable resources) and importing practically everything else. The ratio of imports to GDP is thus unusually high: more than 65% throughout the period 1997-2001 [IMF, 2002], more than double the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (31% in 1999) or for the world as a whole (25%) [World Bank, 2001].

The import trade is part of a commercial chain that extends from the ports and airports, through warehouses and wholesalers, to a mass of petty market vendors and roadside sellers. Trade is the one sector of the economy, outside the mining sector, that is relatively buoyant, accounting for 16% of GDP

in 2001. However, it is also a sector dominated by informal vending, an activity which has become the main source of employment and income for urban Angolans, in particular women.

Conditions for economic recovery

The ending of the war has removed the main obstacle to the recovery of the non-oil sectors of the economy, but this needs to be accompanied by other measures to improve the environment for investment and job-creation. These measures need to address six types of constraints that hold back development of the economy: macroeconomic instability and uncertainty; barriers to competition and excessive bureaucracy; the poor state of the country's physical infrastructure; the inadequacy of financial services; the weakness of the judicial system; and the low level of education and skills of the majority of the labour force.

First, a stable macroeconomic climate is needed to reduce business risk and so build the confidence needed for long-term investment in the non-oil sectors. In the past two years there has been some success in restoring greater macroeconomic stability: inflation, which had been fuelled by weak public expenditure controls and the monetization of large Government deficits, was brought down from a peak of 12,035% (on a year-on-year basis) in July 1996 to 116% in December 2001. By comparative standards, however, a figure in triple digits is still extremely high. It is also noteworthy that the reduction in inflation in 2000-2001 was facilitated by a surge in Government revenue and international reserves (to $1.2 billion or 4.6 months import cover at the end of 2000), made possible by the temporarily high level of oil prices.

Figure 3.7
Annual inflation rate, Luanda, 1999-2001
(%)



Source: INE

In 2001, oil revenues fell, as oil prices weakened, due to the slowdown in the international economy. Weaker oil prices and the high amortization costs of the new deepwater fields may also keep Government oil revenues relatively stable in 2002-04, despite the large increase in production resulting from the start-up of the new Girassol oilfield at the end of 2001.[16] There was still a deficit in Government finances (on a commitment basis) in 2000 and 2001, equivalent to 9.0 and 7.5% of GDP respectively, and lower oil revenues in 2001 resulted in a reduction of international reserves to $732 million (or 2.6 months import cover). This underscores the need to improve the rigour and transparency of the management of public finances, in order to better protect the economy from external shocks. As Box 3.2 examines, it also reinforces the importance of sound debt management, in order to reduce the debt burden, which could again become insupportable in the event of a sharp fall in oil prices, as happened in 1998-99.

[16] Government oil revenue fell from $4.1 billion in 2000 to $3.2 billion in 2001 (excluding one-time oilfield concession bonuses paid at the time of oilfield concessions). Assuming an average oil price of $21 a barrel, Government oil revenue is expected to remain on a plateau of about $3.5 billion per year in 2002-04, before rising sharply as amortization from Girassol diminishes and production from Kizomba, another major field, comes on stream from late 2004.

Box 3.2

The external debt burden

Angola's external debt is unusual in its composition, and thus differs in the nature of its servicing requirements and the possibilities for debt restructuring. The special factor is the high proportion of debt owed to international banks (and to some extent official creditors) under contracts that mortgage future oil production as a means of guaranteeing debt service payments. Inter-related contracts between the national oil company SONANGOL, foreign banks and companies producing and lifting oil ensure that the proceeds from designated oil shipments are paid into earmarked accounts for debt service. Such arrangements have been devised to safeguard creditors, because Angola has large arrears in its external debt service payments, totaling almost $5.6 billion at the end of 2000, out of total external debt of $10.5 billion, according to the IMF (2002). Most of the arrears have built up on loans contracted in the 1980s, before oil-guaranteed financing began.

Weaknesses in the debt management system mean that the debt data are not fully comprehensive. In particular, some oil-guaranteed debts are not recorded in the BNA's debt data-base. These oil guaranteed debts are estimated to have totalled $4.99 billion by the end of 2000. Borrowing with oil guarantees comes at a cost: loans have quite short maturities (usually three to four years) and high interest rates (about 3-4 percentage points above Libor, the benchmark rate for international commercial lending). Unlike the older loans, on which large payments arrears have built up, they have to be serviced. Overall, 95% of Angola's debt was non-concessional at the end of 2000.

The debt burden can best be analyzed in terms of present value (PV), which discounts the value of debt service (interest and amortization) over the life of a country's loans at market interest rates, in order to reflect the degree of concessionality in its debt. The ratios of debt PV to the economy's income (gross national product) or its foreign exchange earnings (exports of goods and non-factor services) can be taken as broad indicators of the capacity of a country to service its debt. It is important to note that, in the Angolan case, both these ratios are highly sensitive to changes in oil revenues.

The World Bank, IMF and international creditors have defined as 'severely indebted' countries, eligible under certain conditions (economic reforms) for debt relief, those countries which have a debt/GNP ratio of more than 80% of GNP or a debt/exports ratio of more than 220%. Angola is classified as severely indebted by virtue of its debt/GNP ratio, which, at 244% in 1999, was the fifth highest in the world, according to World Bank figures. Its debt/exports ratio in 1999 was 178%, below the severity threshold [World Bank, 2001a]. Both ratios are likely to have improved significantly in 2000, when oil prices were much higher than in 1999.

Angola's main problem is that, because of the oil-guaranteed loans, it has large amounts of debt service payments in the short to medium term. Preliminary balance of payments data for 2001 indicate that the debt service due that year amounted to $3.3 billion, mainly for oil-guaranteed loans. This was equivalent to 47% of exports of goods and services. These high debt service obligations are also weighing heavily on the Government budget. The budget execution report for 2000 indicates that Government payments on external debt service amounted to Kz18.74 billion (about $1,870 million), equivalent to 39% of current Government revenue [MINFIN, 2001b]. This too was a very high ratio, despite 2000 being a 'good' year for Government revenue, due to high oil prices. Angola remains exposed to the risk of acute debt service problems in the event of a steep fall in oil prices.

The World Bank considers Angola as one of the few severely indebted countries that could achieve debt sustainability without the write-off of debts, through traditional debt rescheduling. It is unclear, however, to what extent Angola would benefit from debt rescheduling, since the eligible Paris Club debt is not being serviced anyway and it is unlikely that the commercial banks would reschedule the oil-guaranteed debts even in the context of an IMF-backed economic reform programme.

Second, the regulatory framework for business activity needs to be made less cumbersome and bureaucratic, and oriented more to stimulating competition, to foster efficiency and reduce the high price levels in the Angolan market. The complex, costly procedures for business licensing and investment approvals, along with high business tax rates and the risks of harassment from regulatory, fiscal and police bodies, have discouraged new businesses and also created incentives for fiscal evasion, the informalization of the economy and rent-seeking by officials through the extraction of *gasosas*, at the

expense of the State. This environment, along with policies that overtly restrict competition in some sectors (for example, mobile telecommunications and oil sector service industries) has helped to create an oligopolistic market structure in parts of the economy, one of the main reasons for the exceptionally high prices of most goods and services in Angola. While such a business environment continues, it will be impossible for Angola to emulate fast-developing countries that have succeeded in diversifying out of traditional mono-culture export sectors. A positive sign of change may be the establishment of the *Guichet Único da Empresa*, a 'one-stop shop' for business licensing, established by decree 7/00 in February 2000. However, the decree has still not yet been fully implemented and needs to be accompanied by other measures to facilitate business operations and remove barriers to competition [UNDP/IOM, 2002].

A third constraint is the poor provision of basic infrastructure, such as power, water supply and transport, which have suffered from inadequate levels of investment and routine maintenance. In particular, the fact that businesses have to provide their own power supply from generators is one of the most important reasons why the cost of production is high in Angola, making the country uncompetitive in virtually all branches of industry, outside mining. Although Angola is well-endowed with potential sources of energy, including hydroelectric power from its many rivers as well as natural gas and petroleum, most cities face periodic power cuts. The war has been one of the causal factors, but another has been the financial precariousness of the public electricity companies, which for years were unable to charge economic tariffs – a situation that has only recently begun to change as a result of reforms carried out under the IMF Staff Monitored Programme (SMP).[17] While financial reforms of this type are indispensable to ensure the viability of public utilities, public works programmes could also form part of a comprehensive recovery strategy, providing large-scale employment and helping to overcome the deficiencies in infrastructure such as roads and water supply.

A fourth factor is the low level of skills in the labour force, a problem that is likely to be accentuated by the death of skilled young adults from AIDS. High rates of morbidity, in particular from malaria, also contribute to the low productivity of the work-force. These factors underline the importance of expanding access to education, reducing the high illiteracy rate and improving the health status of the population through an effective primary health care system.

Fifth, business development is held back by the weakness of the financial services sector. The banking system, which was a state monopoly until the law on financial institutions enacted in May 1991 (law 5/91), has gradually become more competitive, but it is still poorly developed, in terms of the number and location of bank branches and the range of services offered. The banking sector was given a boost by a new law on financial institutions in 1999 (law 1/99), which liberalized interest rates and effectively allowed the banks to index accounts and loans to the US dollar, to cope with the problems of rapid inflation and currency depreciation. However, there are still only 92 bank branches in the country, of which almost half are in Luanda.[18] Minimum deposits are extremely high, resulting in a very low proportion of the population using banks for saving, and the only credit generally available is for short-term operations, in particular the financing of imports. Furthermore, the two state commercial banks appear to be severely decapitalized.[19]

Some longer-term credit has been made available through the 'autonomous funds' set up to promote business development, such as the *Fundo de Apoio ao Empresariado Nacional* (FAEN), launched in 1992, and the more recent *Fundo de Desenvolvimento Económico e Social* (FDES), set up in 1999 (decree 21/99). However, FAEN and some other development funds set up in the late 1980s and early

[17] Of installed generating capacity of 597 mw, only 297 mw were actually available in 1996 [GURN, 1996]. There has been little investment in the electricity industry, apart from the new 540 mw Capanda dam on the Rio Kwanza, which has been under construction for more than 15 years, at a cost of over $2 billion.

[18] Most of the others are in Benguela, Lobito and Lubango, leaving very few bank branches in the rest of the country.

[19] A third state bank, the *Caixa de Crédito Agro-Pecuária e Pescas* (CAP), was liquidated in April 2001, after accumulating a large stock of non-performing loans.

1990s ended up severely decapitalized, as a result of the non-repayment of loans and the charging of interest rates that were heavily negative in real terms. FDES is attempting to overcome these problems, particularly by charging commercially viable interest rates [De Vletter, 2002].

Finally, the problems of poor loan repayment rates highlight the difficulty of enforcing loan recovery, due to the inability or reluctance of creditors to pursue well-connected defaulters through the courts. This is symptomatic of a wider problem, the weakness of the judicial system and thus the difficulty of enforcing contracts through the courts. Along with the widespread lack of property titles, which makes it impossible to guarantee loans, this is another area in which measures will need to be taken, to create an enabling environment for business development.

3.5 Rebuilding the social sectors

The assessment in Chapter 2 highlighted many of the factors directly responsible for the shortfalls in access to and quality of basic social services. These include problems regarding the availability, training and motivation of teachers and health workers, the availability of materials such as textbooks and drugs, the availability of basic equipment, and the adequacy of infrastructure (schools, health posts, etc). Underlying these problems are deeper issues concerning the policy framework, institutional arrangements and capacity, and the financing of Government services, which need to be given priority attention in the post-war recovery strategy and the I-PRSP.

The policy framework

In the education sector, the Ministry of Education has taken an important step forward by drafting a plan for the reconstruction of the education system, the *Plano Nacional de Acçao de Educação para Todos 2001-2015*, aimed at achieving the goals set at the World Education Forum in April 2000, including universal primary education of six years by 2015. The plan builds on reforms in the education system introduced in the new basic law on education, approved by the National Assembly in June 2001, which restructured the education system, notably by creating a six-year cycle of primary education and extending universal compulsory education from four to six years.[20] As noted in Chapter 2, this will require an increase in the number of primary school pupils from 1.5 million in 2000 to 5 million by 2015. The plan has three successive phases for emergency (2001-2002), stabilization (2002-2006) and development (2006-2015), and could provide a basic framework for achieving education for all – if the necessary resources are made available.

The situation is more complex in the case of health, where there is not yet a sector-wide plan of action, nor an overall National Health Policy. Rather, there is a large number of sub-sectoral policies, programmes and plans – and these do not cover some important areas, such as essential drugs. A set of basic guidelines for health policy was included, however, in the basic health law, adopted in 1992. This stated that the National Health Policy should be based on the principle of equity in the distribution of resources and access to health care, priority for social groups at greatest risk, such as children, mothers, the aged, the disabled and war-wounded, the efficient management of resources, partnership with the private sector, community participation, health education, and training and research. These general principles need to be translated into a fully articulated National Health Policy, along with a sector-wide strategic framework and plan of action for the rebuilding of an effective, efficient and equitable health system. A step in this direction is the *Plano de Desenvolvimento Sanitário*, currently under preparation.

[20] In the old structure, there was a 4-2-2 system of basic education (*ensino de base*), consisting of four years of first level, two years of second level and two years of third level, followed by *ensino médio*, pre-university (PUNIV) and higher education. Under the new structure, which will be introduced in 2003, there will be a 6-3-3 system of general education, beginning with six years of primary education, followed by two cycles of lower and upper secondary education, each lasting three years.

Institutional issues

In both the education and health sectors, there are complex institutional problems, including poor articulation between the different levels of the systems (such as for referral from primary to secondary and tertiary levels of health care) and between the central ministries and provincial health and education authorities, which as a result of administrative deconcentration in the 1990s have become *direcções provinciais* of the provincial governments in place of the former *delegações provinciais* of the ministries. In addition, many national programmes operate as parallel, vertical structures, poorly integrated into health care facilities. For example, the Expanded Programme of Immunization (PAV) is run as a vertical national programme, relying heavily on one-off campaigns, while primary health care structures (health posts and health centres) often do not provide routine immunization services. Compounding these problems are weak information management systems, for the collection and analysis of administrative data in the health and education systems.

Furthermore, the budget management system in these, as in other, sectors is fragmented into a mass of distinct budget units (*unidades orçamentais*), whose budgets do not form part of a unified sectoral budget, but are allocated directly by the Ministry of Finance, often without the involvement of the central ministries. Budget allocations for scores of programmes and institutions in the social sectors are thus made by the Ministry of Finance without reference to any clearly defined sector-wide strategic priorities or criteria. In the case of primary health care facilities (health posts and health centres) and primary and secondary education, the situation is even more complex, because their resources are part of the provincial budgets negotiated directly by the provincial governments with the Ministry of Finance. The central ministries have almost no information or influence on budgetary allocations at the provincial level and thus on the resources made available for primary health care or basic education. Along with the poor information management systems in the social sectors, this fragmentation of the budget management process has created a situation where the education and health ministries are effectively unable to engage in meaningful sector-wide planning, monitoring or evaluation. It will be important to move towards a system of sector-wide planning, in which the intra-sectoral distribution of budgetary resources (and aid flows) is based on strategic priorities and approved criteria.

Budget allocations

One of the root causes of the low access to and poor quality of education, health and other social services has been the low priority accorded to the social sectors, and in particular basic social services, in the General State Budget (OGE). Although the Government of Angola has far greater resources at its disposal than most African governments, due to its substantial oil revenues, budget priorities have been directed elsewhere, in particular to defence and security.

Analysis of budget expenditure in Angola is complicated by the fact that substantial expenditure takes place off-budget. Although all Government expenditure on the social sectors appears to take place through normal budget procedures and to be recorded in the Government budget accounts, this is not true for expenditures in some other sectors, including defence. This affects the calculation of the share of the social sectors in total Government expenditure, because the latter is much higher than indicated in the official budget execution reports of the Ministry of Finance.

In Figure 3.8, social sector expenditure is calculated as a percentage of the IMF estimates of total Government expenditure, including off-budget expenditure. As can be seen, the social sectors have been receiving less than 20% of total expenditure throughout the entire period since 1997. The situation reached its worst point in 1999, following the resumption of the war, when the social sectors' share fell to only 6.0%. Since then, there has been a considerable improvement, to 11.1% in 2000 and 18.5% in

2001.[21] The higher priority accorded to the social sectors appears to have been made possible by a significant decline in military and security expenditure in 2000-01, compared with the period immediately after the return to war, as well as the large increase in oil earnings in 2000.[22]

It is important to stress that these figures are for total social services (defined in the Government classification to include education, health, housing and community services, social assistance and social security, and culture, but excluding water). The percentage share of basic social services, which are generally defined to include primary education, primary health care, water and sanitation), would be much lower than the percentages in Figure 3.8. Angola is therefore far from achieving the goals of the 20/20 Initiative, which aims to ensure that at least 20% of both Government expenditure and donor assistance goes to basic social services.

Figure 3.8

Percentage share of social sectors in total executed Government expenditure, 1997-2001



Sources: MINFIN data on social sector expenditure and IMF estimates of total Government expenditure, including extra-budgetary expenditure. Total expenditure excludes debt amortization. 2001 data are preliminary.

On a per capita basis (see Figure 3.9), social sector expenditure reached its lowest levels in 1998-99 ($25 and $23), due to the large fall in Government revenue in 1998, when world oil prices were exceptionally low, and the effects of the resumption of the war on budgetary priorities in 1999. Social sector expenditure per capita doubled in 2000 (to $45), when high oil prices boosted Government revenue and military expenditure fell, and there was a further increase in 2001 (to $63).

In the specific case of education, per capita expenditure fell to a low of $12 in 1999 and then recovered to $17 in 2000 and $22 in 2001. The education sector's share of total expenditure fell from 6.1% in 1998 to 3.0% in 1999, and then recovered in 2000 (4.3%) and 2001 (6.4%). However, these percentage shares are still extremely low by international standards. Other SADC Governments spend much higher proportions of their budgets on education (in many cases well over 20%), as

Figure 3.9

Social sector expenditure per capita, 1996-2001

(actual expenditure in US dollars at official exchange rate)



	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Other	5.9	19.3	4.9	4.3	14.2	22.9
Health	9.2	10.9	7.1	6.8	13.2	18.4
Education	14.4	15.8	13.4	11.6	17.1	21.7

Sources: MINFIN data on social sector expenditure; BNA data on exchange rates; INE data on population estimates. 2001 data are preliminary.

[21] The breakdown of social sector expenditure in 2001 was as follows: education (6.4% of total expenditure), health (5.4%), housing and community services (2.5%), social assistance and social security (2.9%) and culture (1.3%).

[22] Expenditure on defence and public order reached an unprecedented 59.6% of total recorded and classified expenditure in 1999, according to the IMF [2002]. This share declined to 29.5% in 2000. Calculated as a percentage of the Government's total expenditure, including extra-budgetary spending, the share of defence and public order reached 31.3% in 1999 and declined to 14.8% in 2000.

Figure 3.10 shows. As a percentage of GDP (ranging between 1.5 and 2.6% in Angola in 1998-2000), public expenditure on education has been only slightly more than half the average figures cited by the World Bank [2001a] for Sub-Saharan Africa (4.0%).

Government expenditure on health also reached its lowest point in 1999, with only 1.8% of total expenditure, and per capita expenditure of just $7. In the health sector too there has been a recovery since then, with the sector's total share of Government expenditure rising to 5.4% and per capita expenditure reaching $18 in 2001. However, Angola still compares poorly with other SADC countries, most of which are spending about 8-10% of their budgets on health. In Zambia, the percentage is as high as 13%. Angola's public health expenditure of $18 per capita in 2001 may be compared with an international estimate of $35 for the per capita cost of providing an essential package of primary health care [Sachs et al, 2001].

Figure 3.10

Percentage share of social sectors in Government expenditure: Angola and other SADC countries



Sources: Angola data from MINFIN and IMF; SADC data from UNICEF, 2002

The return to peace should allow the Government to increase substantially its budget allocations to education, health and the rest of the social sector, raising expenditure both in per capita terms and as a share of total Government expenditure. However, it will also be important to improve the intra-sectoral distribution of Government resources, within the education and health sectors, in order to move as rapidly as possible towards universal access to primary education and primary health care. In the past, the distribution of resources within the education and health sectors has not been based on well-defined priorities, within the framework of sector-wide strategies or plans. An unfortunate consequence is that the limited resources available for education and health have been poorly distributed.

For example, in the education sector, the high Government expenditure on overseas scholarships ($26 million in 2000) took up 14% of total education expenditure, reducing the resources available for primary education, at a time when large numbers of primary school-age children are not enrolled in school. This disproportionate allocation of education resources to overseas scholarships, which exceeds the share of expenditure on higher education within the country (10% in 2000), is without parallel elsewhere in Africa. It is not based on a rational human resources development plan, but responds mainly to elite interests, while the rate of return of student beneficiaries is believed to be extremely low. Very few of the students sent abroad subsequently enter the civil service, due to a freeze on recruitment, as well as the low level of salaries in the public sector, which do not attract graduates with marketable qualifications. Similar distortions are evident in health expenditure, where, for example, substantial

resources are devoted to medical evacuation for senior officials, while resources for key life-saving programmes such as vaccination are often minimal.[23]

Additional problems arise as a result of the system by which the Ministry of Finance makes monthly decisions on the disbursement of funds to *unidades orçamentais.* Although justified in general terms by the need to keep overall expenditure consistent with fiscal targets, the way in which the system operates in practice results in disbursements being delayed and poorly spaced, seriously disrupting operations. These decisions on disbursements are not consistent with the overall distribution of resources approved in the annual budget, resulting in lower rates of budget execution in some sectors than others. The social sectors in particular tend to have been penalized in this way.[24]

3.6 The national response to HIV/AIDS

The mounting of an effective national response to the developing HIV/AIDS epidemic is another high priority that needs to feature prominently in the Government's plans. If the epidemic continues unchecked, there is a high risk that Angola will rapidly find itself facing an AIDS crisis comparable to that already faced by several Southern African countries. By 2001, the HIV prevalence rate among expectant mothers (a proxy for the adult population) had reached 8.6% in Luanda, compared with 2.2% only four years earlier (see Chapter 2). At this rate of development, the adult prevalence rate would quickly reach the very high levels already recorded across much of the SADC region: Namibia (20% at the end of 1999), South Africa (20%), Zambia (20%), Swaziland (25%), Lesotho (24%), Zimbabwe (25%) and highest of all, Botswana (36%). As is already the case in those countries, HIV/AIDS threatens to reduce life expectancy, while impoverishing affected families, overwhelming the health service and creating a generation of AIDS orphans. The epidemic will cast a shadow over the prospects for post-war recovery and future development.

HIV/AIDS threatens to intensify and extend poverty in numerous reinforcing ways. Because AIDS primaririly affects those in the most productive age-groups, AIDS-affected households suffer a sharp decline in income, due to sickness, while also facing the high costs of treatment and funerals. The concentration of deaths in the productive age brackets, especially among young adults, is likely to result in a large increase in the dependency ratio, as well as a huge social problem of AIDS orphans, compounding the problems that have resulted from war-related loss of parents and family separation. Projections based on earlier, much lower HIV prevalence data in 1999 projected that 315,000 children would lose their mothers as a result of AIDS by 2009 [Gilbert, 1999]. This will place further stresses on the coping capacity of households and communities. Poverty will be further worsened by the macroeconomic impact of AIDS (the loss of skilled manpower and declines in production) and by the impact of the disease on the already fragile social sectors: the death of doctors, nurses, teachers and other skilled workers and the added burden of AIDS cases (and related tuberculosis cases) on the health system.

The mounting of an effective national response to HIV/AIDS must therefore be a central part of the Government's broad strategy for post-war recovery, poverty reduction and long-term development. An important step forward was the preparation and adoption of a National Strategic Plan for Sexually Transmitted Diseases, HIV and AIDS [GURN, 1999]. This laid out an initial plan of action for 2000-2002 to meet two general objectives: to prevent the transmission of STDs and HIV/AIDS; and to reduce the negative effects of the epidemic at the family, community and national levels. The specific objectives of the strategic plan covered the main issues that need to be addressed:

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[23] The Extended Programme of Immunization was entirely funded by donors between 1993 and 1999. In 2000, the General State Budget included an allocation of Kz21 million (approximately $2 million), or 0.02% of the global budget.

[24] The budget execution rate in the health sector was 59% in 1998, 62% in 1999, 71% in 2000 and 74% in 2001, according to data from the Ministry of Finance. In the education sector, the rates were 82%, 79%, 71% and 82% respectively.

- advocacy to promote the fight against STDs and HIV/AIDS;
- monitoring of the prevalence of STDs and HIV/AIDS and socio-cultural practices related to these diseases;
- information and education programmes to promote safe practices that prevent infection;
- prevention of transmission through contaminated blood;
- reduction of mother to child transmission;
- creation of capacity for treatment of STDs and opportunistic infections associated with HIV/AIDS;
- counseling and social support for STD patients and people living with HIV and AIDS;
- social support for AIDS orphans.

Based on the National Strategic Plan, the main emphasis should be on slowing down the spread of the epidemic through awareness-raising (especially through programmes directed at youth), increased availability of condoms (including through social marketing), improved access to counseling and testing, measures to reduce mother-to-child transmission, including the provision of antiretroviral drugs, and improved screening of blood.

More recently, the Government has also expressed interest in exploring the feasibility of developing a capacity within the country for the manufacture of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs). In addition, a draft law on HIV/AIDS is being prepared. This could make an important contribution to the protection of people living with HIV/AIDS from discrimination, including in the work-place, as well as other dimensions of the national response to the epidemic, such as the provision of social support to AIDS orphans.

However, the reality is that, to date, little has been done to put the National Strategic Plan into practice. No work-plan was drawn up to operationalize the proposed actions. The plan now needs to be updated, since it expires in 2002, and this time it needs to spell out clearly how the plan will be put into operation. There has still been no national sero-prevalence survey, and this is urgently needed, in order to provide a full national picture of the extent of HIV infection. Although the strategic plan included the establishment of a high-level multi-sectoral body, the *Comissão Nacional de Luta contra o SIDA*, to lead the fight against the epidemic, neither this body nor its planned technical committee has yet been set up, almost three years later.[25] The National Commission needs to be established as soon as possible, preferably at a supra-ministerial level, in order to provide leadership across ministerial or sectoral lines.[26] In addition, political commitment needs to be translated into budgetary resources, which to date have been extremely low compared with the enormity of the tasks to be undertaken to reverse the epidemic and deal effectively with its serious and wide-ranging effects.[27] Although the strategy must be multi-sectoral, it needs to be accompanied by the strengthening of the core sectoral systems, in particular the health and education systems, whose current weaknesses and fragility (in terms of coverage, capacity and quality) are fundamental constraints on the potential scope and effectiveness of the national response to HIV/AIDS.

[25] In the meantime, the UN-led Theme Group on HIV/AIDS, involving the UN agencies, Government ministries and some other partners, provides a framework for coordination. But this is no substitute for a multi-sectoral commission, established at a supra-ministerial level to provide overall Government leadership in policy formulation, development of plans and programmes, and coordination.

[26] A possible model could be the Inter-Sectoral Commission for the Peace Process, which is playing this leadership and coordination role with respect to all aspects of the peace process, including those related to political affairs, the humanitarian response and social reintegration.

[27] To date, the budgetary allocations made to the *Programa Nacional de Luta contra o SIDA* (PNLS) in the Ministry of Health have been minimal ($2.8 million in 2001 and about $430,000 in 2002), and this has been mirrored by low levels of financial and technical assistance from the international community.

3.7 Good governance

Underlying many of the problems discussed in the preceding sections are deeper institutional problems concerning the nature of governance in Angola.[28] Although the constitutional revision in 1991-92 opened the way to pluralist politics, more diverse mass media and the emergence of independent associations and national NGOs (see Chapter 2), there have been limits to the scope and impact of the reforms. As a result, popular participation in the conduct of public affairs and Government accountability to the public have remained quite weak in practice. In addition, institutional capacity in the public administration has been eroded since the early 1990s, partly because of the decline in the real value of salaries in the early part of the decade, which undermined motivation and performance, and also encouraged many of the better qualified civil servants to leave Government employment. A third major area of concern has been the inadequate transparency in the management of public resources.

Mechanisms of representation and participation

The main formal mechanisms for the accountability of those in power to the population are the electoral and parliamentary systems. As Chapter 2 has already discussed, the 1992 Constitution provides for presidential elections every five years and parliamentary elections every four years, under a pluralist political system that allows for open competition between rival parties. Between elections, the National Assembly has the constitutional function of ensuring the accountability of the Government. However, under the current Constitution, which formally established a semi-presidential system but one with strong presidentialist characteristics, the Government is responsible for its conduct to both the President and the National Assembly (Article 105). The President of the Republic is an executive president, who chairs the Council of Ministers and shares executive power with the prime minister (Articles 66, 68 and 114). In fact, the president's role is greater than this, since there has been no prime minister since 1999. The National Assembly has the authority to vote motions of no confidence and to censure the Government (Article 88) and thereby force the Government to resign (Article 118), but it is the President who appoints and dismisses the prime minister (when the office is filled) and the ministers. This dualism has not created practical problems to date, but this could change if different parties controlled the presidency and the legislature.

The parliament is responsible for approving legislation, including the General State Budget (Article 88), but not decree-laws and decrees, which are adopted by the Council of Ministers. The Government issues decree-laws under legislative authority granted by the National Assembly. It also has the right to question Government ministers and to obtain from Government institutions whatever cooperation it requires to perform its duties (Article 83). The National Assembly has set up a series of parliamentary committees, in thematic areas ranging from constitutional and legal affairs to human rights. However, the extent to which the Assembly or its committees can scrutinize legislation or subject Government action to effective oversight is limited by weak capacity, especially with respect to research facilities, and the difficulty that deputies sometimes face in obtaining adequate information.

Many of the deputies also have a weak sense of accountability to the electorate. In part, this reflects the long delay in holding elections (see below). In addition, the fact that the majority of deputies (130 out of 220) are elected on national party lists, and do not represent geographical constituencies, means that

[28] Governance has been defined by UNDP [1997b] as the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage society's affairs. This broad concept encompasses the organizational structures and activities of central, regional and local government; the parliament; the judiciary; and the institutions, organizations and individuals that constitute civil society and the private sector. As a result governance encompasses the state, but it transcends the state by including the private sector and civil society organizations. In this section of the CCA, however, the focus is specifically on the state.

those deputies do not have to develop a strong relationship with a local population.[29] Only 90 deputies represent constituencies, and these are elected at a provincial rather than local level.[30] Most deputies rarely meet the voters or travel outside the capital.

Meanwhile, the state of insecurity has prevented the holding of new presidential and parliamentary elections since those held in 1992. Indeed, the return to war at the end of 1992 prevented even the conclusion of the 1992 presidential elections: the second round was postponed *sine die*. Since expiring in 1996 and 1997 respectively, the mandates of both the National Assembly and the President have been extended on security grounds. It remains unclear when new elections will be held, although the cessation of hostilities in March 2002 can be expected to restore security across the country, the main prerequisite for free and fair elections. Other key tasks include the conclusion of the constitutional revision (under debate in the National Assembly since 1998), a possible revision of the electoral legislation, the revival of the National Electoral Commission and the registration of the electorate, a task that could be made more complicated by the fact that a large proportion of adults have no identity documents.

Another consequence of the politico-military situation has been the lack of a strong parliamentary opposition. UNITA emerged from the 1992 elections as the main opposition party in the National Assembly, with 70 out of 220 deputies. However, the return to war shortly after the elections resulted in the party not taking up its parliamentary seats. It was not until the installation of the *Governo de Unidade e Reconciliação Nacional* (GURN) in April 1997 that the UNITA deputies finally entered parliament. From 1992 to 1997, the only parliamentary opposition came from 21 other deputies, who were divided among ten minor parties. From April 1997, parliamentary debate became more vigorous, but this did not last for long: as the country slid back to war in late 1998, the UNITA parliamentary bloc was weakened, and this once again left the National Assembly without a strong opposition.

Local government and decentralization

Mechanisms of democratic representation and participation have not yet been extended to the sub-national tiers of Government, although there were provisions for elected local authorities (*autarquias locais*) in the chapter on *'poder local'* in the 1992 Constitutional Revision Law. Article 146 stated that, as territorial bodies designed to 'pursue their populations' own interests', the *autarquias locais* would have 'elected representative organs and freedom of administration'. The Constitution left uncertain the division of responsibilities between these elected local bodies and what it called the *orgãos administrativos locais*, which were defined as 'deconcentrated local administrative units of the central power' (Article 147). Article 146 stated that a law on local government would define the manner in which the *autarquias locais* would be constituted, as well as their structure, mandate, procedures and powers.

However, the local government law was not enacted and the *autarquias locais* have not yet been established. This has left Angola with a system of provincial, municipal and communal government headed by officials nominated from above, resulting in a weak sense of accountability to their respective populations. Their accountability to local populations is arguably less than during the period of the one-party system, when the provincial commissioners (the predecessors of the provincial governors) had to take account of the views expressed by deputies in the Provincial People's Assemblies. Those bodies were dissolved in 1992.

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[29] According to the Constitution, there are 223 deputies in the National Assembly: 130 elected on national lists, 90 on provincial lists and three in Angolan communities abroad. However, the three deputies representing Angolan communities abroad have never been elected.

[30] Each province is represented in the National Assembly by five deputies (Article 79), despite the fact that there are large differences in the populations of the different provinces.

Power at the sub-national level is concentrated in the 18 provincial governments and in particular their governors, who are nominated by the Head of State. Under the Constitution, they act as the 'representatives of the Government' in their respective provinces and are 'responsible for their activity to the Government and the President of the Republic' (Article 148). Since the 1990s, their role has been increased not only by the absence of any elected sub-national bodies, but also by the 'deconcentration' of administrative responsibilities from central to provincial levels (Decree 17/99, Decree-law 29/00 and Decree 27/00). The provincial governments have gained at the expense of central ministries. The most important change was the conversion of the former *delegações provinciais* of the line ministries into *direcções provinciais* of the provincial governments. Their directors are now appointed by and responsible to the provincial governors, and their budgetary allocations are now part of the provincial governments' budgets. These changes culminated in a decree in May 2000 (decree 2/00), which grouped all sectoral government services into eleven *direcções provinciais*, with the exception of finance, justice and the interior, the only three sectors where the central ministries retain *delegaçoes provinciais*.

These institutional changes have been accompanied by changes in budget management responsibilities, which have likewise given an increased role to the provincial governments, although there has not yet been any significant fiscal decentralization, in so far as almost all revenue is collected at national level (mainly from the oil industry) and almost all resources for provincial governments are provided by transfers from the General State Budget.[31] Provincial governments, as *unidades orçamentais* (budget management units), negotiate their budgets directly with the Ministry of Finance and are now responsible for inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral allocations without the involvement of the sectoral ministries. This has created a situation where the line ministries no longer exert any direct influence on provincial-level budget distribution, even within their sectors, and have no means with which to engage in meaningful sector-wide planning or programming, particularly with respect to basic social services such as primary education and primary health care, which are now the full responsibility of provincial governments.

This has created a dual challenge. The first is that of developing real fiscal decentralization (with all the attendant mechanisms for revenue collection, budget management, accounting, auditing and democratic accountability to local populations), even though the dominance of the oil sector in the economy means that transfers from the central government budget are likely to remain the principal source of revenue for sub-national tiers of government for a long time. The second is that of ensuring that sectoral ministries can play an effective role in sector-wide planning and budgeting, in order to ensure that provincial governments and municipal administrations meet their obligations with respect to national policies and standards.

At the sub-provincial level, the 163 *municípios* and 532 *comunas* are effectively departments of the provincial governments. Their administrators are nominated by the provincial governors, to whom they report and on whom they depend for their financial resources.[32]

The transfer of responsibilities from central ministries to provincial governments is a particular form of administrative deconcentration. Since it has not yet been accompanied by the introduction of elected bodies at provincial level, it does not constitute democratic decentralization. Moreover, this deconcentration has taken place in a context where human resources, institutional capacities and central oversight mechanisms are weak in most provinces. There has been an exodus of Government employees from the worst war-affected provinces of the interior: a census of Government employees in 1998 found that 51% were in just three provinces (Luanda, Benguela and Huíla) and that 32% were in Luanda alone.

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[31] According to Executive Decree 80/99, the only revenue that is locally collected and retained for local use is the revenue from income taxes, some other minor taxes, charges for local services, such as fees paid by market sellers, and some fines.

[32] No municipal or communal administrations yet have the status of *unidades orçamentais*. Some municipal delegations of education (so far only in Luanda) have their own budgets, but they do not have powers to make expenditures without the authorization of the provincial governments. The *direcções provinciais* are in a similar situation: many have specific budgets but no signing powers to make expenditures, which remain with the provincial governments.

The disproportionate concentration of Government employees in the capital is even starker at the higher levels, with 73% of *técnicos superiores* and 42% of *técnicos médios* working there [MAPESS, 1999a].

Public administration and institutional capacity

During the 1990s there was a large expansion of the civil service, in terms of employment and numbers of Government institutions, accompanied by a steep fall in the real value of salaries, which, by undermining the motivation of Government employees and contributing to the departure of many of those who were best qualified, has undermined the capacity of the public administration. As noted above, there is also a disproportionate concentration of civil servants in the more secure areas of the country, in particular Luanda, leaving the public administration exceptionally weak in most of the rest of the country.

During the 1990s, the public administration expanded, both to provide employment and to respond to the political exigencies of the peace process, following the Lusaka Protocol. According to a study on the 'macro-structure' of the public administration [MAPESS, 2000], the number of ministries increased by 38% between 1987 and 1997. The formation of the GURN in April 1997, which brought UNITA and several other former opposition parties into the Government, was one of the key factors responsible for this expansion, raising the number of ministries from 22 to 29. Although there was a modest reversal of the trend in 1999, there are many functional overlaps between ministries, and among the directorates and departments within them.[33] There is also a large number of autonomous public institutes: by 2000, there were 92 such bodies, including 17 autonomous funds [MAPESS, 2000].

While the structure of Government expanded, civil service employment soared, rising by almost half from 131,178 in 1990 to 195,786 in 1998. Including the armed forces and police, whose exact numbers are unavailable, it is likely that there are almost 350,000 individuals on the Government payroll.[34] An analysis of the staff composition of the civil service, based on a census of public employees in 1998, revealed the low educational qualifications of most Government employees: only 3% had a university education and only 16% upper secondary or technical education (PUNIV or *ensino médio*). Almost 17% had less than four years of primary education. The main growth in the civil service payroll has been among administrative and auxiliary staff, who accounted for 73% of Government employees in 1998, compared with just under half in 1990 [MINTAPSS, 1990; MAPESS, 1999a].

During the first half of the 1990s, rapid inflation eroded the real value of public sector salaries. Although there were periodic large increases in nominal salaries, these were outweighed by the continuing high rates of inflation. Salaries reached their lowest point in 1995, when university-educated civil servants (*técnicos superiores*) were earning less than $10 a month and the minimum wage fell to about $1 a month. Since then, there has been a recovery in civil service salaries, as Figure 3.9 shows, but they remain low compared with salaries in the formal private sector. By October 2001, a *técnico superior* was earning $205 a month and a skilled manual worker about $86.

The low salary levels in the public administration have resulted in double employment by Government workers. Many Government teachers, for example, combine their official duties with more remunerative work providing private tuition or teaching in private schools, while it is common for public sector doctors, nurses and other medical staff to work simultaneously in private clinics. It is also difficult for the civil service to attract and retain highly qualified staff. Since the liberalization of the economy in the early 1990s, there has been intense competition for staff with university-level qualifications: the Government has been unable to compete with the private sector, including the increasing number of

[33] The central public administration (i.e. excluding provincial governments, municipal and communal administrations and other sub-national bodies) currently has 1,662 organic structures, including 305 national directorates and equivalent bodies, 521 departments, 95 services and 741 sections [MAPESS, 2000].

[34] Although the public administration accounts for only a small share of total urban employment (10%), it accounts for almost 30% of formal sector employment, according to the IDR 2000/2001 (INE, 2001b).

Figure 3.11
Average monthly civil service salaries, 1999-2001
(in US dollars at informal market exchange rate)



Sources: salary data from MAPESS; monthly average exchange rates from BNA.

international oil companies, as well as international organizations and donor-funded NGOs, in a market where the scarcity of skills has bid up salaries for qualified professionals.

An ad-hoc response to this situation has been the use of non-salary benefits, including official cars and residences, Christmas bonuses, special shopping entitlements, perdiems for official travel, medical evacuation and scholarships, to retain key civil servants. These benefits sometimes dwarf the value of normal salaries, although in most cases they are not contractual entitlements and can be withdrawn at any time. They are made available only to the very highest civil servants (*directores* and above) and to personnel in certain favoured institutions, and as such they introduce distortions in the salary structure. The mass of Government employees, including those involved in direct service delivery to the public, such as teachers and health workers, do not benefit.

Another consequence of low salaries has been the generalization of petty corruption among officials in contact with the public, who demand *gasosas* (bribes) for services such as the enrolment of children in school, treatment in public health facilities and the issuance of identity cards, passports, drivers' licences, business licences and other documents. In other cases, officials receive *gasosas* in lieu of the payment of fines, taxes or fees, depriving the State of revenue. The practice of *gasosas* has come to be widely regarded as normal: in 1998, a survey of civil service personnel found that 74% of administrative staff and 67% of technical staff said they saw nothing wrong about receiving a 'present' for their services [cited in UNDP, 1998].

Figure 3.12
Percentage share of salaries in Government expenditure: Angola and other countries
(2001 data for Angola; 1998 data for others)



Sources: IMF, 2002; World Bank, 2001a

Salaries could be increased without taking up a disproportionate share of the total budget. In recent years, expenditure on personnel has constituted a small part of total budget expenditure, compared with most other African countries. Although the salary increases in the past two years raised the share of salaries in total Government expenditure from only 5% in 1999 to 10% in 2000 and 16% in 2001, this compares with a world average of 17% and figures well above 20 or even 30% in most African countries [World Bank, 2001a]. Furthermore, less than half of the expenditure on personnel in Angola is for the civil service: only 44% in 1999 and 49% in 2000, according to the budget execution reports of the Ministry of Finance [MINFIN, 2000, 2001b]. The rest goes to the armed forces and the police.

The Government has taken some steps to address the problems discussed above. Under the *Programa de Reforma Institucional e Modernização Administrativa* (PRIMA), launched in 1996 with the support of UNDP, the Government carried out a census of civil servants [MAPESS, 1999a], reclassified all civil servants' posts and introduced modern human resource management systems, in an attempt to improve incentives and ensure the rational use of qualified personnel. In order to rationalize the civil service, the Government launched an Administrative Reform Programme in 1999, with the objective of making the public administration more effective, efficient and responsive to the public, notably through improved human resource management and institutional and organizational reforms [MAPESS, 1999b]. The Government set a target, incorporated in the Staff Monitored Programme, of reducing the civil service payroll by 20% (i.e. almost 40,000 staff) between 1999 and 2001 [IMF/GURN, 2000]. Although the results have not yet been officially announced, it is provisionally estimated that about 8,000 staff left the civil service under incentive schemes, including early retirement. The key challenge, however, is to continue the process of raising civil servants' salaries, without which it will be difficult to bring about real improvements in the performance of the public administration or eliminate petty corruption.

Information management systems and access to information. Another systemic weakness, which hinders policy-making, planning and management in virtually all fields, is the lack of effective information management systems. The first weakness in this respect, and the one that is by far the most far-reaching in its consequences, has been the lack of a nationwide population census for more than three decades, since 1970. Combined with the large population movements triggered by the war or resulting from migration to the urban areas, this has resulted in considerable uncertainty about the size and geographic distribution of the population. This hinders planning, including for the provision of social services. Second, routine administrative data systems do not function effectively in key sectors, such as health and education, making it difficult to obtain other key data for planning purposes. These administrative data systems can only be substituted to a limited extent by surveys. Third, financial information is not readily available, due in part to the failure to incorporate all Government revenue and expenditure in the budget accounts (see below), the complexity of the highly fragmented system of budget management units, with limited capacity and weak information flows, and deficiencies in budget classification that make it difficult to analyse sectoral expenditures.

Public access to information is hindered by the fact that systems for the disclosure and dissemination of data and other types of information are weak. It remains difficult for civil society organizations, the press or individual citizens to obtain documents or data that should be readily available and accessible. Combined with the limited development of the press, as well as weak research facilities in the National Assembly, this leaves the public, non-governmental institutions and parliamentarians poorly informed about a wide range of issues of public interest. It should therefore be a priority to strengthen the national statistical system and to ensure that standard economic, financial and social data, as well as laws, decrees, reports and other documents are made available to the public in a timely manner, including through the Internet.

Transparency of public resource management

One of the most important development challenges facing the country is to ensure that the country's large public revenues, generated mainly by oil, are used to meet the priority needs of the population and to promote long-term development. A prerequisite for this is to ensure the transparency of government finances, by bringing all budgetary revenue and expenditure within the framework of the approved national budget and ensuring that expenditures follow strictly the procedures set down by law. Budget execution reports need to be prepared in a timely manner, audited and submitted to the scrutiny of the National Assembly. Likewise, the contracting of Government debt should follow established procedures, be based on a cost-benefit analysis and be consistent with an approved strategy for debt management and with broader economic policy objectives.

For many years, however, there have been substantial off-budget expenditures and revenues, sometimes associated with the contracting of non-concessional, oil-guaranteed loans from international banks (see Box 3.2). The expenditure recorded in the *Sistema Integrado de Gestão Financeira do Estado* (SIGFE) and in the budget execution reports of the Ministry of Finance includes only part of the total Government expenditure. Extra-budgetary expenditures, which take place without following the established Treasury procedures for authorizing Government commitments and payments, make it difficult to manage public finances in accordance with the approved budget or development objectives, or to ensure that resources are not being wasted or diverted.

The Government has been formally committed for some time to ending such extra-budgetary operations. In the Staff Monitored Programme agreed with the IMF in April 2000, it was stated that 'payments by the BNA on behalf of the Government will only be made against proper authorizations, and every effort will be made to achieve full transparency through universal coverage of Government revenues and expenditures in the context of implementation of the 2000 budget…' [IMF/GURN, 2000]. The reformulated SMP in February 2001 repeated the Government's commitments to 'eliminate unauthorized payments outside the budgetary process' [IMF/GURN, 2001].

These commitments were accompanied by a series of other institutional and structural reform measures, including a diagnostic study of the oil sector, initiated in January 2001, an audit of the 1999 accounts of the BNA, and audits of the *Empresa Nacional de Diamantes de Angola* (ENDIAMA) and other companies involved in the diamond industry. A private company, the Crown Agents, was contracted to manage the Customs service, in order to raise Government revenue by halting the evasion of customs duties.

Following a mission to review the implementation of these and other measures in the SMP, which formally expired in June 2001, the IMF stated that there had been some progress in the implementation of the structural measures but that many measures remained to be completed. The mission noted that urgent action was required to improve the production and publication of data on Government revenues and expenditures, including external debt transactions. The Government once again agreed with the IMF to pursue a 'series of transparency and structural measures' to be taken during the remainder of 2001. These were to include identifying all extrabudgetary expenditures and then either eliminating them or including them in the Treasury account; strengthening the control of the Treasury over fiscal operations and foreign debt transactions; publishing data on oil and other government revenues and expenditures, as well as on external debt; conducting a financial audit of the 2000 accounts of the central bank; and hiring an independent international company to assist Sonangol to implement international accounting standards [IMF, 2001].

However, the problem of large extra-budgetary operations has not been resolved: IMF data on Government finances in 2001 indicate that $907 million of expenditure was unregistered, in addition to $205 million of extra-budgetary expenditure registered *ex post*. Together, these expenditures were equivalent to 24% of total Government spending [IMF, 2002].

In April 1996, the Government established the *Tribunal de Contas*, by law 5/96, to examine the Government accounts and report to the National Assembly. However, the *Tribunal de Contas* did not begin functioning until the appointment of its first president in January 2001, almost five years after the enactment of law 5/96, and it is still too early to tell how effective an oversight body it will prove to be in practice. The delay in making the *Tribunal de Contas* a reality has been mirrored by delays in operationalizing the *Alta Autoridade contra a Corrupção*. This body, which was intended to tackle the problem of corruption, was established by another law in April 1996 (law 10/96), but it is still not operational.

Another priority for improved public resource management is the establishment of a system of public procurement that minimizes waste and the opportunities for misappropriation of public resources. At present, Angola does not have a functioning public procurement system, with rules and procedures that are universally applied and enforced. The February 2001 version of the SMP therefore included a

comprehensive review of the public procurement system, which was described as being 'part of the ongoing efforts to tackle corruption' [IMF/GURN, 2001]. The post-SMP measures agreed with the IMF in July 2001 included a Government commitment to seek the assistance of the World Bank for a 'complete overhaul of the procurement system' [IMF, 2001].

Effective rules and procedures also need to be in place, and enforced, in other areas of public resource management, such as the divestiture of state assets. When the Government of Angola began its privatization programme, following the establishment of the *Gabinete do Redimensionamento Empresarial* (GARE) in 1987, the legal and procedural framework was extremely weak. During the early 1990s, large numbers of small state companies, including state farms, were divested, as well as some of the urban housing that had been nationalized or confiscated after the settler exodus in 1975. Most medium and large-scale state enterprises remained in the public sector. During this initial wave of privatization, there were no proper valuations of the companies and properties to be privatized, many of which were handed to their new owners for nominal payments. The process was non-transparent, as there was no competitive bidding. Under the SMP, initial preparations were to be made to extend privatization to larger public enterprises, including the state-owned banks, and the Government was to review the related legislation and strengthen GARE.

Finally, full transparency requires that economic and financial data are published in a timely manner and are made readily available to the general public, including the press. Public access to economic, financial and other data, and to Government documents such as budgets, plans and programmes, remains difficult. The development of a more open style of administration, including the regular and timely publication of key data and their effective dissemination, is an essential part of the process of building a more transparent and accountable system of governance.

3.8 Popular participation and interest groups

In a highly stratified society such as Angola's, with incipient democratic institutions, a weak tradition of political participation and low levels of awareness and organization among the mass of the population, elite groups are in a strong position to defend special interests. In most societies, the poor are at risk of exclusion and marginalization, but this is especially the case in Angola, with its very high rates of illiteracy, destitution and social instability. In a context where a large proportion of the population is living in conditions of extreme precariousness, day-to-day survival takes precedence over broader aspirations and often makes such aspirations too risky to pursue. The low levels of education and high rates of illiteracy, along with the weakness of the mass media and limited public access to official information, are additional disempowering factors. Furthermore, in a society where politics has been closely associated with violence ever since the colonial period, fear still undoubtedly reinforces the effects of precariousness and ignorance, despite the introduction of a pluralist political system in 1991.

Chapter 2 noted that the reforms of 1991 permitted the emergence for the first time of independent civil society organizations, including trade unions, professional associations and NGOs not linked to the state or a single state-sanctioned political party. However, the fact that only a small minority of the population is employed in the formal sector of the economy means that socially-based mass organizations, such as trade unions, are weak – compared with some other Southern African countries, such as South Africa, Zambia or Zimbabwe, where unions have been in the forefront of movements for social or political change. Professional associations, which have been active defendants of rights in many Southern African countries, have emerged in Angola since the 1990s, but continue to reflect the relative weakness of the professions themselves, in terms of qualified personnel, institutions and traditions. In the rural areas, the development of community-based organizations (CBOs), such as peasants' associations, has been held back by the insecurity, fear and instability reigning in the rural areas, or prevented altogether by rural displacement and depopulation. The same factors, along with the state's manipulation of traditional political authorities since the colonial era, has also greatly weakened these authorities, generically known as *sobas* and *regedores*, even though these continue to enjoy considerable prestige in many communities.

In these conditions, elite groups are in a strong position to influence policy and how it is implemented. During the 1990s, for example, elite groups were the main beneficiaries of the transfer of land from former state agricultural companies to private hands. The restoration of the *fazendas* and their further encroachment on communal lands benefit these elite interests, often at the expense of the family farming sector (or pastoral nomadic livestock-raising systems in the south-west) and thus at the risk of deepening, not reducing, rural poverty. Second, the low priority given to social sector expenditure and the distortions in the intra-sectoral distribution of health and education expenditure reflect the fact that elite groups do not use publicly-provided basic social services and benefit from the overseas medical evacuation and state scholarships provided by state bodies such as the *Junta Nacional da Saúde* and the *Instituto Nacional de Bolsas de Estudos*. Third, some public officials and domestic and foreign private businesses can obtain benefits from inadequate transparency in public resource management and in the mechanisms for the administrative awarding of permits and resources to the private sector.[35]

Nonetheless, the new peacetime situation does create improved conditions for self-organization and self-assertion on the part of the masses of the population. Fear should recede. Increased post-war Government spending on education would, over time, produce a more aware populace. This would also be beneficial for the development of the mass media. Peace and rising oil revenues should also indirectly reduce the material vulnerability of the poor, by stimulating the non-oil sectors of the economy, although the extent to which this happens and improves the lives of the poor will depend also on the policy environment. The development of the non-oil sectors of the economy would also increase the formal sector workforce. Finally, expectations will increase in the post-war period, and it will become less easy to blame failings on the consequences and priorities of the war. War will no longer be a plausible pretext.

[35] The absence of an effective system of public procurement is a case in point, because it limits the checks needed to curb kick-backs and the waste of public resources. Likewise, the administrative mechanisms for licensing of businesses and investments have sometimes resulted in oligopolistic market structures, characterized by low levels of competition and consequently high levels of prices that benefit the protected investors but hold back the broader development of the economy. Non-transparent mechanisms for privatization and the under-valuation of state assets, ranging from commercial farms to small businesses and urban property, enriched those who were well-placed to acquire these divested assets, at the expense of large financial losses for the state. The provision of subsidized credit from state-owned banks, such as the Caixa Agro-Pecuária e Pescas (CAP), and from the Government-financed 'development funds', with very low repayment rates, had the same effects, until welcome reforms in this sphere in 1999-2001. In the same manner, elite groups benefited from administratively allocated access to subsidized foreign exchange at the official exchange rate, until the reforms in the foreign exchange market in 1999. Many of these problems are now officially acknowledged and, in some cases, such as the dual exchange rate and the subsidization of credit, important reforms have taken place. In others, such as procurement practices, the problem of extra-budgetary expenditures, business licensing and privatization procedures, important policy changes and institutional measures are yet to be introduced or to be fully implemented.

Chapter 4

External assistance to Angola

The two preceding chapters have provided an assessment of the situation in Angola with respect to civil, political, economic and social rights, and an analysis of the main underlying factors that account for the shortfalls in the realization of rights. This chapter provides an overview of the key features of external assistance to Angola, as well as some of the constraints facing donors and the factors that have influenced their decisions. The chapter does not attempt to evaluate external assistance to Angola, in terms of its relevance, effectiveness or impact. This would not be possible without undertaking a major study on the subject, which has not yet been attempted in Angola. Although there have been dozens, possibly hundreds, of individual project evaluations, as well as a few broader evaluations or reviews of individual donors' cooperation assistance, these are not sufficient to draw firm conclusions about the overall contribution of external aid to achieving humanitarian or development objectives.

4.1 Rights, responsibilities and partnerships

Implicit in the concept of rights is the notion of responsibility or duty. The recognition of rights implies the responsibility of individuals and social organizations, such as the family, communities and private companies, as well as the State, to uphold those rights.[1] While these responsibilities lie at different levels of the society, from the individual upwards, the international conventions place particular emphasis on the responsibilities of the State. This is logical, since it is States that are parties to the conventions and are bound, by virtue of their ratification and entry into force, to uphold the rights enshrined in them. National laws upholding rights, including in Angola's case the Constitution, likewise impose legal responsibilities on the State, as well as individuals and other non-state actors. The responsibility of the State for the upholding of rights is especially important in terms of the legal framework and its implementation, the policy environment, the mobilization of resources (through taxation) and the delivery of public services, including basic social services.

While the international conventions place the principal onus of responsibility on States Parties, some of the conventions refer also to the role that external partners should play in achieving the realization of rights, through international cooperation. This reflects the resource-related nature of some rights, particularly in the case of economic and social rights, and the international community's recognition that their realization may only be achieved progressively, especially in developing countries where financial and technical resources are limited.

The international community thus has a responsibility to provide financial and technical assistance, as a way of supplementing the resources available domestically and so moving more rapidly towards the full achievement of the rights enshrined in the conventions. The CRC, for example, states in Article 4 that 'States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention', but adds that 'with regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the framework of international cooperation'. In the Angolan case, this partnership approach to the realization of rights should take into account the fact that, because of its oil revenues, the Government of Angola has relatively large resources at its disposal, compared with most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Donors should

[1] Take, for example, the case of children's rights. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) states in Article 27 that 'the parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary responsibility to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living necessary for the child's development', while adding that 'States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their means, shall take appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child to implement this right and shall in case of need provide material assistance and support programmes…'

therefore expect the Government to play the leading role in any partnership, in terms of resource mobilization and allocation, as well as in setting policy, planning and coordination.

For the vast majority of donors in Angola, a rights-based approach to external assistance is a novel concept. However, in an innovative development in the humanitarian field in Angola, the UN's Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 2002 (CAP 2002) explicitly introduced the paradigm of a partnership in support of the realization of rights as the foundation for humanitarian action. This highlighted the leading responsibility of the Government, while appealing to donors for complementary support [UN, 2001]. Box 4.1 presents some of the features of the rights-based approach of the CAP 2002.

Box 4.1
The rights based approach of the CAP 2002

For the first time in Angola, the UN's Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 2002 presented a rights-based strategy for humanitarian action, involving a partnership between the Government, the international community and other actors [UN, 2001]. The strategy drew on Angolan law, in particular the Constitution, and international humanitarian and human rights law.

At the heart of the strategy was a series of core principles, codified legally in the Angolan Constitution and the international conventions. One such core principle affirmed that humanitarian assistance will promote the best interests of vulnerable groups. Another stated that humanitarian assistance will be provided impartially to all people in need, regardless of political or social affiliation, or location. A third added that humanitarian partners will be accountable to the populations they serve and will ensure full transparency during the planning, implementation and monitoring of humanitarian assistance programmes.

The CAP emphasized the leading role of the Government. 'Recognizing that primary responsibility for humanitarian assistance rests with the Government, agencies will provide complementary support in key social sectors.' The Government was to 'retain overall responsibility for coordination and provide substantial financial support', as well as provide protection for IDPs, including through respect of Decree 1/01 on the norms for resettlement. It would take the lead in providing frontline direct assistance to vulnerable populations, take concrete steps to expand access to these populations by humanitarian agencies, and repair damaged infrastructure and provide security along access corridors. The role of UN agencies was to 'support the Government in its efforts to coordinate and provide humanitarian assistance'.

Reinforcing the partnership approach, the CAP 2002 introduced a set of 'partnership targets' in each sector, specifying the actions that would be taken by the Government to uphold and gradually fulfill the rights of vulnerable populations. The role of external partners, both financial donors and the international agencies and NGOs involved in delivering humanitarian relief, was to complement the actions taken by Government.

4.2 External assistance flows to Angola

There have been major changes in the scale, sources and nature of aid flows to Angola during the quarter-century since independence, as a result of the end of the cold war, the related shifts in Angola's international relations and the intensification of the humanitarian crisis during the past decade, notably following the return to war in 1992 and 1998. During the past decade, Angola has been one of the largest recipients of donor assistance in the world, relative to the size of its population and economy. However, the Government's dependence on aid is low, because of the oil-based nature of the economy, which gives the Government access to relatively large internal sources of revenue.

Evolution of aid flows. During the second half of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, Angola received substantial assistance from the USSR, Cuba and other 'Eastern bloc' countries. There was relatively little assistance from 'Western' bilateral donors, with some notable exceptions, such as Sweden. Several UN agencies also had programmes in the country. During this period, Angola was a

member of neither the IMF nor the World Bank, and almost no international NGOs operated in the country.

The situation changed radically in the early 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet bloc, the break-up of the USSR and the accompanying ideological shift in Angola's ruling party and Government in 1990-91 brought about a sharp decline in assistance from Angola's former Soviet bloc allies and closer relations with the major Western industrial countries, notably the United States, which finally established diplomatic relations with Angola in 1993. The start of the economic reforms in 1987 had meanwhile been accompanied by negotiations for accession to the IMF and the World Bank, which took effect in 1989, leading on to a substantial lending programme by the Bank in the early to mid 1990s. However, there was still no IMF lending to Angola, despite the country's serious macroeconomic difficulties throughout the 1990s. There was a brief IMF 'staff monitored programme' (SMP) for a few months in 1995 and a new SMP in 2000-2001, but neither involved the commitment of IMF resources.

The collapse of the Bicesse peace process and the dramatic deterioration of the humanitarian crisis during the war in 1992-94 brought about a surge in humanitarian assistance and a large influx of international NGOs. It was also during this period that the United Nations greatly expanded its role in the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance. In 1993, the UN set up in Luanda a Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UCAH), which issued a series of annual consolidated humanitarian appeals.[2] By 1994, the World Food Programme (WFP) was delivering more food aid to Angola than any other country in the world.

Following the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, there was a partial redirection of donor assistance towards rehabilitation and recovery, although the instability of the peace process and the continuing humanitarian emergency limited the extent of the shift. In September 1995, the Government of Angola, UNDP and the European Commission jointly sponsored a round-table donors conference in Brussels to mobilize resources for reconstruction and recovery. The round-table exceeded all expectations, resulting in donor pledges of more than $900 million for an integrated, community-level programme, the *Programa de Reabilitação Comunitária e de Reconciliação Nacional* (PRC). However, the PRC was undermined by ineffective implementation, along with the continuing fragility and eventual collapse of the peace process in 1998 [UNDP, 1998b, 2000b]. After the war resumed, the humanitarian crisis once again came to the fore. Since then, some donors have limited their assistance entirely to humanitarian needs, although others have continued to provide some support for rehabilitation and development.

Overall, the trend in aid disbursements over the past decade showed a 'hump' in the mid-1990s, followed by a decline in the late 1990s. According to data from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Angola's net ODA receipts rose from an annual average of $297 million in 1990-93 to $447 million a year in 1994-96, but then declined to an average of $359 million in 1997-99.

Over the entire period from 1990 to 1999, Angola received ODA totalling $3.6 billion, of which 59% was disbursed by bilateral donors and 41% by multilateral donors. The EU was by far the largest source of aid: including both the European Commission and member states, the EU accounted for 61% of Angola's aid receipts in this period. The largest bilateral donors (providing more than $200 million each during the 1990s) were Sweden, Italy, Spain, the USA and Portugal, while the largest multilateral donors were the EC ($628 million), WFP ($344 million) and the World Bank ($219 million). These figures do not include assistance provided by the oil companies, which have emerged as a significant additional source of funding for social and humanitarian programmes in recent years, channelling aid through Sonangol's 'social bonus fund' and the Fundação Eduardo dos Santos (FESA), as well as to NGOs and UN agencies.

[2] UCAH became the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 2000.

Aid dependency. There is a wide perception that, as an oil-rich country, Angola is less dependent on aid than most African countries. Clearly, Angola is much less dependent on aid than certain very poor African countries, such as Mozambique, but, when compared with Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the situation is more complex. In the analysis below, three indicators are used: aid per capita, the ratio of aid to gross national product (GNP) and the ratio of aid to total Government expenditure.

In terms of net aid receipts per capita (see Figure 4.1), the OECD/DAC data clearly show Angola as a country with a relatively high volume of aid, even though net aid receipts fell in the second half of the 1990s from their peak in the mid-1990s. Total ODA receipts per capita declined from a peak of $40 in 1996 to the $27-30 range in 1997-99. However, they remained much higher than the average figures for Sub-Saharan Africa, where net ODA receipts have been on a consistently downward trend in recent years, falling to an average of $19 per capita in 1999.

The high level of ODA per capita in Angola has been accounted for primarily by the large flows of humanitarian assistance and, following the Brussels round table in 1995, support by several donors for reconstruction in the brief period of 'quasi-peace'. Since the resumption of the war in late 1998, the escalation of the humanitarian crisis has once again focused donor attention overwhelmingly on emergency relief. A study by the European Commission on aid flows to Angola in 2000, covering aid by the European Union countries, Norway and the USA, found that food aid alone accounted for 47% of all ODA disbursements [EC, 2001]. Including non-food emergency assistance, 55% of ODA was for humanitarian purposes. In fact, this figure should probably be still higher, as much of the assistance for health (the second main category of aid with 14%) has also had a humanitarian character (see Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.1
Aid dependency: Angola and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1995-99



Source: OECD, Devolopment Assistance Committee, Creditor Reporting System.

Angola's relative aid dependency can be expressed in economic terms by comparing the value of net ODA receipts to the size of the economy (GNP). Figure 4.1 shows that, in 1995-99, net ODA receipts as a%age of GNP were much higher in Angola than in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. This reflects not only the fairly high level of ODA per capita, but also the small size of the country's economy outside the enclave oil sector. Quite a different picture emerges, however, if aid flows are compared with the level of Government expenditure. This relationship, captured in the ratio of net ODA receipts to total Government expenditure, shows the relative importance of donors and Government in providing resources for the provision of public services.

The ratio is low in Angola, compared with most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, despite the fact that ODA is high in per capita terms and relative to the size of the economy. The reason for this is the weight of the oil industry in the Angolan economy and the high taxation rates characteristic of the oil sector (in all countries), which result in a high%age of Angola's GDP accruing to the Government as fiscal revenue. Consequently, Government expenditure is high as a%age of GDP (83% in 1999 and 61% in 2000), compared with most developing countries.[3] Conversely, the ratio of net ODA receipts to Government expenditure (7.7% in 1999) is low, as is clear from Figure 4.3, which compares Angola with the few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for which data are available. Apart from more developed countries such as South Africa and Mauritius, most Sub-Saharan African countries have ratios of ODA to Government expenditure that are in the 20-40% range.

Figure 4.2
Sectoral breakdown of gross ODA, 2000



Note: Data limited to ODA disbursed by EU (member states and EC), USA and Norway, either directly or via UN agencies; notably excludes aid from UN agencies' core resources, other multilateral agencies and Arab states.
Source: EC, 2001

Figure 4.3
Net ODA as % of Government expenditure: Angola and other African countries, 1999



Sources: Angolan data from OECD/DAC for aid and IMF, 2002, for Government expenditure; data for other countries from World Bank, 2001a

It is thus the scale of oil revenues that makes the Government of Angola much less dependent on aid than is the case in most African countries. Furthermore, once peace has been consolidated and the humanitarian crisis has receded, dependence on aid can be expected to diminish sharply relative to population and GNP. The ending of the war and the substantial increase in oil revenue resulting from the surge in oil production expected in the second half of the present decade, when several major new deepwater oil fields will come on stream, should enable the Government to allocate more resources to longer-term development and to rely to a large extent on internal resources, supplemented by external borrowing rather than grants from donors.

Dependence on donors for humanitarian assistance. Despite the scale of domestically generated resources available to the Government and the consequently low ratio of ODA to Government expenditure, dependence on donor assistance has been extremely high in some specific sectors, such as emergency food distribution and health. While these sectors have taken the lion's share of donor assistance, they have been accorded low priorities in Government budgets, although in the past two years there have been some signs of greater commitment of financial resources than in previous years.

[3] Although average figures for Sub-Saharan Africa are not available, comparisons may be made with the figures (for the most recent available years) in individual African countries such as Botswana (35.3%), Cameroon (14.8%), South Africa (30.4%) and Zimbabwe (35.3%).

Dependence on the international donor community is most striking in the case of emergency food aid. Although the Government has begun to provide some food assistance for displaced populations in the past three years, notably through the *Programa Nacional de Emergência para a Ajuda Humanitária* (PNEAH), the quantities delivered to beneficiaries have remained extremely small compared with the food aid provided by donors. In 2000, donors disbursed $166 million for food aid, with the USA accounting for 63% of this amount [EC, 2001]. Most food aid is delivered through WFP, the ICRC and the European Commission, with NGOs acting as the main agents for local distribution. During 2002, WFP alone is assisting 1.06 million vulnerable people in 16 provinces.

Overall, the international community is providing food rations to about 8% of Angola's population. Although there have been signs of 'donor fatigue', resulting in substantial under-financing of some non-food emergency requirements by donors, food aid has remained at relatively high levels. This has been crucial to preventing large-scale starvation, in the absence of an effective Government capacity to meet urgent humanitarian needs. It may have reduced the pressure on the national authorities to mobilize domestic resources to respond to the humanitarian emergency. In addition, the readiness of the international community to provide emergency assistance in lieu of the Government may have helped create an environment in which both sides of the conflict were less concerned about the effects of tactics that resulted in the mass displacement of civilian populations.

Figure 4.4

Distribution of gross ODA disbursements per capita, by provinces, 2000

(in US $)



Note: Data limited to ODA disbursed by EU (member states and EC), USA and Norway, either directly or via UN agencies; notably excludes aid from UN agencies' core resources, other multilateral agencies and Arab states.

Source: EC, 2001

The donor role in the health sector. After food aid, health has been the largest sector for donor assistance, much of it provided in an emergency context. Data for 2000 indicate that donors' expenditure in the health sector was equivalent to approximately one quarter of what was spent by the Government.[4] The high concentration of Government health expenditure on the central structures of the Ministry of Health (47% in 2000), Luanda province (29%) and to a lesser extent Benguela (6%) and Huíla (3%) has left most provinces overwhelmingly dependent on health services funded by donors and delivered by NGOs and UN agencies. At a national level too, some high-priority health programmes that are critically important for reducing mortality, such as the Expanded Programme of Immunization (PAV), are mainly funded by donors.

Overall, this situation suggests that to a significant extent donors are 'substituting' for Government responsibilities in the financing of health services, creating a high degree of donor dependence. Without strong Government leadership and capacity for planning, budget management and donor coordination, such dependence is likely to lead to donor-driven programming with its attendant risks of duplicative initiatives, parallel programme structures and inefficient or inequitable allocation of

[4] The EC study on donor aid flows indicates that donors disbursed $43.8 million for the health sector in 2000 [EC, 2001]. The Ministry of Finance's budget execution data for the same year indicate that actual Government expenditure on health totaled Kz1.78 billion (equivalent to $172 million).

resources. Angola is not yet developing mechanisms such as Sector Wide Approaches to Programming (SWAPs) to mobilize resources from Government and donors behind a common strategy, whether in health or any other sector.

Geographical distribution of aid. The available data on the provincial distribution of external assistance suggest large disparities, in per capita terms (see Figure 4.4). The EC study on aid flows in 2000 reported that Cuando Cubango and Lunda Sul each received 38 times more external aid, in per capita terms, than Lunda Norte and 17 times more than Cabinda [EC, 2001). To some extent, these disparities reflect humanitarian priorities, particularly in the east of the country and the *planalto central*, while also counter-balancing biases in the distribution of Government budgetary resources, which tend to favour Luanda and the provinces generating oil revenues (Cabinda and Zaire).

4.3 Aid policy and donor practices

During the 1990s, a broad consensus emerged among donors on the importance of partnership between donor and recipient countries. Partnerships were seen as crucial for ensuring the relevance, sustainability and positive impact of development cooperation.[5] The key tenet is that recipient countries should formulate their development strategies and set out priorities, plans and instruments for implementation, while donors should assist and strengthen such efforts. At the same time, donor governments and NGOs have become increasingly concerned with the question of aid effectiveness.[6] A consensus has emerged among most donors that their resources have a greater impact in countries where governments are pursuing policies conducive to poverty reduction, sound economic management, transparency and democratic governance. These donors have concluded that, in countries where this is not the case, they should consider reducing their financial assistance and instead focus on helping to create the conditions for such frameworks to be put in place. Meanwhile, they should reward the 'good performer' governments by providing additional support to them.

The dilemma facing donors, however, is that many of the world's poor live in countries where the regimes in power are not pursuing pro-poor policies. Many of these regimes are also either not committed to or are unable to pursue an effective leadership role in the development dialogue with donors, so that the basic tenet of the partnership model is not in place. In short, either the Government's commitment to poverty reduction, good governance and responsible economic management is lacking or the capacity to exercise effective leadership in policy formulation, planning and coordination is weak. In such cases, where the partnership between donors and Government is at best fragile and sometimes completely absent, donors are faced with the question of how to respond.

The absence of a basic policy framework for good governance, sound economic management and poverty reduction measures has led most donors to classify Angola in the 'fragile partnership' category. As a result, some donors have radically scaled down or ended completely their development cooperation with the Government since the late 1990s. This underlying suspicion or lack of confidence has sometimes been qualified by other concerns, in particular the desire of embassies to promote good relations with the government of a country with large oil resources, in order to help their national companies to obtain access to oil block licenses or to win contracts or business permits in a market that is already one of the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa by virtue of its substantial foreign exchange earnings from oil. Strategic concerns, related to Angola's role in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its intervention in the conflicts in the two Congos, have also been a factor influencing donor attitudes.

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[5] This approach was laid out in the OECD/DAC strategy document *Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation* [OECD/DAC, 1996]. The basic partnership elements were made more explicit in a working checklist issued by OECD/DAC two years later [OECD/DAC 1998].

[6] The growing concern that aid often has little positive impact, and sometimes even a negative impact, particularly in Africa, was highlighted by the World Bank's study *Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why* [World Bank, 1998].

However, strategic access to oil resources outside the Middle East does not appear to be a major factor driving donor aid policies. Although Angola is an increasingly important source of oil for Western countries, including in particular the United States, which has historically been receiving about 7-10% of its oil imports from Angola, this oil is produced offshore in an enclave sector and traded on the international market. Access to this oil has not been affected in any significant way by diplomatic relations – indeed, even during the Cold War, when the United States did not recognize the Angolan Government and was financing the UNITA rebels, US oil companies operated in Angola and Angolan oil was exported to the USA.

Most donors' aid programmes have thus been conditioned mainly by the humanitarian situation (and in some cases their related need to offload cereal surpluses as food aid) and by perceptions of the extent to which longer-term development partnerships are possible and likely to be effective. With respect to the latter, most donors have concluded that their partnership with the Government is fragile. There is a widespread view among donors that the Government's commitment to reform has been weak – a much more fundamental problem than the weakness of capacity, because it raises fundamental questions about the Government's will or intentions (see Box 4.2).

Box 4.2

Partnerships, Government commitment and capacity

From a donor perspective, the two key dimensions for an effective partnership between a Government and donors are *commitment* and *capacity*. The *commitment* concerns the regime's interest or willingness to take ownership and leadership of a national development process that is actively pursuing poverty reduction, in accordance with the development vision embraced by the international community in the Millennium Declaration Goals. That is, while the partnership model refers to general principles for local leadership and ownership for setting agendas, there is an additional expectation that this agenda will be in line with and actively support a strong poverty reduction strategy if donors are to provide financial support.

The *capacity* has to do with the ability of a regime to actually implement its own agenda, and is usually considered at three levels: individual skills (micro level), organizational capacity (meso level), and institutional development (macro level). The micro level looks at the extent to which the public sector has access to the requisite number and quality of skills, while the meso level is concerned with the focus, structure and relations between the key public entities responsible for policy formulation and implementation. Institutional development refers to the general framework conditions for taking decisions in society. In many of the 'fragile partnership' countries, capacity is often weak along all three dimensions.

Donors rank commitment as strategically more important for partnership than capacity. This is in line with the issue of trust, which deals with intention rather than ability. The message is thus that the first-order problem is *effectiveness* – 'doing the right things'. Once that has been agreed to, the *efficiency* problem –'doing the things right' – can be sorted out. The corollary, as far as most donors are concerned, is that lack of *commitment* is a problem the regime itself has to tackle. Once that is in place, the donors would be happy to address the lack of *capacity* through capacity building support.

In addition, the weakness and inadequate transparency of Government systems for budget management, procurement, accounting and auditing have made donors wary of providing financial assistance directly to the Government. As a result, the few donors that have continued to provide assistance to the Government, including some UN agencies, have channelled funds through separate accounts, with their own autonomous financial management, procurement, auditing and reporting procedures, usually those of the contributing donor. The Ministry of Finance's Budget Execution Reports indicate that no external assistance is being channelled through the Government budget: the budget line for external grants was zero in the accounts for both 1999 and 2000 [MINFIN, 2000; MINFIN, 2001].

The Netherlands, Sweden and the UK were prominent among the bilateral donors that effectively ended their development cooperation with the Government of Angola, on the grounds that the minimum conditions for a fruitful partnership were not in place. Likewise, the World Bank reduced its portfolio in Angola and withdrew its country representative in 1999, limiting new lending to the second phase of the *Fundo de Apoio Social* (FAS), which was justified as a facility directly assisting poor communities.During the second half of the 1990s, the continuing absence of an IMF agreement was one of the main factors prompting donors to scale down or end their assistance to the Government. The agreement between the Fund and the Government on the Staff Monitored Programme (SMP), which began in April 2000, raised hopes among donors that a more favourable environment might emerge. The SMP focused in particular on institutional reforms, aimed at ensuring the transparency of Government finances, as well as macroeconomic stabilization. In tandem with the SMP, the Government began work on preparing the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP), a condition for an eventual IMF loan under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). However, most donors remained cautious, waiting to see how implementation of the SMP turned out in practice and sceptical regarding the commitment of the Government to implementation of a credible poverty reduction strategy.

The IMF itself was unable, under its rules, to consider lending to Angola without the prior successful implementation of the SMP during a minimum of two consecutive quarters. When the SMP expired in June 2001, with most of the benchmarks not met and many of the institutional measures not yet completed, the prospects of an IMF loan again receded and donors' caution about stepping up assistance to the Government was reinforced. An agreement between the Government and the IMF on a Fund loan now appears to be impossible before 2003, on the most optimistic scenario, if only because it would require agreement first on a new SMP and its successful implementation.

For many donors, the return to war in 1998 brought immediate humanitarian concerns to the forefront. This will not change much in the short term, despite the restoration of peace, due to the seriousness of the humanitarian situation, which will not diminish significantly before the first post-war harvest in April 2003. In the humanitarian field, there is not only a moral imperative for donor assistance, but there is at least a basic planning framework, led by the Government with the support of the UN, notably through the National and Provincial Emergency Plans of Action (PEPAs), as well as a high degree of coordination, both within the UN system (through OCHA) and between the UN, the Government, NGOs and donors. Following the restoration of peace, Government departments, UN agencies and NGOs worked together in June 2002 to prepare Provincial Emergency Plans of Action for Resettlement and Return. Humanitarian coordination structures exist at the provincial level, although these are not active in all provinces, and there are specialized coordination groups in sectors such as health and nutrition, resettlement, agriculture and food assistance, water and sanitation, and protection. The Humanitarian Coordination Group, which is co-chaired by the Minister of Social Assistance and Reintegration and the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, acts as the main forum for humanitarian coordination. Almost all humanitarian assistance is delivered through UN agencies and NGOs, however, due to the weakness of Government delivery systems, and most monitoring is being conducted by the UN.

Some donors shifted to an almost exclusive focus on humanitarian assistance after the resumption of the war in 1998. Others, such as the European Commission (EC) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), considered that it was still possible to engage in different types of aid activities (humanitarian/recovery/development) in Angola, because of the widely differing security conditions across the country: these and other agencies tended to shift their recovery/development programmes to more secure regions, mainly in the South West and coastal areas. More recently, some donors, such as the EC, have progressively restored recovery efforts in major war-affected areas, such as the *planalto central*, as security conditions have improved. This trend is likely to strengthen in the new situation created by the reestablishment of peace: various donors are willing to support the demobilization and social reintegration of surplus troops and the return of displaced populations to their areas of origin, as well as other community-level measures

aimed at overcoming the humanitarian crisis, helping to consolidate peace and starting the process of reconstruction and economic and social recovery.

While some donors continued to provide assistance for recovery and longer-term development, even during the period of war between 1998 and 2002, most worked primarily or exclusively through NGOs, associations, UN agencies or semi-autonomous public bodies like the FAS and the EC-backed *Programa de Apoio à Reconstrução* (PAR), rather than through mainstream Government institutions. In addition, as noted above, almost all humanitarian assistance has been channelled through UN agencies and NGOs. The overall breakdown of donor aid flows by types of executing agencies is not known. However, data from the different UN agencies active in the country suggest that total expenditures by the UN system in Angola were close to $288 million in 2000. While part of this amount represents overhead costs, rather than programme delivery, it is striking that this figure is not far below the total aid disbursements of $321 million in 2000 recorded by the EC study [EC, 2001]. WFP alone had expenditures of $214 million in Angola in 2000.

Significantly, some donors' support for long-term development has focused on core structural problems, such as governance and the development of a stronger civil society, precisely because these are seen as prerequisites for progress in other areas. Thus, assistance for the promotion of human rights and democracy accounted for 4% of donor aid flows in 2000. The USA, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, Spain and the UK have been the main donors providing assistance in this thematic area [EC, 2001]. Here too, most of the assistance has been directed to UN agencies, NGOs and professional associations. The emergent independent media have also received some donor support. Much of this work is clearly intended to develop the conditions that could lead to improved governance and respect for human rights, by strengthening strategic civil society organizations.

Advocacy also takes on increased importance in countries where Government commitment to pro-poor policies and democratic governance is perceived to be weak. While bilateral donors are inevitably cautious about engaging directly in advocacy on policy issues, they have sometimes assisted civil society organizations, including advocacy NGOs and the private media, to address such issues. UN agencies have devoted considerable efforts to promotion of human rights, humanitarian law and the international development goals. Examples are the analytical work done by UN agencies through published studies such as the national Human Development Reports [UNDP, 1997, 1998 and 1999] and the Situation Analysis of Children [UNICEF/GURN, 1999] and the inputs made by the UN System during the process of preparation of the Interim PRSP [UN, 2001c].

Donor coordination has historically been weak in Angola, outside the humanitarian field. However, the intrinsically difficult environment has made some donors increasingly conscious of the importance of inter-donor co-ordination, in order to obtain the benefits of greater exchange of information, harmonization of aid programmes and, where necessary, the adoption of common policy positions.[7]

In conclusion, the principal donors in Angola have so far adopted a cautious approach to long-term development programming, due both to the primacy of the humanitarian crisis, security constraints and the weakness of Government commitment and capacity to lead the process of developing and implementing an appropriate policy, planning and budget management framework for social and economic recovery, poverty reduction and improved governance. In these conditions, it is not realistic to expect donors to engage seriously in joint planning exercises with the Government of the SWAP type seen in countries with much stronger partnerships, such as Mozambique, Ghana or Uganda. Many donors will continue to wait and see if key strategy documents such as the Interim PRSP will provide a clear policy direction and will actually be implemented. Until the Government has shown through concrete actions on the ground that it is serious about pro-poor policies and reforms in governance, most donors are likely to hedge their bets by focusing mainly on humanitarian assistance

[7] For example, UNDP has taken the lead to bring donors together to discuss strategic development issues, notably by launching a donors working group on the PRSP early in 2002.

and action to support peace-building, including the return and reintegration of IDPs, refugees and demobilized soldiers, while continuing to channel assistance mainly through programmes and projects executed by UN agencies, NGOs or autonomous quasi-public bodies.

Chapter 5
Conclusions

The legacy

This document has provided a broad assessment of the situation facing Angola's people after years of war, population upheavals and, with the exception of a flourishing oil industry, economic decline and malaise. The picture is a grim one. Almost one third of the population is displaced, internally or across the country's borders as refugees. The country is littered with landmines. If not forced to flee their homes, rural people in most parts of the country have retreated into a low-level subsistence economy, decapitalized and cut off from markets.

Meanwhile, mass displacement has transformed Angola into a predominantly urban society – but without the urban planning, infrastructural investments or services to cope with such a large and sudden increase in population. With the non-oil sectors of the economy depressed, jobs and income earning opportunities are scarce, resulting in intense competition among largely unskilled urban-dwellers, mainly in the informal sector. It is not surprising in these circumstances that the proportion of urban households living in extreme poverty, with earnings of less than 75 US cents a day, has doubled since 1995.

The war, poverty, insalubrious environmental conditions, unsafe water sources and the decline of the social sectors have resulted in some of the worst social indicators in the world, including the second highest under-five mortality rate, after Sierra Leone. Malaria is responsible for most deaths, both of children and adults. But HIV infection is spreading rapidly and could eventually become the single largest cause of mortality. Low access to maternity services, including attendance at deliveries by trained health personnel and effective emergency referral mechanisms, results in extremely high rates of maternal mortality. It has been estimated that an Angolan woman has a one in nine lifetime risk of dying from maternity related causes, compared with a risk of one in 5,000 in Portugal.

About half of primary school-age children are not enrolled in school, mainly because of financial constraints (poverty, school costs and children's need to work), but in some cases because children do not have birth certificates or there are no school places available. Access to education is by far the worst in rural areas and virtually non-existent in areas that have been inaccessible during the war.

Girls are especially disadvantaged and illiteracy rates are much the highest among women, especially in the rural areas. Along with cultural biases, this puts women at a disadvantage in employment and, as a result, women are overwhelmingly engaged in subsistence agriculture and petty trade. Women also continue to face disadvantages in access to resources, ownership of assets and inheritance.

In the prevailing conditions of war, displacement and poverty, large sections of the population, including IDPs, children and women, have been vulnerable to violence, abuse and exploitation. Large numbers of children have had to enter the labour market, at the expense of their education and often in hazardous, harmful conditions.

The displaced, the refugees and the poor in general are to a large extent marginalized and voiceless. They are too vulnerable, afraid and preoccupied with day-to-day survival to assert their rights. There are not yet strong community-based organizations or peasants' associations. The trade unions remain weak, largely because of the small size of the formal labour force. These conditions, as well as the delay in holding new national elections (last held a decade ago), the lack of elections at provincial or local levels and the weakness of the press, have constrained popular participation in the political process, despite the reforms in 1991-92 that introduced a formally pluralist system of governance.

The opportunities

The country now has an exceptionally favourable opportunity to overcome this legacy and move towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals, so that progressively all of Angola's people can enjoy their full civil, political, economic and social rights.

First, there is every reason to believe that the war is definitively over. The politico-military situation is quite unlike that in 1991 or 1994, when the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol simply 'froze' a military stalemate, which could later be 'unfrozen', as happened in both 1992 and 1998. The current peace resulted from the overwhelming military superiority of the Government forces. The Angolan people are tired of war and there is a strong desire among all segments of the society to build a sustainable peace.

This will make it possible for the country to move on from the current humanitarian emergency to begin the tasks of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery – although it should not be overlooked that the humanitarian caseload is increasing in the short run, as access opens up to large numbers of rural people in extreme need in parts of the country that were previously beyond the reach of humanitarian agencies. The return of IDPs, refugees and demobilized soldiers to their areas of origin will take place only slowly and these returnees will require assistance until they are able to harvest their first crops. Nonetheless, it is realistic to expect a gradual reduction of the scale of the humanitarian emergency in 2003-04.

Second, the country can look forward in the next few years to unparalleled levels of oil production and Government revenue, that will provide an exceptionally favourable internal resource base for reconstruction and development. Although oil production (running at over 900,000 b/d in early 2002) is forecast to remain quite stable until 2005, it will then rise rapidly, probably reaching more than 1.9 million b/d by 2007, as major new deepwater fields come on stream. Assuming a steady oil price, of about $18 a barrel, the Government's fiscal revenue from oil is forecast to rise from a little over $3.1 billion in 2001 to over $5 billion a year by 2007. Again, revenue will be fairly stable in 2002-04, due both to flat production and to high amortization costs for the investments in the new deepwater fields, but revenue will soar from 2005 onwards. The projected increase in oil production over the medium term will be large enough to turn the current account of the balance of payments from deficit into surplus, after 2005, finance much of the country's reconstruction, build up official reserves and permit a rapid decline in the stock of public debt.

The threats

At the same time as the country has unparalleled opportunities, it also faces several major threats, which, if not properly managed, could have extremely damaging consequences, cancelling out the opportunities. Six risk factors are especially important to highlight.

The first is that the country's large and rising public revenues are mismanaged and wasted. Some other oil producing countries may serve as a salutary warning in this respect: Nigeria, for example, has earned more than $320 billion from oil in the past 30 years but has little to show for it. The key to rigorous management is transparency. It is critical that all revenues and expenditures are channelled through the official, approved budget and that all Government spending follows strictly the official procedures. This needs to be accompanied by strong accountancy and auditing systems, as well as the rigorous application of modern procurement procedures, to limit opportunities for corruption.

The second risk is that failure to improve the business climate outside the oil sector will continue to result in large-scale urban unemployment (disguised as underemployment in the informal petty commerce sector), causing urban poverty to worsen and frustration to simmer, especially among the youth. In this respect, it must be presumed that the majority of Angolans will continue to live and seek employment in the urban areas. The process of urbanization will not be fundamentally reversed

– as most IDP return movements will involve IDPs living in temporary camps and resettlement sites, rather than those integrated into urban communities.

In the short to medium term, substantial numbers of jobs could be generated by public works programmes linked to national reconstruction efforts. In the longer term, however, the key to sustainable job creation is to create a business environment that encourages investment. The medium-term surge in oil revenues should, in principle, make this easier to achieve – by facilitating macroeconomic stabilization and generating the resources for investment in physical infrastructure (electricity, water, transport, etc.), whose poor state and unreliability have been one of the main constraints on business development. However, there are other important prerequisites for business development, including in particular predictability in Government policy, a regulatory framework that promotes competition and does not burden businesses with excessive bureaucracy, the availability of modern banking services, a literate, skilled, healthy workforce and a judicial system that can be relied upon to uphold contracts.

A third risk is that policy is distorted by elite interests at the expense of the poor. Elite interests could benefit, for example, from the continuation of non-transparent mechanisms for the management of public finances, procurement, the award of business licences (and the restriction of competition through protected oligopoly markets) and the award of other resources, such as land. In particular, the continuation of the current trend towards concentration of some of the best land resources in the hands of a small number of large *fazendeiros* runs the risk of deepening rural poverty, stimulating further migration to the cities and sowing the seeds of future land conflicts, as in Zimbabwe.

Fourth, unless huge investments are made in education, there is a risk of both present and future generations reaching adulthood without the basic skills of literacy and numeracy, wider civic and life-skill knowledge or potential work-place skills. To achieve universal primary education by 2015, while keeping up with the growth of the school-age population, the country will have to increase the number of children enrolled in primary school from an estimated 1.5 million in 2000 to 5 million in 2015. Achieving this goal should be one of the main priorities for the allocation of the resources generated by oil taxes over the next decade.

Fifth, the spread of HIV/AIDS poses enormous risks and challenges, to which no serious response has yet been mounted. Unless the gravity of the situation is fully grasped and appropriate action is taken, the consequences will almost certainly be as catastrophic as they already are in some other Southern African countries. As Chapter 3 discussed, the continued expansion of the epidemic will end up reducing drastically average life expectancy, while overwhelming the health service and creating hundreds of thousands of AIDS orphans. By hitting hardest the most productive age-groups, the disease will reduce productivity, kill large numbers of the most qualified personnel in private companies, the civil service and public services, push large numbers of families into poverty (or deeper into poverty than they already are) and undermine economic recovery and development.

Sixth, there is a risk that new conflicts will emerge in the future if there are not genuine avenues for popular participation in the conduct of public affairs and a strong culture of tolerance, respect for human rights and democratic principles. A key step forward, which should now be possible in the new post-war context, will be the holding of national elections in free and fair conditions. This will require an independent national electoral commission, the registration of the adult population, unrestricted campaigning, access to the mass media and lack of intimidation. There is also a need to extend democratization to the provincial and local levels, in order to promote greater popular participation and strengthen mechanisms of accountability.

Government commitment and leadership

With the country now looking forward to peace, reconstruction and rising oil revenues, there is a much improved context in which to address the policy, institutional and budgetary issues that are of critical importance for future progress towards the fulfilment of rights. Strengthening the capacity to

address these issues effectively will be important, given the systemic weaknesses in the public administration. However, capacity will not be the only factor determining the extent and pace of progress. Even more important will be the degree of political will or commitment to tackle the shortfalls in rights and their underlying causes.

It will take enlightened leadership to rise above special interests and demonstrate the political will needed to seize the new opportunities and move forward decisively towards overcoming the many problems still facing the country, including the threats outlined above. The Government's role should essentially be to set an appropriate policy framework, with related strategies, plans and programmes, while also ensuring that appropriate institutional structures, mechanisms and procedures are in place, providing leadership and co-ordination for other actors (including donors) and allocating budgetary resources in accordance with well defined priorities. The proposed Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) – and its successor 'full' PSRP -- could provide the necessary broad policy framework. Such a strategy would incorporate the actions needed to overcome the humanitarian emergency, promote post-conflict reintegration, reconstruction and recovery, and promote job-creation, access of the rural poor to land and markets, food security and universal access to basic social services, while also tackling emerging threats like HIV/AIDS. The strategy would also address the large 'macro' issues of promoting democratic governance, sound economic management, transparency in the management of public resources and curbs on corruption.

The donor role

Such a policy framework, backed up by the requisite Government commitment in terms of leadership, co-ordination and resource allocation, would provide the foundations for an enhanced partnership between the Government and donors, including the UN System. Donors would be better able to play a supporting role, complementing the Government's efforts. The Government would be taking the lead in setting policies and strategies, establishing clear priorities and objectives, around which other partners could rally. The Government would also be devoting the bulk of its internal resources to meeting these development objectives. Donors would see themselves as supplementing, rather than substituting for, these internal resources. Once the commitment and leadership of the Government are in place, and demonstrated in practice by policy implementation and resource allocations, the UN agencies and other donors would willingly contribute to building the necessary capacity in Government institutions.

At the same time, the donor community cannot assume that all of the above will automatically happen. Ultimately, the quality of Government commitment and leadership will depend on the aspirations, expectations and demands of the people of Angola. Building a powerful civil society, with representative, effective organizations, as well as pluralistic mass media, an independent judiciary and a strong National Assembly, capable of acting as an effective check on executive power, will be fundamental components of a strategy for long-term improvements in the quality of government.

The next steps for the UN

Following the completion of the CCA, the UN System in Angola will begin to discuss and develop the strategy and programmes that the UN agencies will pursue in the period from 2004 to 2008. This will culminate in the drafting, discussion and adoption of the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for 2004-08.

It must be borne in mind that the specific details of the UN System's forthcoming programme strategy, objectives and activities cannot be derived mechanically from the assessment and analysis contained in the CCA. The CCA is a broad assessment and analysis of the country situation, which provides an overall vision of the major problems and challenges for the future. However, the UN System is only one actor, indeed a relatively minor one, among many. The principal actor, as stated

above, must be the Government itself, as the authority entrusted by the people with the responsibility for leading the country – and one with substantial internal resources, thanks to the fiscal revenue from oil. Other actors include the NGOs and other civil society organizations.

For this reason, this CCA does not identify the specific priorities or areas of focus for the UN System during 2004-08. These and other strategic issues will be addressed during the preparation of UNDAF, when it will be necessary for the UN agencies and the System as a whole to consider carefully what specific role they should play, taking into account their comparative advantage (in terms of agency mandates and experience) and their fairly modest resources, as well as the problems and challenges identified in the CCA.[1] It will be necessary to consider in detail the role that will be played by the Government, in terms of policy framework, programmes, institutional arrangements and budgetary allocations, and also take into account the contributions of other partners, including national and international NGOs and bilateral and multilateral donors.

This in turn requires a broad consultative process, involving the UN agencies, the Government, NGOs and other civil society organizations, deputies in the National Assembly and donors. The UN intends to adopt such a participatory approach, so that the widest range of views can be obtained in the process of designing the UN programme framework for 2004-08.

[1] In 2001, total UN expenditure in Angola ($288 million) was equivalent to about 6% of total Government expenditure ($4,669 million), according to preliminary data. Moreover, about half the expenditure by the UN was for humanitarian assistance.

Annex 1

Angola CCA indicators and data

A. RIGHT TO PERSONAL SECURITY AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY

Conference goals and targets	Indicators		Source of data	Year	Data
Security of person [WCHR]	Population displacements	Total no. of reported IDPs since end 1992 (millions)	OCHA	Dec 2001	4.3
		Total no. of reported IDPs since Jan 1998 (millions)	OCHA	Dec 2001	3.53
		Total no. of confirmed IDPs since Jan 1998 (millions)	OCHA	Dec 2001	1.36
		No. of IDPs living in camps & transit centres	OCHA	Dec 2001	335,000
		Cumulative no. of IDPs resettled since January 2001 (est.)	OCHA	Dec 2001	200,000
		% of IDPs resettled in accordance with norms (decree 1/01) since January 2001 (est.)	OCHA	Dec 2001	50,000
		No. of Angolan refugees in neighbouring countries	UNHCR	Dec 2001	Total 457, 492 Zambia 218, 540 DRC 186,975 Namibia 30,599 Congo (Rep.) 15,300
	Landmines	Estimated total no. of landmines (millions)	INAROEE	2001	6-7
		Estimated area with danger from mines as % of national territory	INAROEE	2001	35
		Reported area cleared of mines (sq km)	INAROEE	2000	15.2
		Reported length of roads cleared of mines (km)	INAROEE	1997-2000	6,000
		Reported number of mines removed	INAROEE	2000	16,609
		Reported number of UXOs removed	INAROEE	1997-2000 2000	384,794 50,275
		Reported annual no. of landmine victims of which, deaths	INAROEE INAROEE	2000 2000	963 403
		Estimated cumulative no. of amputees due to landmines	INAROEE	2000	772

B. RIGHT TO SURVIVAL AND A LONG AND HEALTHY LIFE

CHILDREN'S RIGHT TO SURVIVAL

Conference goals and targets	Indicators	Country data					Comparative data			
		Source	Years	National	Urban	Rural	Source	Years	Developing countries	Sub-Saharan Africa
Reduce infant mortality rate by 2/3 between 2000 and 2015 [MDG]	Infant mortality rate (deaths of children under 1 per 1,000 live births)	MICS	1996 2001	166 150[a]	n.a. 148	n.a. 155[a]	SOWC	2000	63	108
Reduce under-5 mortality rate by 2/3 between 2000 and 2015 [MDG]	Under-five mortality rate (deaths of children under 5 per 1,000 live births)	MICS	1996 2001	274 250[a]	271 245	276 260[a]	SOWC	2000	91	175
Achieve universal child immunization [WSC]	% children aged 12-23 months vaccinated against TB (BCG)	MICS	1996 2001	59.5 68.8[a]	74.2 73.7	47.0 57.0[a]	SOWC	1999	80	67
	% children aged 12-23 months vaccinated against measles	MICS	1996 2001	45.5 53.4[a]	49.2 58.2	42.4 41.9[a]	SOWC	1999	69	51
	% children aged 12-23 months vaccinated against polio (OPV3)	MICS	1996 2001	27.5 63.2[a]	36.6 64.3	19.8 60.6[a]	SOWC	1999	72	48
	% children aged 12-23 months vaccinated against DPT (DPT3)	MICS	1996 2001	23.9 33.9[a]	35.3 39.0	14.2 21.9[a]	SOWC	1999	69	46
Eradication of polio [WSC]	Number of confirmed cases	MINSA	2000	55			WHO	2000	721	162

a/ Accessible areas only.

RIGHT TO A LONG AND HEALTHY LIFE

Conference goals and targets	Indicators	Country data					Comparative data			
		Source	Years	National	Luanda	Other provinces	Source	Years	Developing countries	Sub-Saharan Africa
Halt and start reversal of spread of HIV/AIDS by 2015 [MDG]	HIV prevalence rate (% of women 15+ receiving ante-natal care)	MINSA	1997 1999 2001		2.2 3.4 8.6	 Huíla 4.4 Benguela 2.6	HDR UNAIDS	1999 2000	1.3 …	8.7 8.8
	HIV prevalence rate in high-risk groups (%)	MINSA	2001		Sex workers 32.8 TB patients 10.4					
	Estimated number of people living with HIV	MINSA	1997 1999 2001	118,954 195,092 523,654						
	Knowledge of AIDS (% of women that have heard of AIDS)	MICS	2001	68[a] Urban 74[a] Rural 53[a]						
	Knowledge of AIDS (% of population that has heard of AIDS)	MINSA/ UNESCO / UNDP[a]	2001	87[b]	98	Benguela 79 Cabinda 97 Kwanza Sul 85 Huambo 73				
Halt and start reversal of spread of malaria by 2015[MDG]	Notified cases of malaria per 1,000 population	MINSA	1999 2000	233 155		Benguela 165				
	Notified deaths from malaria per 1,000 population	MINSA	1999 2000	2.0 0.7		Benguela 0.8				
	Notified deaths of malaria as % of total notified deaths	MINSA	1999 2000	88 76						
	Notified deaths from malaria as % of total deaths of children under 5	INE	1994		38					
Achieve universal access to primary health care [ICPD/WSSD/ FWCW]	% of population with access to essential drugs	WHO	1999	20						
	No. of doctors in public health system per 100,000 people	MINSA	2000	5,5			HDR	1990-99	78	32
	Government health expenditure (executed) as % of GDP	IMF	1998 1999 2000	1.4 1.2 2.0			WDI	1990-98		1.7

a/ Accessible areas only. b/ Data from Inquérito sobre as Percepções dos Angolanos sobre o VIH/SIDA, 2001, conducted in Luanda, Cabinda, Benguela, Kwanza Sul and Huambo.

REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS										
Conference goals and targets	**Indicators**	**Country data**					**Comparative data**			
		Source of data	**Years**	**National**	**Urban**	**Rural**	**Source of data**	**Years**	**Developing countries**	**Sub-Saharan Africa**
Reduce maternal mortality ratio by half of 1990 levels by 2000 and a further half by 2015 [ICPD, WSSD, FWCW, WSC]	Maternal mortality ratio (maternal deaths per 100,000 live births)	WHO/ UNICEF/ UNFPA	1995	1,300 (model based estimate)			SOWC	1985-99	440	1,100
	MMR in health facilities (maternal deaths per 100,000 live births)	CAOL/ MINSA	1999 2000		Luanda 853 Luanda 716					
	Lifetime risk of maternal death (%)	WHO/ UNICEF/ UNFPA	1995	11 (model based estimate)						
	% of births attended by skilled health personnel	MICS	1996 2001	22.5 44.7[a]	35.3 52.7	13.4 25.4[a]	SOWC	1995-2000	53	39
	% of expectant mothers receiving ante-natal care (at least 1 visit)	MICS	1996 2001	63.5 65.6[a]	80.4 70.8	51.4 53.0[a]	SOWC	1995-2000	65	64
	% of pregnant women immunized against tetanus	MICS	1996 2001	49.2 62.2[a]	69.3 65.6	35.6 54.2[a]	SOWC	1997-99	50	42
Universal access to safe & reliable contraceptive methods [ICPD]	Contraceptive prevalence rate (any method, %)	MICS	1996 2001	8.1 6.0[a]	13.1 8.0	4.3 2.0[a]	SOWC	1995-2001	62	22

a/ Accessible areas only.

RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD AND NUTRITION

Conference goals and targets	Indicators	Country data					Comparative data			
		Source of data	Years	National	Urban	Rural	Source of data	Years	Developing countries	Sub-Saharan Africa
Halve the proportion of people suffering from hunger by 2015 [MDG]	% of population below minimum dietary energy consumption (2,100 kcal/day)	IPCVD IDR	1995 2000/01		33.3[a]		HDR	1996-98	18	34
	% of household expenditure spent on food in poorest two quintiles	IPCVD IDCP IDR	1995 1998 2000/01	73.5[c]	77.0[a] Luanda 62.5[d] Others 74.5[cd]	78.8[cd]				
	% of population requiring food aid	FAO/ WFP	2001/02 forecast	10.1						
	% of national cereal requirements met by domestic production	FAO/ WFP	2001/02 forecast	50.0						
Malnutrition in children under 5 reduced by half by 2000 [WSC, WSSD, WFS]	% of under-5 children stunted (moderate and severe)	MICS	1996 2001	53.1 45.2[e]	46.8 43.3	57.5 49.6[e]	SOWC	1995-2000	32	41
	% of under-5 children wasted (moderate and severe)	MICS	1996 2001	6.4 6.3[e]	5.2 6.5	7.1 5.8[e]	SOWC	1995-2000	9	10
	% of under-5 children underweight (moderate and severe)	MICS	1996 2001	41.6 30.5[e]	31.6 29.7	48.5 32.4[e]	SOWC	1995-2000	28	30
	% of children aged 6-59 months receiving Vitamin A supplement in previous 6 months	MICS	2001	30.8[e]	31.0	30.0[e]	SOWC	1999	50	70
	% of households consuming iodized salt	MICS	2001				SOWC	1997-2000	70	68
	% of children aged 0-3 months who are exclusively breastfed	MICS	1996 2001	12.0 14.0[e]	7.6 14.0	15.3 13.0[e]	SOWC	1995-2000	44	34

a/ The Inquérito Prioritário sobre as Condições de Vida aos Domicílios (IPCVD) was carried out in the cities of Cabinda, Luanda, Benguela, Lobito, Catumbela, Lubango and Luena. b/ The Inquérito aos Agregados Familiares sobre Despesas e Receitas (IDR) was carried out in Cabinda (city of Cabinda), Luanda, Benguela (cities of Benguela, Lobito and Catumbela), Lunda Norte (cities of Dundo and Chitato), Huíla (city of Lubango), Namibe and Cunene. Data cited here are preliminary, unofficial data from first six months of survey. c/ The Inquérito sobre a Disposição e Capacidade no Pagamento dos Serviços Sociais Básicos (IDCP) was carried out in Luanda, Uíge, Huambo and Lubango. d/ Data for poorest two quartiles. e/ Accessible areas only.

RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING, WATER AND SANITATION														
Conference goals and targets	Indicators	Country data					Comparative data							
		Source of data	Years	National	Urban	Rural	Source of data	Years	Developing countries			Sub-Saharan Africa		
									Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
Adequate shelter for all [Habitat II]	No. of persons per room	MICS	1996 2001	2.4	2.3	2.4								
Halve proportion of population unable to reach or afford safe water by 2015 [MDG]	% of population with access to appropriate sources of drinking water[a]	MICS IDCPSSB[b] MICS	1996 1998 2001	36 58 62[c]	53 Luanda 56 Others 80 71	27 38 40[c]	SOWC	2000	78	92	69	57	83	44
Universal access to sanitary means of excreta disposal [WSC]	% of population with access to sanitary means of excreta disposal	MICS	1996 2001	40 60[c]	61 74	27 26[c]	SOWC	2000	52	77	35	53	73	43

a/ Defined to include water supplied by taps linked to the mains (within the household, yard or building, or public standpipe) and water from boreholes and protected wells and springs. b/ / The Inquérito sobre a Disposição e Capacidade no Pagamento dos Serviços Sociais Básicos (IDCP) was carried out in Luanda, Uíge, Huambo and Lubango. c/ accessible areas only.

C. RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT

RIGHT TO EDUCATION															
Conference goals and targets	Indicators	Country data							Comparative data						
		Source of data	Years	National	Urban	Rural	Female	Male	Source of data	Years	Developing countries		Sub-Saharan Africa		
Universal access to, and completion of primary education by 2015 [MDG/WEF]	Net primary enrolment ratio[a]	MICS MED MICS	1996 1998 2001	49.7 47.4 62.5[b]	63.7	39.6	48.0 41.8	51.8 53.6	SOWC	1995-99	F 76	M 83	F 50	M 58	
	Gross primary enrolment ratio[c]	MICS MED MICS	1996 1998 2001	89.4 59.0	109.5	75.0	82.1 51.6	97.7 67.0	SOWC	1995-99	F 89	M 98	F 69	M 82	
	% of pupils starting Class 1 who reach Class 5	MICS	1996 2001	30.2 76.0[b]	39.7 76.9	18.2 73.1[b]	26.8 72.5[b]	33.8 79.3[b]	SOWC	1995-99	73		66		
	Gross enrolment ratio in III[o] nível *ensino de base*[d]	MED	1998	23.3			21.2	25.4							
	Public expenditure on education (executed) as % of GDP	IMF	1998 1999 2000	2.6 1.5 1.9					WDI	1994-97			4.0[e]		
Adult literacy reduced by half by 2015 [WEF]	Adult literacy rate (% of population aged 15 and above that can read and write a simple phrase)	MICS[c]	20001	67[c]	74	50[c]	54[c]	82[c]	SOWC	2000	F 66	M 82	F 54	M 69	

a/ Pupils aged 6-11 enrolled in Classes 1-6 as % of population aged 6-11. b/ Accessible areas only. c/ Pupils enrolled in Classes 1-6 as % of population aged 6-11. d/ Pupils enroled in Classes 7-8 as % of population aged 12-13. e/ As % of gross national income (GNI).

WOMEN'S RIGHT TO EQUALITY IN ACCESS TO EDUCATION

Conference goals and targets	Indicators	Country data					Comparative data			
		Source of data	Years	National	Urban	Rural	Source of data	Years	Developing countries	Sub-Saharan Africa
Achieve equal access of boys and girls to all levels of education by 2015 [MDG]	Females as % of males gross primary enrolment ratio (I & II levels *ensino de base*)	MICS MED MICS	1996 1998 2001	84.0 77.0			SOWC	1995-99	91	84
	Females as % of males gross enrolment ratio, III level *ensino de base*	MED	1998	83.5						
	Females as % of males in higher education	MED	1998	69.7						

RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING

		Source of data	Years	National	Urban	Rural
Halve the proportion of people living on less than US$1 a day by 2015 [MDG]	% of households below poverty line ($49.80 per adult equivalent per month in 1995; $51.20 in 2000/01)	IPCVD	1995		61.0[a]	
		IDR	2000/01	…	63.0[b]	
	% of households below extreme poverty line ($17.86 per adult equivalent per month in 1995; $22.8 per adult equivalent in 200/01)	IPCVD	1995		11.6[a]	
		IDR	2000/01	…	24.7[b]	
	Poorest fifth's share of total household expenditure	IPCVD	1995		7.0[a]	
		IDCP	1998	2.7[c]	Luanda 12.5[d] Other 6.5[cd]	9.9[cd]
		IDR	2000/01	…	4.4[b]	
	Gini-coefficient (inequality measure, with 0 = perfect equality and 100 perfect inequality)	IPCVD	1995		45[a]	
		IDR	2000/01		51[b]	
Universal access to employment [WSSD, WSSD+5]	% of economically active population (10 years & over) unemployed, Luanda	INE	1993		Luanda 24.4	
		IPCVD	1995		Luanda 32.3	
	% of employed population (10 years & over) under-employed, Luanda	INE	1993		Luanda 79.3	
	Informal sector employment as % of total employment, Luanda	IPCVD (Adauta)	1995		Luanda 63.0	
	Sources of employment (% of total): Self-employment Private sector Public administration State companies Businessmen Unpaid family work	IDR	2000/01		 43[b] 19[b] 10[b] 5[b] 6[b] 16[b]	

a/ The Inquérito Prioritário sobre as Condições de Vida aos Domicílios (IPCVD) was carried out in the cities of Cabinda, Luanda, Benguela, Lobito, Catumbela, Lubango and Luena. b/ The Inquérito aos Agregados Familiares sobre Despesas e Receitas (IDR) was carried out in Cabinda (city of Cabinda), Luanda, Benguela (cities of Benguela, Lobito and Catumbela), Lunda Norte (cities of Dundo and Chitato), Huíla (city of Lubango), Namibe and Cunene. Data cited here are preliminary, unofficial data from first six months of survey. c/ The Inquérito sobre a Disposição e Capacidade no Pagamento dos Serviços Sociais Básicos (IDCP) was carried out in Luanda, Uíge, Huambo and Lubango. d/ Data for poorest quartile of population.

WOMEN'S RIGHT TO EQUAL ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES										
Conference goals and targets	Indicators	Country data					Comparative data			
		Source of data	Years	National	Urban	Rural	Source of data	Years	Developing countries	Sub-Saharan Africa
Gender equality in employment [FWCW]	Women's % share of civil service employment	MAPESS	1998	40						
	Women's % share of *técnicos superiores* in civil service	MAPESS	1998	27						
	Women's % share of employment in formal sector	IPCVD	1995		Luanda 33.0					
	Women's % share of employment in informal sector	IPCVD	1995		Luanda 63.5					
	Labour force participation ratio (ratio of percentages of women and men who are economically active)	IPCVD	1995		Luanda 0.99		WDI	1999		0.7

RIGHT TO A CLEAN, HEALTHY AND SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT								
Conference goals and targets	Indicators	Country data			Comparative data			
		Source of data	Years	Data	Source of data	Years	Developing countries	Sub-Saharan Africa
Implement national strategies for sustainable development by 2005 so as to reverse the loss of environmental resources by 2015 [Rio+5; MDG]	Arable land per capita (hectares)	MINADER/FAO	1997	0.4-0.6	WDI	1996-98		0.25
	Forest area as % of total land area	MINADER/FAO	1997	18.5	WDI	2000		27.3
	Nationally protected areas as % of total land area	Min. Pescas e Ambiente	2001	6.5	WDI	1999		6.2
	Population density (inhabitants per sq km)	INE	2001	11.1	WDI	1999		27
	% of households using wood or charcoal for cooking	IPCVD MINADER/FAO	1995 1997	Urban areas[a] 15.0 Rural areas[b] 99.4	HDR	1997	16.7	62.9
	% of households using woodfuel for lighting	IRD	2000/2001	10.8[c]				

a/ Data from the Inquérito Prioritário sobre as Condições de Vida aos Domicílios (IPCVD), carried out in the cities of Cabinda, Luanda, Benguela, Lobito, Catumbela, Lubango and Luena. b/ Data from the Inquérito aos Agregados Rurais, carried out in Cabinda, Bengo, Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, Benguela, Huambo, Namibe, Huíla and Cunene. c/ The Inquérito aos Agregados Familiares sobre Despesas e Receitas (IDR) was carried out in Cabinda (city of Cabinda), Luanda, Benguela (cities of Benguela, Lobito and Catumbela), Lunda Norte (cities of Dundo and Chitato), Huíla (city of Lubango), Namibe and Cunene.

D. RIGHT TO PROTECTION

RIGHT OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE				
Conference goals and targets	Indicators	Source of data	Year	Data
Effective legal framework, law enforcement and access to justice [WCHR]	% of municipalities with functioning municipal courts	OAA	February 2001	7.3
	Prisoners awaiting trial as % of total prison population	Ministry of Interior	April 2001	69
	Judges per 100,000 population	Ministry of Justice	January 2001	0.7
	Public prosecutors per 100,000 population	Ministry of Justice	January 2001	1.4
	Lawyers per 100,000 population	OAA	February 2001	4.0

CHILDREN'S RIGHT TO PROTECTION						
Conference goals and targets	**Indicators**	**Source of data**	**Year**	**National**	**Urban**	**Rural**
Protection of children in especially difficult circumstances, particularly in situations of armed conflict [WSC]	% of children registered at birth	MICS	2001	29	34	19
	% of children 0-17 with disabilities	MICS	1996 2001	1.3	1.0	1.4
	% of children who are orphans (of both parents)	MICS	1996 2001	1.6 1.3		
	% of children aged 10-14 working	IDR	2000/2001		23[a] of which: Unpaid family work 88 Self-employment 10 Private sector 2	
		MICS	2001	Paid work 4[b] Unpaid family work in agriculture or trade 29[b] Total, incl others 41[b]		
	% of children aged 5-14 working	MICS	2001	Paid work 3[b] Unpaid family work in agriculture or trade 20[b] Total, incl others 30[b]	Paid work 3 Unpaid family work in agriculture or trade 15 Total, incl others 25	Paid work 2[b] Unpaid family work in agriculture or trade 34[b] Total, incl others 42[b]

a/ IDR sample was 90% urban. b/ Survey carried out in accessible areas.

E. RIGHT TO PARTICIPATION

RIGHT TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION						
Conference goals and targets	**Indicators**	**Source of data**	**Presidential**	**Parliamentary**	**Provincial**	**Municipal**
Free and fair elections and democratic government [WCHR, MDG]	Date of last free and fair elections		1992	1992	Never	Never
	No. of free and fair multi-party elections held since independence (1975)		1	1	0	0
	Length of mandate of elected state offices (years)	Constitution	5	4		

WOMEN'S RIGHT TO EQUAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION								
Conference goals and targets	**Indicators**	**Country data**			**Comparative data**			
		Source of data	**Years**	**National**	**Source of data**	**Years**	**Developing countries**	**Sub-Saharan Africa**
Equitable access to political institutions	% of women in ministerial and vice-ministerial posts	National Assembly	2002	15	WDI	1998		7
	% of female deputies in National Assembly	GURN	2002	16				
	% of female provincial governors and vice-governors	GURN	2002	0				
	% of female municipal administrators	GURN	2002	0				

RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION AND TO RECEIVE AND IMPART INFORMATION										
Conference goals and targets	**Indicators**	**Country data**					**Comparative data**			
		Source of data	**Years**	**National**	**Urban**	**Rural**	**Source of data**	**Years**	**Developing countries**	**Sub-Saharan Africa**
Freedom of expression [WCHR]	No. of media not owned by the state:									
	Daily printed press	Ministério da Comunicação Social	2001	0						
	Weekly printed press		2001	7						
	National radio stations		2001	0						
	Local radio stations		2001	5						
	TV stations		2001	0						
	Daily newspaper circulation per 1,000 population	Jornal de Angola	2001	9			WDI	1996		12
	Ownership of radio sets per 1,000 population	MICS	1996	71[a]	110[a]	47[a]	SOWC	1997	245	199
	Ownership of TV sets per 1,000 population	MICS	1996	19[a]	47[a]	2[a]	SOWC	1997	157	47

a/ Figures based on MICS data on ownership of radio and TV sets per household, assuming that no households have more than one radio set and TV. Households' ownership of radios was 32.6% national, 50.7% urban and 21.8% rural. Households' ownership of TV sets was 8.6% national, 21.6% urban and 0.9% rural.

F. DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS

	Source	Unit	Year	Data
Total population and growth rate				
Estimated total population	INE	million	2000 2001 2002 Proj. 2010	13.4 13.8 14.2 18.1
Population growth rate	INE	%	2001	3.0
Life expectancy				
Life expectancy at birth	MICS	Years	1996	Overall 42.4 Male 40.7 Female 44.2
Fertility, birth and death rates				
Total fertility rate (no. of children born per woman during lifetime at prevailing age-specific fertility rates)	MICS	No.	2001	7.1
Crude birth rate (annual no. of births per 1,000 population)	UN	No.	2000-2005	51
Crude death rate (annual no. of deaths per 1,000 population)	UN	No.	2000-2005	19
Population age structure				
% of population 0-14	INE	%	2001	45.0
% of population 15-64	INE	%	2001	52.0
% of population 65+	INE	%	2001	3.0
Dependency ratio (population 0-14 and 65+ as % of population 15-64)	INE	%	2001	92.3
Urbanization				
% of population living in urban areas	INE	%	1960 (census) 1970 (census) 1990 (est.) 2001 (est.)	11 14 37 60
Estimated % of population living in city of Luanda	INE	%	1960 (census) 1970 (census) 1983 (est.) 2000 (est.)	5 8 11 22
Population displacement				
Total reported number of IDPs (since end 1992)	OCHA	million	Dec 2001	4.1
Total reported number of IDPs (since Jan 1998)	OCHA	million	Dec 2001	3.5
Total confirmed number of IDPs (since Jan 1998)	OCHA	million	Dec 2001	1.3
Number of IDPs in camps	OCHA	1,000	Dec 2001	335
Number of IDPs resettled	OCHA	1,000	Jan-Dec 2001	383
Number of Angolan refugees in neighbouring countries	UNHCR	1,000	Dec 2001	457

G. ECONOMIC INDICATORS

	Unit	1996	1997	1998	1999	Preliminary	
						2000	2001
Gross domestic product (GDP)							
GDP at current market prices	$ million	6,423	7,675	6,445	6,088	8,864	9,472
GDP per capita	$	494	590	495	468	661	686
Real GDP growth	%	11.2	7.9	6.8	3.3	3.0	3.2
Oil sector	%	10.4	4.7	3.5	1.0	0.4	-1.0
Non-oil sector	%	12.2	12.3	9.8	4.8	6.8	9.6
Shares in GDP							
Oil sector	%	58.0	47.9	37.8	58.7	60.6	53.6
Non-oil sector	%	42.0	52.1	62.2	41.3	39.5	46.4
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries	%	7.1	9.0	13.0	6.4	5.8	8.0
Diamonds	%	3.4	4.3	5.4	8.2	6.4	5.8
Trade and commerce	%	15.0	16.2	19.3	15.1	14.5	15.6
Non-tradable services	%	8.3	11.8	10.6	4.9	6.9	9.6
Manufacturing	%	3.5	4.4	6.3	3.5	2.9	3.8
Production of selected commodities							
Crude petroleum	1,000 b/d	681	713	739	746	748	740
Diamonds (recorded exports)	1,000 carats	918	1,417	2,716	3,806	4,313	
Cereals	1,000 tons	500	431	594	530	500	577
Balance of payments							
Merchandise exports fob	$ million	5,169	5,066	3,491	5,225	7,885	6,704
Merchandise imports fob	$ million	2,040	2,597	2,079	3,109	3,147	3,325
Current account balance	$ million	-249	-953	-2,039	-1,562	885	-252
Current account balance/GDP	%	-5.0	-12.4	-31.6	-25.7	10.0	-2.7
Foreign direct investment (net)	$ million	588	412	1,114	2,471	878	1,347
Overall balance of payments	$ million	2,150	-809	-1,385	-152	6	-924
International reserves, external debt and ODA							
Gross international reserves	$ million	558	396	203	496	1,198	732
Import cover	months	3.3	1.8	1.2	1.9	4.6	2.6
Medium & long term external debt	$ million	9,666	9,589	9,776	11,252	10,541	
as % of exports of goods and services	%	156	180	268	208	128	
Oil guaranteed debt	$ million				4,550	4,986	
Public external debt service (due) as % of exports	%	34	36	71	45	39	47
External payment arrears	$ million	2,528	3,254	4,224	5,043	5,562	
Net ODA receipts	$ million	473	355	335	388		
Net ODA receipts per capita	$	40	29	27	30		
Net ODA receipts as % of GDP	%	12	8	8	16		
Public finance							
Total revenue	$ million	2,929	3,094	2,034	2,852	4,586	3,938
Total revenue/GDP	%	44.8	40.3	31.6	46.8	51.7	41.1
Oil taxes share of total revenue	%	89.7	84.9	74.1	87.8	89.3	80.5
Total expenditure/GDP	%	64.1	64.7	42.8	82.6	60.7	48.6
Social sector share of recorded, classified expenditure	%		25.5	13.8	9.1	31.0	
Overall budget balance (commitment basis) as % of GDP	%	-19.3	-24.4	-11.3	-35.7	-9.0	-7.5
Prices and exchange rates							
Consumer price inflation, Luanda (annual, December)	%	1,651	148	135	329	268	116
Average oil export price	$ per barrel	20.4	18.6	11.9	17.6	27.1	22.9
Official exchange rate	Kz per $[a]	0.13	0.23	0.39	2.84	10.03	21.60
Parallel exchange rate	Kz per $[a]	0.17	0.30	0.61	3.16	10.56	23.46
Exchange rate spread	%	29	32	56	37	5	9

a/ The kwanza reajustado (Kzr) was replaced by the kwanza (Kz) in December 1999, at Kz1 = Kzr1 million. Data prior to that date have been converted to kwanzas.

Sources: IMF; FAO/WFP, 2001; OECD, Development Assistance Committee, Creditor Reporting System.

Annex 2
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