by David Martin and Phyllis Johnson
The will of the international community to support democracy and peace is being tested in southern Africa at present, as two countries face serious threats to national unity.
Democratic elections were held a month ago in Angola. The unanimous verdict of the international community, including the United Nations and the United States, was that the polling was “free and fair”. Yet the main opposition group, Unita, refuses to accept that verdict.
Unita has pulled out of the joint national army and its leader, Jonas Savimbi, has withdrawn from the capital to the southern city of Huambo for “security reasons”.
Unita, which won a third of the parliamentary seats, mostly in the south, remains heavily armed despite the peace agreement signed last year at Bicesse in Portugal.
The peace has allowed Unita forces to gain effective control of some cities and towns that it had not managed to take during 16 years of war. In flagrant violation of the peace accord. Unita has refused to allow civil administration into 55 rural administrative areas under its control.
The incumbent Angolan leader, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, fell just short of the overall majority required for a first round victory in the presidential election. Savimbi has so far refused to allow the second round of polling and now demands that the entire parliamentary election be redone.
Despite various public offers to mediate, the international community seems unable or unwilling to take action that will allow a democratically elected government to be sworn into office.
The countries that brokered the peace agreement and sit on the joint political-military commission -Portugal, the United States and Russia — have given lip service to democracy in Angola but have taken no serious action since the elections to seek its implementation.
There are very real fears that every day of delay increases the spectre of partition of the war-weary country.
The scenario in Angola has serious implications for Mozambique, which has just begun a peace process leading to elections in a year’s time.
The leader of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR or Renamo). Afonso Dhlakama, is saying -as Savimbi said only a few weeks ago — that he will accept the results of elections even if he does not win.
Yet, before the ink was dry on the peace agreement. Renamo was infiltrating well-equipped reinforcements in crisp new uniforms into the north of the country.
The reason for the delay in signing the Mozambique ceasefire agreement in Rome (originally scheduled for 1 October) has now become apparent in light of the new offensive by Renamo.
Under a plan coordinated by General Mateus Ngonhamo, Renamo had planned to infiltrate freshly trained and equipped forces through Malawi before the scheduled ceasefire date. The new troops had been trained in Kenya.
Their mission was to seize as many district capitals as possible so they could claim that these areas were theirs when the ceasefire was signed. The district towns targeted were Ulongwe and Mutarara in Tete province, Milange and Mocuba in Zambezia province, Ribaue and Angoche in Nampula province.
A successful offensive would have enabled Renamo to declare a military “belt” and announce the seizure and administration of the northern part of the Mozambique, thereby cutting the country in half. The plan also envisaged the seizure of two to four districts in the south in Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo provinces.
The offensive bore considerable similarities to the 1986 invasion of Mozambique from Malawi, which had the same intent, to sever the country and capture at least one northern port for resupply via sea routes from South Africa.
However, due to logistical difficulties, the arrival in Mozambique of the fresh Renamo forces was delayed. At the same time, international pressure made it impossible for them to delay any further the signing of the agreement in Rome. This was finally signed on 4 October to the embarrassment of General Ngonhamo who felt his plans had been compromised.
General Ngonhamo is formerly Renamo’s head of intelligence. Some four months ago he was appointed commander for the south, following the death of General Gomes who was killed in a government attack. But Ngonhamo never took up his post in the south, remaining in Malawi where he has close links with that country’s intelligence service.
Ngonhamo is known to be one of the commanders who strongly opposed the Rome accord, arguing that Renamo had been fighting to shoot its way into power and not to negotiate. One of those who supported him in this was Renamo’s chief negotiator in Rome, Raul Domingos, who believed his position within the movement was being weakened.
While initial signs indicated that the ceasefire was working fairly well, with hungry Renamo forces contacting the authorities for food, indications of serious breaches began to occur from 11 October. There were two attacks on government forces on that day, one in the north of the country and one in the south.
On 17 October — the anniversary of the death in 1979 of Renamo’s first commander, Andre Matsangaisse — the real offensive began. Renamo forces attacked and overran the district capital of Maganja da Costa in Zambezia province.
On 19 October, after two abortive attacks during the morning, they occupied parts of the port of Angoche in Narnpula province.
About 40 government soldiers, who had withdrawn into barracks in compliance with the ceasefire agreement, were killed in this attack and the garrison commander was wounded.
Next to fall were the district capitals of Memba (another port) in Narnpula, also on 19 October, and Luzela in Zambezia province the following day.
At about the same time, word was sent to the Zambezia provincial capital, Quelimane, saying Renamo would seize the city the following Thursday (22 October). Dhlakama, according to locals, was scheduled to arrive in Quelimane after the city was seized. Whether this was a serious plan, or simply scare tactics, is not known.
There were some strong indications of impending military movement in the centre of the country. One hint came in late September with reports of the Malawi intelligence service surveying the border inside the country looking for infiltration routes. This was not unexpected, in advance of the signing of the ceasefire agreement.
On 17 October, a plane chartered by USAID landed at Maganja da Costa, not realising the town had been taken by Renamo. Passengers on the plane reported they were surrounded by 150 to 200 men dressed in brand new uniforms, carrying sophisticated communications equipment and armed with light machineguns.
Two hours later, the plane and passengers were allowed to depart after orders for their release were received from the main Renamo base area at Gorongosa.
On 22 October, a government commando unit landed at Angoche and regained control of the town. Some Renamo soldiers were captured others were killed and the rest fled. Government forces regained control of Memba a few days later, after Domingos announced that Renamo had “withdrawn”.
The United Nations military observers in the country at the time numbered 20. This was not even enough to monitor the 49 assembly points (29 for government forces. 20 for Renamo) where military men were supposed to begin gathering from 21 October.
The observers planned to split into three groups, based in Maputo, Beira and Nampula, cities a very great distance apart. The small numbers and the delay in reaching Beira and Nampula, meant that the timetable established in the peace agreement could not be adhered to, a point acknowledged by the Aldo Ajello an Italian who heads the United Nations observer mission.
The UN group stated that they cannot help to establish the ceasefire, and that it must be established by the belligerents before they can observe it.
The number of fresh Renamo forces infiltrated after the ceasefire was signed is presently put at 1,500, or two battalions, and the number could be higher.
Apart from these serious breaches of the ceasefire through military action, Renamo has also committed two further breaches of the Rome accord. Tuesday, 20 October, was the deadline to announce the location of the 20 assembly points where their forces would gather. But they have not done so.
Renamo officials also stalled their arrival in Maputo to join the ceasefire monitoring commission, refusing to accept the accommodation offered by government. Fust they refused to accept hotel accommodation, and then insisted that the standard of housing was inadequate.
There seems to be little pressure from the international community to keep the peace process on track, although the Political Committee (EPC) of the European community bas sent two messages to Renamo urging them to comply ·with the ceasefire agreement. (SARDC)
