by Phyllis Johnson
As Laurent Kabila’s forces sweep through eastern Zaire, a new perspective is emerging on his objectives, tactics and allies.
This perspective is viewed in the context of classic “liberation” army tactics, rather than a “rebel” force, similar to the conflicts that brought ‘to power the current governments in Uganda in 1986 and Rwanda in 1994.
Kabila’s forces are moving through eastern Zaire in the traditional manner described by the former
Chinese leader, Mao Tse Dong, as “fish through water”: through a very receptive countryside and taking towns with support from a publicly enthusiastic citizenry. This is reminiscent also of tactics used in liberation wars in southern Africa.
Expatriates in eastern Zaire, mainly Belgian nationals, report an improvement in conditions. For the mining conglomerates which have lucrative contracts in the area, it is better than “business as usual”, with the prevailing peace and the removal of the corrupt officials and ill-disciplined soldiers.
By all accounts to date, the “rebel” forces are polite and treat the population well. The population’s response is not particularly surprising since they have been suffering for many years from an oppressive, ill-disciplined, and under-paid Zairean army.
Reports from Zaire’s third largest city, Kisangani, say that the government soldiers chased away their Serb mercenary allies, because the soldiers themselves did not want to fight for the city. They said they are being paid too little to risk their lives, that they just wanted to loot what they could and get out of town, away from an unsympathetic public.
There are apparently no new refugees being generated, and Kabila’s forces have not pursued the existing Rwandan refugees, who have been in the area for some time and who include Hutu members of Interahamwe, some of whom had previously been fighting on the side of the national army.
It is becoming clear that, far from destabilizing the area, the situation in the eastern part of the country is being stabilized.
This follows more than 30 years of instability under the rule of Marshal Mobuto Sese Seko, whose regime was noted for massive corruption and chronic underdevelopment
It is also becoming clear that this is a well-organized offensive that has been in the planning for some time, by an alliance of opposition forces in Zaire supported by Uganda and Rwanda, and perhaps indirectly by others. South Africa, whose arms manufacturing industry is parastatal, has been supplying arms, ammunition and heavy equipment to Uganda and Rwanda for some time.
The philosophy of President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda can be identified in the tactics, behaviour and training of Kabila’s forces, which are similar to those used by Museveni’s National
Resistance Army (NRA) when it seized power in Uganda in 1986.
This strategy was used again when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) moved out of their bases in Uganda and seized power in Rwanda in 1994. General Paul Kagame, now the Vice·President and Defense Minister of Rwanda, was the intelligence chief of Museveni’s NRA in Uganda before leaving to head the RPF army’s takeover oi Rwanda.
The pattern seems to be repeating itself in eastern Zaire; and if it is taken one step further, it also resembles the earlier removal of the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin in 1979, by a combined force of
Ugandan “rebels” and the Tanzanian army.
When Amin invaded Tanzania in 1978, the army fought him back, but when the turbulence continued, the Tanzanian government decided it would not be secure until he was gone. Museveni appears to have made a similar decision regarding Mobutu.
This would suggest that the objective of the opposition forces is the capital, Kinshasa.
There is little to stop them in evidence so far except the onset of the rainy season in East Africa, which makes bush roads impassable and leaves the Zaire River as the main artery of transport.
Kinshasa is 1500 km away by river, but there are other options such as air transport to neighbouring Congo.
The Kabila forces have shown a very deliberate policy of securing the borders, starting with
Uganda’s border with Zaire in the north, across which Ugandan rebels were quite successfully destabilizing the Ugandan government
The Kabila forces and their allies now control Zaire`s borders with Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi,
Tanzania, and are working on securing the borders with Zambia and Angola.
The latter two countries border on Zaire’s Shaba province, (formerly Katanga); and at least two towns have been taken. One is a port on Lake Tanganyika (presumably to secure arms supply) and the other is a town on the Zambian border.
There can be little doubt that the Katangan exiles from Angola are fighting in their home province. They have been in exile for over 30 years since their attempted secession in the 1960s, and they made two unsuccessful attempts to re-take the province in the late 1970s.
This and other armed opposition, including Kabila himself, have been confronting Mobutu by various means ever since he took power in the 1960s.
Mobutu’s past must be taken into account, therefore, and also his record in power. He stashed away billions of dollars in foreign bank accounts, while the population of the mineral-rich country lived in extreme poverty. He was aided in this by solid support of various US governments and their intelligence agency, which no longer needs him now that the Cold War is over.
No one in the region and few in Zaire are going to shed tears at his departure because Zaire has been a very real source of instability for neighbouring countries.
Finally, however, the curtain may come down on the 1960s drama of the Belgian Congo after the historical last act in Zaire. (SARDC)
